







Year : 2019 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND THE 









Iurchenko Denis, 2019, THREE ESSAYS ON EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND THE 
DIGITALIZATION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 
 
Originally published at : Thesis, University of Lausanne 
 
Posted at the University of Lausanne Open Archive http://serval.unil.ch 




L'Université de Lausanne attire expressément l'attention des utilisateurs sur le fait que tous les 
documents publiés dans l'Archive SERVAL sont protégés par le droit d'auteur, conformément à la 
loi fédérale sur le droit d'auteur et les droits voisins (LDA). A ce titre, il est indispensable d'obtenir 
le consentement préalable de l'auteur et/ou de l’éditeur avant toute utilisation d'une oeuvre ou 
d'une partie d'une oeuvre ne relevant pas d'une utilisation à des fins personnelles au sens de la 
LDA (art. 19, al. 1 lettre a). A défaut, tout contrevenant s'expose aux sanctions prévues par cette 
loi. Nous déclinons toute responsabilité en la matière. 
 
Copyright 
The University of Lausanne expressly draws the attention of users to the fact that all documents 
published in the SERVAL Archive are protected by copyright in accordance with federal law on 
copyright and similar rights (LDA). Accordingly it is indispensable to obtain prior consent from the 
author and/or publisher before any use of a work or part of a work for purposes other than 
personal use within the meaning of LDA (art. 19, para. 1 letter a). Failure to do so will expose 
offenders to the sanctions laid down by this law. We accept no liability in this respect.
FACULTÉ DES HAUTES ÉTUDES COMMERCIALES 
DÉPARTEMENT STRATÉGIE, GLOBALISATION ET SOCIÉTÉ 
THREE ESSAYS ON EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND 
THE DIGITALIZATION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL 
FINANCE 
THÈSE DE DOCTORAT 
présentée à la 
Faculté des Hautes Études Commerciales 
de l'Université de Lausanne 
pour l’obtention du grade de 
Docteur ès Sciences Économiques, mention « Management » 
par 
Denis IURCHENKO 
Directeur de thèse 
Prof. Jeffrey Petty 
Jury 
Prof. Rafael Lalive, président 
Prof. Guido Palazzo, expert interne 
Prof. Tatiana Manolova, experte externe 












FACULTÉ DES HAUTES ÉTUDES COMMERCIALES 
 





THREE ESSAYS ON EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND 





THÈSE DE DOCTORAT 
 
présentée à la 
 
Faculté des Hautes Études Commerciales 
de l'Université de Lausanne 
 
 
pour l’obtention du grade de 









Directeur de thèse 





Prof. Rafael Lalive, président 
Prof. Guido Palazzo, expert interne 
Prof. Tatiana Manolova, experte externe 







Members of the thesis committee 
 
 
Prof. Jeffrey Petty 
Professor of Entrepreneurship, Academic Director of EMBA, University of Lausanne 
Thesis supervisor 
 
Prof. Guido Palazzo 
Professor of Business Ethics, Vice-Dean of Programmes, Student Affairs and Executive Education, 
University of Lausanne 
Internal member of the thesis committee 
 
Prof. Tatiana Manolova 
Professor of Management, Bentley University 
External member of the thesis committee 
 
Prof. Jörn Block 
Professor of Management, University of Trier and Erasmus University Rotterdam 




University of Lausanne 
Faculty of Business and Economics 
Ph.D. in Economics 
Subject area “Management” 
I hereby certify that I have examined the doctoral thesis of 
Denis IURCHENKO 
and have found it to meet the requirements for a doctoral thesis. 
All revisions that I or committee members 
made during the doctoral colloquium 
have been addressed to my entire satisfaction. 
Signature:  ____________________________   Date:  _________________ 
Prof. Jeffrey PETTY 
Thesis supervisor 
23 May 2019
    
University of Lausanne 
Faculty of Business and Economics 
 
 
Ph.D. in Economics 














and have found it to meet the requirements for a doctoral thesis. 
All revisions that I or committee members 
made during the doctoral colloquium 










Prof. Guido PALAZZO 
















Foremost, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis advisor Professor Jeffrey 
Petty for his wholehearted support of me and my research at all stages of the Ph.D. program. 
His patient guidance, useful critiques, and the willingness to always find time for me have 
been very much appreciated. I could not have imagined having a more dedicated and reliable 
advisor and mentor for my Ph.D. study. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my committee members – Professors Guido Palazzo, 
Tatiana Manolova, and Jörn Block – for their encouragement, insightful comments, and 
thought-provoking questions. My special thanks are extended to Professors Palazzo and 
Manolova for their help with the academic job search process. 
I would also like to thank my fellow Ph.D. colleagues and friends, especially Morten 
Aaltvedt, Aurélien Feix, Thomas Fischer, and Moritz Gruban for the stimulating discussions 
and the words of encouragement throughout my study. 
Last but not least, I would like to express my very great appreciation to my wife, Aleksandra, 
for encouraging, inspiring, and believing in me, as well as to my mother, grandmother, aunt 
Lyuda, and mother-in-law, for their unfailing support, warmth, and approval. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE – Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER TWO – Democratization Makes Strange Bedfellows: The Legalization of Equity 
Crowdfunding ........................................................................................................................... 11 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 11 
Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 15 
Methods ........................................................................................................................ 23 
Findings ........................................................................................................................ 26 
Discussion .................................................................................................................... 35 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER THREE – The Diffusion of Equity Crowdfunding Across the Globe .................. 44 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 44 
Literature review .......................................................................................................... 47 
Methods ........................................................................................................................ 53 
Data analysis and initial findings ................................................................................. 55 
Discursive themes ........................................................................................................ 60 
Discussion .................................................................................................................... 70 
Contributions ................................................................................................................ 73 
Conclusions and further research ................................................................................. 77 
CHAPTER FOUR – Responding to the Crowd: How Online Investor – Entrepreneur 
Discussions Inform Equity Crowdfunding Decisions .............................................................. 79 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 79 
Literature review .......................................................................................................... 82 
Hypotheses development .............................................................................................. 88 
ii 
Methodology ................................................................................................................ 93 
Results .......................................................................................................................... 99 
Discussion .................................................................................................................. 102 
CHAPTER FIVE – Conclusion .............................................................................................. 108 
Theoretical contributions ............................................................................................ 108 
Implications for practice ............................................................................................. 110 
Limitations ................................................................................................................. 113 
Further research .......................................................................................................... 114 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 116 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 131 
iii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Organizing framework for research on Equity crowdfunding/overview of main 
themes .................................................................................................................................... 131 
Table 2. Timeline of the main events in the US related to the emergence and legalization 
of equity crowdfunding .......................................................................................................... 132 
Table 3. Categories and related coding scheme .………………………………………….... 133 
Table 4. Coding frequencies, grouped by stakeholder …...……………………………….... 134 
Table 5. Summary table with illustrative quotes ....…………………………….…………... 135 
Table 6. Overview of newspaper articles …………………………………………………... 137 
Table 7. Overview of government documents …………………………………................... 137 
Table 8. Country-level data …...………………………………............................................. 138 
Table 9. Overview of the main events during the legal acceptance process ……………...... 139 
Table 10. Process of regulatory acceptance of equity crowdfunding ……...…………......... 140 
Table 11. Narratives on competitiveness across countries ……………………..................... 140 
Table 12. Coding frequencies, grouped by stakeholder ………….…………………............ 140 
Table 13. Overview of equity crowdfunding platforms` features ……...………………....... 141 
Table 14. Main coding categories with illustrative quotes ……...……………….................. 142 
Table 15. Summary of discussion themes, grouped by campaign stage ……………............ 143 
Table 16. T-test of the (in-) equality of distribution of different topics across campaign 
stages ...................................................................................................................................... 143 
Table 17. Summary statistics ……...……………….............................................................. 143 
Table 18. Correlation matrix ………….…………………..................................................... 144 
Table 19. Regression coefficients for Model I (funds raised) ……...………………............. 145 
Table 20. Regression coefficients for Model II (number of investors)................................... 146 
iv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Visual map of the equity crowdfunding field …………………………………..... 148 
Figure 2. Overview of main themes in the discourse ………………………………............. 149 
Figure 3. Daily discussion frequencies ………………………………….............................. 150 
Figure 4. The distribution of discussion topics over the course of campaigns …………….. 150 
Table 21. Regression coefficients for Model III (funding rate) .……...………………......... 147 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE – Introduction 
Since its emergence in the late 2000-s, platform-based, online crowdfunding has 
become a prominent source of funding for a rich variety of initiatives. In general, online 
crowdfunding may be described as “a novel method for funding a variety of new ventures, 
allowing individual founders of for-profit, cultural, or social projects to request funding from 
many individuals, often in return for future products or equity” (Mollick, 2014, p. 1). Projects 
funded on crowdfunding platforms range from charitable in nature donations for a good cause 
to business ventures with a potential to yield a return on investment. Thus far, the reward-
based form of crowdfunding, whereby backers may receive a nonfinancial reward (e.g., an 
advertised product) in return for their financial contributions (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 
Schwienbacher, 2013) has attracted most of the public attention. Some of the ventures posted 
on Kickstarter – leading reward-based crowdfunding platform – such as Exploding Kittens 
(card game) or BauBax (jacket for travelers) were unlikely to be funded by professional 
investors. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs behind these and related ideas managed to generate 
media coverage and successfully transform customer awareness into financial contributions 
totaling above $5 million. Despite the tremendous success of a small number of ventures, they 
remain outliers. As few as 0.214% of all successfully funded Kickstarter campaigns raise $1 
million or above, whereas only one-third of all projects that reached their goals attracted more 
than $10,000 (Kickstarter, 2019). While this may be a substantial amount for pre-seed stage 
startups, the benefits of a $10,000 fundraising campaign for a more mature company are 
somewhat questionable. 
Moreover, this type of crowdfunding is entirely suitable for B2C ventures that may 
secure support from the general public by offering some tangible rewards. However, reward-
based crowdfunding offers fewer opportunities for high potential but specialized startups as 
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well as for those targeting the B2C sector. Finally, although a reward-based crowdfunding 
campaign may serve as a valuable market test and provide much useful feedback from 
potential customers, the crowd is unlikely to offer any professional advice. Unlike venture 
capitalists (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Hellmann & Puri, 2002), “hands-on” investors “who 
carefully select the investment projects they are proposed (Sahlman, 1988, 1990) and remain 
deeply involved in those projects after investment is realized” (Casamatta, 2003, p. 2059), an 
average backer of a Kickstarter campaign lacks both expertise and incentives to help an 
entrepreneur develop his or her business strategy or find potential investors for the next round.  
More recently, equity crowdfunding, a more commercial form of crowdfunding, 
whereby the crowd “takes an equity stake in the business in much the same way VC funding 
works” (Vulkan, Åstebro, & Sierra, 2016, p. 37), has firmly established as an alternative 
solution for entrepreneurs seeking both flexibility and swiftness of online fundraising as well 
as a considerable amount of funding historically associated with professional investors. For 
example, in 2017, the average successful campaign advertised on Crowdcube – leading equity 
crowdfunding platform – raised as much as £692,000 ($900,000), and the most funded in 
2017 campaign (restaurant chain Vita Mojo) attracted £3.2 million ($4.16 million) 
(Crowdcube, 2017). The results of this study indicate that the least funded, successful 
campaign posted on Crowdcube between September 2017 and September 2018 managed to 
attract as much as £54,600 ($71,000), which is substantially higher than most reward-based 
Kickstarter projects ever raise. Consequently, equity-based crowdfunding is suitable for a 
wider concerning both industry and maturity spectrum of companies.  
 Two other significant aspects differentiate equity crowdfunding from other forms of 
online fundraising in a fundamental way. First, because equity crowdfunding provides an 
opportunity to receive a return on investment, it is becoming increasingly attractive for 
professional investors (Schwienbacher, 2018). In some cases, professional investors 
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participate on equal footing with the crowd (e.g., Crowdcube, Seedrs), in others, deals are pre-
selected by business angels – private individuals who, in contrast to VCs, often invest in a 
wide variety of projects and industries, thus increasing the scope of potentially qualified deals 
(Shane, 2009) – and VCs (Syndicate Room). Second, equity crowdfunding involves selling 
securities of companies in the form of equity, debt, or convertible note. Therefore, equity 
crowdfunding falls within the purview of securities laws and requires regulatory approval. 
Overall, equity crowdfunding is a multidimensional concept, which uniquely combines 
properties of traditional, professional equity funding as well as more recent, amateur Internet-
based fundraising.  
These unique characteristics of equity crowdfunding described above, as well as its 
increasing role in entrepreneurial ecosystems, have generated considerable interest from 
entrepreneurship scholars (Block, Colombo, Cumming, & Vismara, 2018; Mochkabadi & 
Volkmann, 2018). Recently, researchers have acquired insights into the impact of selected 
campaign characteristics (e.g., team quality, equity retention) on funding success (Ahlers, 
Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015; Piva & Rossi-Lamastra, 2018). Nonetheless, several 
unresolved issues warrant further investigation. To start with, the continued existence of 
equity crowdfunding markets fundamentally depends upon regulatory approval. The existing 
crowdfunding literature, however, only skimmed the surface of how government policy 
shapes crowdfunding markets (Cumming, Vanacker, & Zahra, 2019; Johan, Cumming, & 
Zhang, 2018). Numerous studies offer a detailed legal analysis of crowdfunding legislation in 
different countries (Horváthová, 2018). Yet, the comprehensive understanding regarding how 
crowdfunding policies and regulations are enacted, why they are so rapidly disseminated 
across the globe, and how these processes are shaped by the public discourse and interests of 
key stakeholders is still not available. 
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The global character of the pro-crowdfunding reforms as well as their rapid diffusion 
across the globe despite the apparent lack of strong corporate backers highlights a marked 
difference between equity crowdfunding and other financial innovations (e.g., Funk & 
Hirschman, 2014). Another sharp distinction of the legalization of equity crowdfunding from 
previous regulatory changes such as the amendments to the “Prudent Man” Rule in 1979 is 
the former`s prominence in public discourse. Previously, security regulations used to be 
discussed behind closed doors among a narrow circle of investors and government officials. 
The legalization of equity crowdfunding has been a more dynamic and multistakeholder 
process. Suddenly, securities regulations – a highly specialized topic – were featured in 
national newspapers and other public media. In the United States, the regulatory reform that 
also contained special provisions on equity crowdfunding was a part of a nationwide, the 
JOBS Act political campaign spearheaded by the incumbent President Barack Obama. Equity 
crowdfunding was described as a possible remedy against unemployment, and thus its swift 
legalization was a public interest issue. Across the globe, the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding has not faced a fierce opposition from incumbent players – professional 
investors, which makes a stark contrast to the normative view on industry change (Ingram & 
Rao, 2004; Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007). This mutual tolerance and, sometimes, 
collaboration between established actors and new market entrants is an exciting phenomenon 
calling for further investigation. Overall, studying the legalization process of equity 
crowdfunding across several countries may lead to numerous surprising findings that may be 
generalizable for other emerging industries, in particular, for those based on a broader 
community of users such as recent sharing economy innovations.  
Another promising avenue of research is related to the core principle of crowdfunding 
– the wisdom of the crowd (Surowiecki, 2004). In its literal sense, this means that, taken 
together, all individuals should be making rational funding decisions. Indeed, it is vital that 
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the increasing number of unprofessional investors arrive at informed funding decisions and 
back productive entrepreneurship. Emerging evidence indicates that in some circumstances 
this may be the case. For example, a community of users in a non-commercial context may 
arrive at informed decisions similar to those of experts (Mollick & Nanda, 2016). However, 
the evidence regarding the rationality of decisions in equity crowdfunding is inconclusive 
(e.g., Abrams, 2017). Scholars have demonstrated the strong influence of herding momentums 
on the funding dynamics (Vulkan et al., 2016). However, it is not entirely clear whether this 
behavior is driven by rational factors (Vismara, 2016b).   
The dynamics of an online environment and the one-to-many relationships between 
the entrepreneur and many prospective investors significantly impact the quality and type of 
due diligence, which, in the VC context,  typically includes “confirmation of the nature and 
status of the firm's product, production capability, market demand, and status of key 
relationships with other organizations (Fried & Hisrich, 1994)” (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003, p. 
243), but there is evidence indicating the occurrence of a certain level of vetting. To facilitate 
the selection process, many leading equity crowdfunding platforms adopted discussion forums 
that allow information exchange among prospective investors as well between investors and 
entrepreneurs. Whereas similar online forums serve as an effective reputation mechanism in 
the e-commerce context (Tomboc, 2013), there is a profound lack of understanding of how 
these online discussion platforms impact crowd decision-making in the equity crowdfunding 
context. Since both professional and everyday investors invest on equity crowdfunding 
platforms, I expect that professional investors conduct some form of due diligence. Given the 
time and format constraints imposed by the crowdfunding format on investors, I presume the 
online due diligence to be a quick and straightforward process much unlike the laborious 
approach employed by VCs. However, up until now, we know very little about 
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communication dynamics on equity crowdfunding discussion boards, and what impact, if any, 
it has on crowdfunding decisions.  
Based on the discussion above, I propose two sets of research questions for this 
dissertation. With respect to the legalization process of equity crowdfunding, I ask the 
following research questions: 
• How did the digitalization of entrepreneurial finance affect the relationship between 
traditional capital providers, government actors, and entrepreneurs? 
• How were the (securities) regulations redesigned in light of the digitalization of 
entrepreneurial finance?  
• How did other countries respond to the much-publicized passage of pro-crowdfunding 
regulations in the United States? 
In addition, I pose the following questions with regard to the discussed above investor-
entrepreneur discussion dynamics: 
• How do online discussions between investors and entrepreneurs impact equity 
crowdfunding performance? 
• What are the dynamic and thematic patterns of investor-entrepreneur online 
discussions? 
In general, this study seeks to offer a deeper understanding of the emerging equity 
crowdfunding phenomenon. I focus on two previously unexplored research directions. On the 
industry level, I analyze the emergence and legalization of equity crowdfunding in the United 
States and across four Commonwealth countries – the United Kingdom, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia. To pursue these research directions, I draw on the literature on new 
industry emergence and legalization (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Hiatt & Park, 2013), which have 
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analyzed similar processes in other contexts such as the regulatory approval of peer-to-peer 
ridesharing services in the UK, Netherlands and Egypt (Uzunca, Rigtering, & Ozcan, 2018) or 
regulatory categorization of dietary supplement in the US (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). 
Furthermore, I borrow from the studies of policy diffusion (Henisz, Zelner, & Guillén, 2005; 
Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006) to analyze the adoption of pro-equity crowdfunding rules 
in the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand following the initial campaign for the 
legalization of equity crowdfunding in the United States. On the platform level, I look into 
how communication between an entrepreneur and crowd investors impacts the success and 
performance of equity crowdfunding campaigns. To address this and related research 
questions, I engage with the studies of investor decision making in the domain of 
entrepreneurial finance (Macmillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985; Muzyka, Birley, & Leleux, 
1996) as well as with the broader management literature analyzing the certification effect in 
strategic selection processes (Fernandez, Castilla, & Moore, 2000; Megginson & Weiss, 
1991). Methodologically, I explore the research directions discussed above using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  
Summary 
This chapter established the basis for the dissertation. This study builds upon the 
studies of new industry emergence and legalization, policy diffusion, social movement 
framing theory as well as existing literature on investor decision-making to study equity 
crowdfunding at both industry and platform levels.  
As you may see in Figure 1 and Table 1, the field of equity crowdfunding was 
originally focused on the industry level, but then the center of scholarly attention has shifted 
to the individual and platform levels. Only recently, the industry level of analysis has started 
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to regain prominence. In my dissertation, I combine both levels to analysis to gain a more 
holistic perspective on equity crowdfunding. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
[[Please insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here]] 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Despite perceived differences, the processes of legalization and crowdinvestor 
decision making are both multistakeholder decision-making processes. As I demonstrate in 
this dissertation, the social discourse plays a significant role in both of them. While this study 
uses two different levels of analysis, namely, industry and platform levels, as well as different 
dependent variables – funding decisions and legalization processes – my primary focus 
remains on the decision making processes and social discourse in the equity crowdfunding 
context.  
Equity crowdfunding is a relatively new form of entrepreneurial finance, however, the 
processes of legalization and strategic selection have been well researched in management 
literature. Owing to the explosion of equity crowdfunding activity and proliferation of 
platforms, I am looking into the equity crowdfunding multistakeholder dialogue at two levels. 
In the first two chapters of my dissertation, I analyze the role of discourse in the processes of 
legalization of equity crowdfunding as an industry as well as the diffusion of respective 
policies across the globe; in the third chapter I study the role of discourse in the ultimate 
funding success of equity crowdfunding campaigns. Below I describe the rest of the 
dissertation in more detail. 
Chapter Two analyses the legalization process of equity crowdfunding in the United 
States. Researchers have typically focused on newly implemented crowdfunding regulations 
such as the JOBS Act in the U.S., yet scant attention has been devoted to why and how these 
regulations and policies are being implemented. This study is based on a comprehensive 
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archival dataset consisting of newspaper publications and government documents. I first seek 
to offer a deep understanding of how the social discourse resulting from negotiations between 
several disparate groups contributed to the ultimate legalization of equity crowdfunding. 
Furthermore, I propose that equity crowdfunding has become a public interest issue, and, 
consequently, the regulatory change resulted from the collaboration between multiple 
stakeholders including politicians and entrepreneurs, which is in stark contrast to the 
previously established normative view on industry change.  
Chapter Three further examines how the policies and regulations focused on the 
promotion of equity crowdfunding have diffused from the United States to the United 
Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Based on archival qualitative and statistical 
data, I demonstrate how entrepreneurs and politicians in favor of equity crowdfunding helped 
shape the regulatory environment of this emerging form of entrepreneurial finance. Drawing 
from the results of the qualitative analysis, I identify several conditions that were instrumental 
in the regulatory approval process of equity crowdfunding, such as the complementarity with 
the goals of key stakeholders. Additionally, I try to understand the reasons behind the cross-
country differences in the diffusion processes concerning the timelines of the reforms and the 
patterns of social discourse on equity crowdfunding.  
Chapter Four studies the process of investment due diligence and decision-making – 
the cornerstone of entrepreneurial finance. This chapter is based on live campaign discussions 
sections on of an equity crowdfunding portal over a 1-year window and aggregated 
investment and participation frequencies obtained from InsideTab (crowdfunding database). 
Using mixed-method content analysis, I examine the impact of investor communication on the 
outcome of equity crowdfunding campaigns. The results of this study indicate that discussions 
between investors and entrepreneurs matter for the success of equity crowdfunding and that 
evaluation criteria applied by investors evolve throughout a campaign.  
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Lastly, Chapter Five recapitulates some of the main findings and contributions, as well 
as indicates a few avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO – Democratization Makes Strange Bedfellows: The Legalization of 
Equity Crowdfunding 
ABSTRACT 
The digitalization of entrepreneurial finance has paved the way for new disruptive funding 
models such as platform-based equity crowdfunding. Owing to the interests of several 
disparate groups, the ensuing discourse leading to the ultimate legalization of equity 
crowdfunding has been a dynamic process involving many different stakeholders, which is a 
marked change from the closed-door sessions more commonly associated with securities 
regulations. Based on the analysis of a unique longitudinal dataset, I propose that digital 
crowdfunding and entrepreneurial finance, in general, have become a public interest issue, 
and therefore the opportunities and implications are more notable than previously depicted.  




 Equity crowdfunding is viewed by many as a powerful tool for advancing the field of 
entrepreneurship, especially for the vast majority of ventures not commonly supported by 
institutional investors, but there is also a public interest dimension at play in this context that 
is not normally considered within the realm of entrepreneurial finance. Owing to the less 
bounded nature of equity crowdfunding and the more diverse set of actors involved in the 
funding process, this new form of funding has redefined the role of agency in entrepreneurial 
finance (Nambisan, 2017). In recent years, digital equity crowdfunding has moved from the 
margins to the heart of entrepreneurial finance with equity crowdfunding platforms attracting 
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more than $2.9 billion since 2010 (InsideTab, 2018). This rapid emergence of crowdfunding 
platforms, and the call for equity crowdfunding in particular, has been viewed as a disruption 
in the world of entrepreneurial finance (Mollick, 2014; Vulkan et al., 2016) and has prompted 
public and political debate regarding the role of crowdfunding and the applicability of the 
regulatory guidelines, which have historically been seen as safeguards with respect to 
entrepreneurial financing and securities.  
Traditionally, the discourse surrounding securities regulations has concerned a limited 
scope of politicians, professional investors, and law experts but the digitalization of 
entrepreneurial finance has pushed the debate into the public domain and broadened the range 
of stakeholders involved in the process. Unlike the change of the “prudent man rule” in 1978, 
which only involved negotiations between the NVCA and a narrow circle of government 
officials, the legalization of digital equity crowdfunding has been a more dynamic and multi-
stakeholder process. A key driver of this debate is the realization that the digitalization of new 
venture funding has provided public access to an arena typically reserved for professional or 
sophisticated investors. However, despite a general belief that these types of regulatory 
changes are socially constructed and that they result from negotiation and compromise 
between multiple interested parties (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), minimal attention has been paid 
to the multi-stakeholder nature of the process itself.  
Although entrepreneurship researchers were quick to recognize the potential 
significance of the democratization of entrepreneurial finance, early studies on crowdfunding 
have predominantly focused on issues related to the projects that are listed on platforms (e.g., 
benefits and outcomes) with little regard for the public dialogue and ensuing legal process that 
enabled platform-based crowdfunding to move from a niche activity supporting fringe 
projects to a viable funding source for all categories of ventures. Thus, we still lack an 
appreciation for the role played by key stakeholders including politicians, regulators, 
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incumbents, and entrepreneurs in the legalization of equity crowdfunding as an accepted 
practice (McKenny, Allison, Ketchen, Short, & Ireland, 2017) and are only now beginning to 
grasp the dynamics of the relationships among stakeholders and the associated implications, 
some of which are unexpected and run counter to prevailing views (e.g., Greenberg & 
Mollick, 2017). 
Legalization is “the action of making something that was previously illegal 
permissible by law” (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2019). Legalization of any industry 
has been viewed in the literature as a fundamentally political process contingent upon the 
endorsement of various government agencies (Funk & Hirschman, 2014; Uzunca et al., 2018). 
Over the years, scholars have identified several important factors affecting the process and 
outcome of legalization (and prohibition) such as industry action and lobbying (Hiatt & Park, 
2013; Lee, 2009), direct government intervention (Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001; Yan & 
Ferraro, 2016) as well as pressure exerted by social movements (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009) 
and public media (King & Haveman, 2008). However, very few studies characterize the 
legalization as an endogenous, multistakeholder process shaped by the interactions between 
new market entrants, politicians, regulators, incumbent industry players and other interested 
parties (Georgallis, Dowell, & Durand, 2018).  
Epistemologically, I build on the less established, interpretative approach that is being 
increasingly utilized in studies of entrepreneurship (Leitch, Hill, & Harrison, 2010; Nicholson 
& Anderson, 2005; Packard, 2017; Petty & Gruber, 2011). According to public interest 
theory, “regulation is designed to benefit society as a whole, [so] regulatory agencies typically 
maintain a dominant frame of serving the public interest (Pigou, 1932). The definition of what 
serves the public interest, however, can be open to interpretation” (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015, p. 
1730). When viewed from the interpretivist standpoint, regulations are negotiated and socially 
constructed, and, may be affected by some institutional entrepreneurs, as is the case with other 
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institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The discourse surrounding these institutions is also 
socially constructed by a wide array of stakeholders, most notably media outlets such as 
newspapers (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992). Thus, the rules and understanding 
of what constitutes “public interest” are the result of negotiations and discursive struggles.  
Taking into account the previous research on new industry emergence and 
legalization, equity funding, and equity crowdfunding, in particular, I seek to address the 
following research questions using the interpretative stance: 
1. How did the digitalization of entrepreneurial finance affect the relationship between 
traditional capital providers, government actors, and entrepreneurs? 
2. How was equity crowdfunding legalized in the US in light of the digitalization of 
entrepreneurial finance?  
 Drawing from the campaign for the legalization of equity crowdfunding in the United 
States (U.S.), I contend that the passage of crowdfunding rules has been an outcome of an 
unanticipated collaboration between groups with very different, seemingly incompatible, 
objectives. The effective use of collective action and collaboration between the 
“crowdfunding movement” and key stakeholders (e.g., policymakers and investors) interested 
in supporting an increased level of entrepreneurship activity appear to have been instrumental 
in the legalization of crowdfunding as a new funding practice. Focusing on the negotiated 
nature of equity crowdfunding regulations allows me to contribute to the literature on 
entrepreneurial finance while adding to the nascent literature studying crowdfunding at the 
industry level and, more specifically, the policy issues related to crowdfunding (Dushnitsky, 
Guerini, Piva, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2016; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017). The analysis of the 
public and political discourse reveals that the legalization of crowdfunding has become a 
matter of public interest and therefore, the implications of public policy on entrepreneurship 
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are much broader than previously depicted. Furthermore, countries with a public policy 
agenda designed to promote entrepreneurship are now faced with a new dimension of 
competition as a result of digitalization as the norms of new venture funding are challenged. 
The economic benefits of entrepreneurship and innovation are well established (Kirzner, 
1997; Schumpeter, 1934), but those governments that are slow to react or that do not adapt 
their policies and regulatory regimes to the new digital reality may fail to retain or attract 
entrepreneurs and/or the growing segment of individual investors. However, I also highlight 
that the digitalization of equity crowdfunding may not provide the same measure of benefits 
to all of the stakeholders involved in the legalization process and that the proliferation of 
global funding platforms may result in unintended outcomes. While I discuss different types 
of crowdfunding in this study, my special focus is on equity crowdfunding as this form of 
crowdfunding was within the purview of securities authorities and required regulatory 
approval in the United States. 
Literature Review 
Overview 
The funding of new ventures has a long and rich history but has only featured in the 
literature in recent decades following the formalization of entrepreneurial finance with the 
advent of the venture capital (VC) industry and ever-increasing levels of funding (Gompers & 
Lerner, 1999; Kaplan & Lerner, 2010). While early researchers were constrained by the 
quality of data recorded by hand in documents and stored in physical archives, the digitization 
of records and selected processes has afforded greater access and provided larger data sets 
across a range of investors. As research provided a greater understanding of the processes, 
decision-making criteria, and outcomes associated with VC investment, the scope of inquiry 
expanded to include corporate venture funds, business angels, and, more recently, platform-
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based digital crowdfunding (Block, Colombo, et al., 2018; Drover et al., 2017). Yet, early 
digitization in and of itself did not markedly reshape the entrepreneurial finance industry, its 
dynamics, or outcomes as professional investors merely automated elements of the deal 
origination and evaluation processes.  
Venture capital 
Despite funding no more than 0.25% of all new businesses (Kaplan & Lerner, 2017; 
Wright, Lumpkin, Zott, & Agarwal, 2016), research on VC investments has dominated the 
entrepreneurial finance literature over the past forty years. This interest is motivated, in part, 
because of the relative mystery concerning the inner workings of this holy grail of funding but 
also due to its long-term impact on economic development (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Kaplan 
& Lerner, 2010; Timmons & Bygrave, 1986).  
Since the inception of the VC industry in the late 1940s, VC firms have been managed 
as a business partnership by a team of professional investors who are considered value-added 
investors because they provide benefits beyond financing such as monitoring and governance, 
access to networks, and the professionalization of young companies (Gorman & Sahlman, 
1989; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). The VC selection process involves a lengthy, resource 
intensive due diligence process, which may extend over many months, wherein a deal may be 
rejected at any stage due to a variety of reasons such as the characteristics of a market or VC 
firm investment focus, and the outcome is rarely positive with as few as 1-3% of deals being 
selected (Petty & Gruber, 2011). Moreover, VCs invest substantial amounts of money and 
expect a significant return on investment, typically resulting from an IPO or a trade sale 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  
In the early days, VCs focused on start-ups and seed-stage companies, but by the late 
1990s they had shifted their attention to mid-stage and later stage deals, and more recently the 
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tendency has been to move towards later-stage investments (Hellmann & Thiele, 2015; 
NVCA, 2016). Regardless of the stage of the company, VC investing is inherently limited in 
scope to high-growth ventures in selected high-tech industries such as software, 
biotechnology, and the Internet (Denis, 2004; Ueda, 2004). Taken together, the VC industry 
can be characterized as an “exclusive club” with a limited number of investors interested in, 
competing for, and ultimately selecting very few deals possessing a specialized profile. Thus, 
many potentially productive but low-growth companies operating outside of these target 
industries do not qualify for VC funding.  
Business angels  
The documented history of angel financing goes back centuries, as wealthy individuals 
backed a large number of emerging industries such as textiles, colonial trade and railroads 
(Landes, Mokyr, & Baumol, 2010), but the phenomenon of angel investing has received less 
scholarly attention, partly because of the scarcity of data (Mason, Botelho, & Harrison, 2016).  
More recently, the BA market has evolved such that individual angels are joining 
forces to create BA groups or networks, and, correspondingly, provide a more considerable 
amount of capital to each deal (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Mason et al., 2016). In the U.S. 
alone, according to The Center for Venture Research, BAs invested $25 billion in startups in 
2015 (The Center for Venture Research, 2015) and Mason, Botelho, and Harrison (2016) 
report that BAs “finance significantly more businesses than venture capital funds (VCFs), and 
at the start-up stage, the amount that they invest is also greater” (p. 322). Similar to VCs, BAs 
are also commonly perceived as value-added investors owing to the experience and advice 
they often provide and their access to commercial and investor networks. However, although 
many BAs do conduct a due diligence process that generally resembles that of VCs, the BA 
process is typically less onerous, and angel investors tend to reach an agreement with 
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entrepreneurs more quickly (De Clercq, Fried, Oskari, & Sapienza, 2006; Mason & Stark, 
2004).  
Unlike the trend among VCs, BAs continue to invest in seed and early-stage 
companies, with entrepreneurs receiving average investments as low as €185,000 per 
company (EBAN, 2016). BAs play an essential role in the entrepreneurial finance landscape, 
supporting companies that require smaller amounts of capital. However, many angels tend to 
prefer investing in companies that are close in proximity (Mason, 2007; Wong, Bhatia, & 
Freeman, 2009). Thus, even though there is an increasing number of angels investing in a 
broader range of companies, angels represent only about one percent of the population, so 
entrepreneurs living in regions without a significant presence of BAs do not have access to or 
benefit from this vital form of early-stage funding (Avdeitchikova, 2009).   
Crowdfunding  
Equity crowdfunding via a digital platform is a relatively recent phenomenon, but the 
core underlying principle of private individuals or ‘the public’ providing cash for funding new 
ventures or projects dates back many years (Freedman & Nutting, 2015). The overarching 
term ‘crowdfunding’ includes four models of funding: (i) donation or charity crowdfunding, 
(ii) reward crowdfunding, (iii) peer-to-peer lending approach or crowdlending, and (iv) equity 
crowdfunding or crowd investing (Short, Ketchen, McKenny, Allison, & Ireland, 2017).  
Whereas the early crowdfunding campaigns were typically launched more locally, 
philanthropic in nature, and focused on more creative (e.g., Pono Music, Coolest Cooler) or 
social (e.g., Saving the Local Theater, Spacehive) projects, the digitalization of crowdfunding 
is viewed by many as ushering in an unprecedented era of new venture funding. In 2015, only 
12 years after the initial digitalization efforts, 539 crowdfunding platforms were operating in 
EU-15 countries (Dushnitsky et al., 2016) and the governments of many countries, including 
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the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and France have recently passed laws that 
allow the general public to invest via equity crowdfunding platforms (Jones, 2016; SEC, 
2015; Torris, 2016). While the more traditional forms of crowdfunding have received little 
scholarly attention, the digitalization of platforms has generated a growing stream of literature 
with the majority of the extant literature primarily examining the determinants of 
crowdfunding performance and the investor’s motivation and decision-making processes. 
However, despite gaining insights from early scholarly efforts (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 
Schwienbacher, 2014; Mollick, 2014), the understanding of the high-level parameters and the 
relevance of the context still remains incomplete  (McKenny et al., 2017). 
  Regardless of the type of crowdfunding, the character of the crowdfunding platform 
“investor” is perhaps the greatest source of differentiation from other sources of new venture 
funding. Research has found that some contributors to equity crowdfunding campaigns, 
similar to traditional investors, do appear to be interested in the financial potential of a 
concept (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). However, unlike the more traditional forms of new 
venture equity finance, many supporters of reward-based crowdfunding projects participate 
for other more subjective reasons such as the “warm glow” effect – a positive feeling gained 
from helping others (Allison, McKenny, & Short, 2013), the focus on sustainability (Calic & 
Mosakowski, 2016), perceived product creativity (Davis, Hmieleski, Webb, & Coombs, 
2017), or the entrepreneur`s use of language that indicates accomplishment (Allison et al., 
2013; Moss, Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015). 
 The dynamics of a virtual environment and the one-to-many relationship between the 
entrepreneur and a multitude of potential investors dramatically influences the quality and 
type of due diligence that can be conducted, but there is evidence indicating that in equity 
crowdfunding context some level of vetting is taking place. Whether it is an entrepreneur’s 
willingness to offer information related to risk, new funding sources and business development 
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processes (Ahlers et al., 2015; Block, Hornuf, & Moritz, 2018) or feedback provided by other 
investors (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018; Mamonov, Malaga, & Rosenblum, 2017), 
measures to reduce information asymmetry are being initiated by players on both sides of the 
process.  
 How these publicly accessible digital platforms are actually affecting the 
entrepreneurial landscape is an area that has yet to be examined on a wide scale, but the initial 
results present a mixed picture. Cumming and Johan (2013) show that startups and 
entrepreneurs favor fewer restrictions with respect to equity crowdfunding versus investors 
who are inclined towards more extensive regulations. A campaign on a reward-based 
crowdfunding site may provide positive signals to professional investors (Roma, Messeni 
Petruzzelli, & Perrone, 2017). However, at a more general level, crowdfunding may also pose 
serious reputational risks and moral hazards as well as impact the social structures of firms, 
markets, and economic activity (Felin, Lakhani, & Tushman, 2017; Lehner, Grabmann, & 
Ennsgraber, 2015).  
Collective action 
The emergence of new industries and practices has been studied from a wide variety of 
approaches, ranging from institutional theory to evolutionary economics and population 
ecology (Gustafsson, Jääskeläinen, Maula, & Uotila, 2016; Hoffman, 1999). Among those, 
the collective action perspective that builds on studies of social movements has generated a 
fruitful stream of research (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Lee, Struben, & Bingham, 
2018). The central premise of this perspective assumes that organizational fields, industries, 
and social movements are forms of coordinated collective action and, therefore, their 
behaviors follow similar consistent patterns (Zald & Berger, 1978).  
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The collective action perspective has been invoked in multiple associated but distinct 
contexts including resource mobilization (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Rosenbloom, 
Berton, & Meadowcroft, 2016), institutional entrepreneurship (David, Sine, & Haveman, 
2013; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), and strategic action field theory (Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012). However, regardless of their conceptual differences, each framework shares similar 
assumptions regarding the character of industry emergence. The analysis of industries such as 
TV broadcasting (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), higher education (Kim et al., 2007), and retail 
business (Ingram & Rao, 2004) has demonstrated that, in general, institutional change is 
contentious in nature, and incumbents tend to defend their positions, status, and resources 
fiercely. Incumbents are often also endorsed by governments and regulators, parties that 
believe they will benefit from the status quo (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Thus, this stream 
of research has typically focused on the contestation of issues across various stakeholders as a 
mechanism of institutional transformation. 
Social movement framing theory has firmly established itself as an essential part of the 
collective action perspective (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 
1986). This framing approach was initially characterized as somewhat stable mental scripts 
that organize life, and guide what is “in frame” and what is “out of frame” (Goffman, 1974). 
From the social movement perspective, framing “…involves the strategic creation and 
manipulation of shared understandings and interpretations of the world, its problems and 
viable courses of action” (Campbell, 2005, p. 49) and may be used by opposing groups to 
forge coalitions and alliances. Due to the diversity of views on the potential impact of equity 
crowdfunding, I employ a social movement framing perspective (Cornelissen & Werner, 
2014; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015) in order to shed light on the underlying dynamics of collective 
action among stakeholders associated with the legalization process. 
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Regulations, legalization and industry emergence 
 Regulated markets such as finance and healthcare constitute a large part of the world 
economy, and firms that introduce a new product into these sectors oftentimes need to receive 
government approval. In regulated industries, the success and long-term survival of 
companies and even whole industries largely depend on legal acceptance (Gurses & Ozcan, 
2015). Accordingly, regulators wield enormous power over firms, especially over those in 
emerging business, which are yet to be considered as “justified and integrated into the 
prevalent institutional order” (Rao & Singh, 2001, p. 264). 
 Enacting any policy or changing regulations may be costly for government actors. It 
could incur direct financial costs such as in the case of Feed-In Tariff schemes (Georgallis et 
al., 2018) or potential political costs if the interests of powerful incumbents are threatened 
(Ingram & Rao, 2004). As policymakers need to engage with numerous stakeholders, they 
have to take into account how new market entrants relate to the interests of incumbents 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hiatt & Park, 2013). Therefore, regulators tend to endorse those 
industries that have already demonstrated their potential viability and formed a “sensible 
organizational community” (Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999, p. 3). While persuading 
regulators is always problematic, it is arduous for firms operating in emerging industries as 
they are deprived of resources, connections, and legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
 In this study, I analyze the legalization of equity crowdfunding as a multistakeholder 
process resulting from collaboration from multiple parties. In order to better understand the 
dynamics of interactions between different stakeholders and analyze the social discourse on 
equity crowdfunding in detail, I draw both from the literature on new industry emergence and 




In addition to leading the world of entrepreneurial finance in terms of new venture 
funding, the U.S. was the first country to thoroughly reexamine its policies and securities 
regulations in light of digitalization. Furthermore, the public campaign for the legalization of 
equity crowdfunding widespread public attention, which is unprecedented for such a 
specialized topic as securities regulations. Accordingly, this study centers on the legalization 
process of equity crowdfunding in the U.S.   
Being interested in understanding how “the social meaning” of crowdfunding was 
constructed and negotiated in the public sphere, I required access to data that provided 
insights into several stakeholders’ views, objectives, and concerns. Past research has shown 
how media coverage and the public discourse, in general, not just represent but also construct 
the social reality of a particular situation (Gamson et al., 1992), thus, the data were collected 
from newspaper publications and transcripts of hearings in the U.S. Congress and the Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
In order to track the societal level discourse on crowdfunding and the support for 
entrepreneurship, I chose three of the most widely circulated and respected U.S. national daily 
newspapers: The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post. These 
broadsheet newspapers cover business and political news, and their circulation is widespread 
throughout the country. Equity crowdfunding was legalized in the U.S. in 2012, and the 
formal rules were introduced in 2013, so in order to capture the press coverage leading up to 
the legalization of equity crowdfunding, I conducted an extensive search of articles published 
between 2008 and 2013 using LexisNexis. I analyzed the subset of national and regional 
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newspapers1 using the word “crowdfunding” both as the search and index term. While several 
of these newspapers provided some coverage of the emerging debate, The New York Times 
(51 articles), The Washington Post (40 articles), and The Wall Street Journal (32 articles) 
provided the most comprehensive coverage of crowdfunding, much of which was syndicated 
across other outlets. One regional newspaper from the Bay Area in California, The Mercury 
News, also provided extensive coverage of the on-going debate, but this data were not 
included in the analysis in order to avoid “regional bias” (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 
2004) given that the readership is primarily based within California. 
Data related to the legalization process of equity crowdfunding in the U.S. were 
collected from the transcripts of testimonies and hearings of the U.S. Congress and the SEC as 
well as other types of government documents devoted to the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding such as press releases. The hearings preceded the official adoption of the new 
regulations in two stages between September 2011 and December 2013. During the first stage, 
the JOBS Act, which included a crowdfunding provision, was passed by Congress and signed 
by the U.S. President on April 5, 2012. During the second stage, the SEC was working on the 
specific rules and regulations devoted to equity crowdfunding. Table 2 provides an overview 
of the main events and themes with respect to the emergence of crowdfunding movement and 
the broader macroeconomic environment in the US. Looking into these processes allowed me 
to study the arguments and counterarguments on equity crowdfunding as well as strategies 
leveraged to endorse equity crowdfunding. Altogether, newspaper articles and transcripts of 
hearings generated approximately 120,000 lines of text. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Table 2 about here]] 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
1 The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The Mercury News, The Denver Post, 
USA Today, The Tampa Bay Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer.  
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Collectively, this longitudinal data set provided a detailed account of the legalization 
process of equity crowdfunding and the essential arguments used by the advocates and 
opponents of equity crowdfunding. Thus, it allowed for the identification of the prevailing 
themes and changing nature of key relationships that proved instrumental in the acceptance of 
crowdfunding.  
Data analysis technique 
The data were analyzed using qualitative interpretative methods to unveil the themes 
present in the public discourse on crowdfunding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013; Leitch et al., 2010). Given the paucity of research on the higher-level 
antecedents of crowdfunding (McKenny et al., 2017), the coding frame was developed from 
an inductive standpoint. In the first step, I utilized “open coding” to identify initial categories 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008); a process that involves simple descriptive coding. Once the 
preliminary coding structure was established, the data were recoded using axial coding where 
a researcher searches for relationships between and among these categories, which facilitates 
assembling them into higher-order themes (Corley & Gioia, 2004). Finally, similar themes 
were grouped into higher-level dimensions, which served as a basis for the ultimate 
framework. Developing the final framework entailed constant comparison between the codes, 
which resulted in the subsequent creation of new codes or the division, combination, or 
abolishment of the original codes. The complete list of categories and sub-categories is 
presented in Table 3. A more detailed discussion of the framework will be provided in the 
following section.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 




 The original text was copied verbatim, with the transcription ranging from excerpts as 
brief as a single phrase to complete paragraphs. The authorship of a message (e.g., a 
journalist, an investor, or a politician) was retained to identify the major players in the debate. 
The vast majority of the coded text contained enough relevant information to be grouped 
within one of the categories, and some of the text contained multiple themes or messages that 
required the use of more than one category. The iterative analysis process continued until 
additional analysis did not generate any further insights, which signified that the point of 
theoretical saturation had been reached (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
 Great care was taken to increase the validity or “trustworthiness” of the coding 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The data were first stored and managed using NVivo so that each 
passage of text, code, or another relevant piece of evidence was preserved. Second, I used 
peer debriefing and discussed the initial categories and emergent coding frame with other 
researchers who were not directly involved in the study, and solicited critical questions 
regarding the data collection and analysis procedures to get an outsider's perspective (Corley 
& Gioia, 2004). Finally, an experienced qualitative researcher reviewed the data analysis 
procedure, the development of the coding scheme, and the resulting conceptual categories.  
Findings 
A few dominant themes in the frames utilized by both the opponents and promoters of 
crowdfunding emerged as a result of the analysis. Not surprisingly, several narratives 
reflecting the interests and objectives of investors and entrepreneurs surfaced in the public 
discourse while a more conservative or cautionary narrative appeared in the political and 
regulatory arenas. As the reform`s advocates attracted more attention and dominated the 
narrative throughout the debate, I begin with the frames used to legitimize digital equity 
crowdfunding. Afterward, I analyze the frame that reflects the views of the opposition. 
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Contrary to what parties on either side of the issue may have originally envisioned, there was 
one narrative that garnered support from even the most stalwart skeptics in the political ranks 
and fostered collaboration among stakeholders - the “public interest” frame.  
I located “power quotes” giving voice to participants in the body of text, whereas 
“proof quotes”, which aimed to describe codes in more detail (Pratt, 2008), are contained in 
Table 5. The descriptive statistics representing coding frequencies are reported in Table 4. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Tables 4 and 5 about here]] 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Public interest frame 
 During the campaign for the legalization of crowdfunding, the narrative of public 
interest was primarily raised by politicians – Congressmen and Senators – and, less notably, 
by pro-crowdfunding activists. This frame played a significant role in convincing 
policymakers to reexamine the securities regulations. My interpretation of the narrative 
indicates that this discourse primarily concentrated on three themes: jobs, the state of the 
economy, and democratization.  
 Jobs: The issues of job creation and unemployment were omnipresent during the 
campaign for the legalization of crowdfunding. Policymakers also believed that too much 
bureaucracy limited the ability of startups to hire new workers. Members of Congress such as 
Spencer Bachus problematized the situation by stating that jobs are not being created partly 
because of the “red tape”:  
We cannot wait for the SEC to act when millions of Americans are out of work and 
small businesses can`t access capital because of outdated regulations. Small business 
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accounts for the majority of new jobs created in the U.S. The Committee took action 
today and passed common-sense ideas that will promote jobs (JOBS Bills Pass, 2011). 
Crowdfunding was widely publicized as one of the tools to rectify this problem. The 
logic behind this narrative was based on the following premise: “Small companies create jobs. 
The easier it is to fund a small company, the more jobs there will be. Federal rules make it 
harder for start-ups to raise capital. Ergo, relax the rules” ("Start 'em up," 2012). Some 
politicians actively endorsed equity crowdfunding proclaiming it “a powerful new venture 
capital model” (Spurring Capital Formation, 2011). For others, supporting the crowdfunding 
bill, and, more generally, the pro-entrepreneurship JOBS Act was also a way to “turn the 
corner in an election year” (Weisman, 2012). The crowdfunding activists also leveraged the 
frame of job creation by providing some evidence of how equity crowdfunding might benefit 
spurring the job market: “I think we will get the capital flowing based on our projections so 
we can create 500,000 companies over the next five years and employ 1.5 million jobs -- 
(inaudible) jobs” (Connecting Investors and Job Creators, 2011). 
The state of the economy: The issue of the economic slowdown was deeply ingrained 
in the U.S. politico-cultural context in the 2010-2012 period. Both unemployment and the 
response to the global recession were major elements of the 2012 elections campaign. Barack 
Obama, the winning candidate, announced the intention to introduce the JOBS Act, which 
later included the provision on crowdfunding and received bipartisan approval in Congress. 
The advocates of crowdfunding claimed that the legalization of equity crowdfunding would 
create more jobs and boost the economy, which once again, spans the boundaries of 
entrepreneurship and becomes a “public” issue. This focus on the societal level of benefits, as 
well as the upcoming elections, partly explains why equity crowdfunding became a part of the 
“bigger picture” about jobs and economic development. Both crowdfunding activists and 
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politicians contended that it was in the public interest to legalize equity crowdfunding 
platforms as bolstering employment and the economy are society-level concerns.  
We all know, and predictably our economy has grown to a near halt in certain respect.  
And every economist will tell you that many entrepreneurs are looking to the banks.  
But they know that there's really no money to be had for a lot of the start-up 
businesses….So with that change, we need to change some of the rules and regulations 
that are prohibiting those types of opportunities. So I'm bringing this bill forward. This 
is called Crowd Funding (Spurring Capital Formation, 2011).  
Democratization: In addition to the “anemic job market” (Weisman, 2012) and 
economic slowdown, the proponents of crowdfunding believed that their efforts would 
democratize entrepreneurial finance and make the industry less elitist. Democracy has been a 
significant part of political discourse in the U. S. for a long time, and, as such, frames of 
democracy and “civil rights” have frequently been leveraged by social movements and 
interest groups (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; McCammon, Muse, Newman, & Terrell, 
2007). In a similar vein, the champions of crowdfunding framed the institutional 
configuration as problematic due to the lack of access for the general public:  
It is ironic that thousands of people were able to invest money into scams like that 
perpetrated by Bernie Madoff (predominately through experienced and licensed 
financial advisors) yet they are prevented from making their own decisions about 
putting a fraction of that same money to use in a community startup (Small Business 
Investment Barriers, 2011). 
The supporters of crowdfunding reasoned that many companies that have the potential 
to create new jobs, but lack collateral or possess few prospects of providing “a 10X return in 
the shortest period of time” (Connecting Investors and Job Creators, 2011) are largely 
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unnoticed by institutional investors. This issue was not only a problem for entrepreneurs but 
was also a public issue. A lack of new companies due to finance elitism resulted in the 
absence of new jobs, and,  as a result, led to the “tragedy in American innovation” 
(Connecting Investors and Job Creators, 2011). Consequently, according to entrepreneur 
Steve Case, the U.S. could become less appealing to entrepreneurs and “lose its 
entrepreneurial strongholds” while “other nations are stepping up their game” ("Case: We 
could lose entrepreneurship," 2012).  
Advancing the field of entrepreneurship frame 
Spur entrepreneurship: Crowdfunding devotees often offered projections of how 
legalization would spur entrepreneurship, with estimates ranging from 1,000-2,000 businesses 
funded by a leading platform such as Seedrs annually in the UK to a rather optimistic 500,000 
new companies per year in the U.S. Additionally, they envisaged many benefits for 
entrepreneurs beyond financing. Firstly, crowdfunding would allow entrepreneurs to engage 
with the local community and convert social capital to financial capital: “Beyond the 
money…it (crowdfunding) connected us to the community, got our name out -- and 
engendered good will” (Collins, 2011). 
 Secondly, another expected benefit of crowdfunding was related to the connection 
between entrepreneurs and the market. This connection with a more extensive and more 
diverse set of players could take a variety of forms such as market validation and increasing 
customer loyalty through transforming them into investors. The advocates of equity 
crowdfunding believed that funded companies would obtain a “built-in base of customers who 
were strongly motivated to help the brand succeed” ("Should Equity-Based Crowd Funding 
Be Legal?," 2012) due to their “vested interests” in a business. Some of the experts such as 
venture capitalist Michael Greeley remarked that crowdfunding “will resonate most with 
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people who get the product” that is, “people who are trying to buy securities in these 
companies will really want to be buying the product” (Mandelbaum, 2012).  
 Lastly, several people have argued that crowdfunding would significantly enhance the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and investors, particularly from an entrepreneur`s 
perspective. The proponents of crowdfunding have stated that it will make this relationship 
more transparent, and, also, entrepreneurs would gain access to “tens of millions more 
potential investors” ("Should Equity-Based Crowd Funding Be Legal?," 2012). Furthermore, 
the legalization of equity crowdfunding would eliminate “interfering investors who second-
guess them and demand higher prices for higher returns” (Collins, 2011) or, in other words, 
switch the role of agency in entrepreneurial finance by giving entrepreneurs more control over 
their ventures (Nambisan, 2017). 
Enhance industry dynamics: The impact of digitalization on the funding landscape 
appears to be double-edged. Some pro-crowdfunding activists and entrepreneurship 
researchers have asserted that, due to its mass appeal and open access, crowdfunding is 
“fundamentally disrupting finance” (Mollick, 2014; Small Business Capital Financing, 2013; 
Vulkan et al., 2016). The advocates of these beliefs asserted that the “invasion” of micro-
investors might supplant business angels and early-stage VCs and force them to compete for 
high growth, potentially lucrative deals.  
However, the mounting evidence suggested that, contrary to these claims, 
crowdfunding may actually provide a more robust pipeline of deals for professional investors. 
Less sophisticated investors participating in equity crowdfunding campaigns do not provide 
the same value-added services, and raising substantial amounts of money is still challenging. 
Some activists have even called crowdfunding “the breeding grounds for the VCs and the 
private money” (Connecting Investors and Job Creators, 2011). 
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Hence, even though the increase in funding options for entrepreneurs may disrupt the 
industry status quo, there appears to be an opportunity for conventional investors such as VCs 
to identify more deals, better gauge market acceptance, and gain greater standing by providing 
follow-on funds.  
Funding frame 
Bridge the funding gap: The core strategy of the crowdfunding movement rested on 
the notion of highlighting the problems associated with the slowdown in entrepreneurial 
activity, which was to a larger extent attributed to a widening funding gap. In the wake of the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, the supply of investment capital from VCs was dramatically 
reduced. In 2009, total venture investment decreased 37% in dollars, and 30% in the number 
of deals from 2008 (NVCA, 2010) and the search for funding became more demanding for 
seed- and startup stage companies as capital markets reoriented toward mature companies. As 
gaining access to and qualifying for both equity and debt financing became an arduous task, 
more than 50% of small enterprises relied on credit cards and other bootstrapping activities. 
 However, the champions of crowdfunding did not just attribute the problems to the 
shrinking market for the initial funding of new ventures, which started to gain momentum 
again after 2010.  Professional investors depend on successful exits in order to generate their 
target returns on investment, but opportunities on public markets had all but disappeared 
when the crowdfunding debate first entered the public domain. During the 2008-2009 period, 
less than twenty VC-backed firms successfully had an IPO (NVCA, 2010), which further 
exacerbated the market conditions for equity investors. Acknowledging the importance of 
new venture funding and the potential for profitable exits, several high-profile supporters of 
equity crowdfunding platforms such as Barack Obama planned to “cut away the red tape that 
33 
 
prevents too many rapidly growing startup companies from raising capital and going public” 
(Connecting Investors and Job Creators, 2011).   
Supporting lower potential ventures: Throughout the campaign, the way equity 
crowdfunding was presented and discussed created a narrative of providing early-stage 
funding to deals that were largely neglected by institutional investors: small deals for smaller 
companies at the early or seed stage or with lower growth potential. More generally, they 
criticized the fundamental institutional configuration of entrepreneurial finance, which is 
highlighted by Sherwood Neiss:  
Try going into a bank to get a loan or a line of credit, try finding a credit card 
company that will give you a decent interest rate, or try pedaling your idea to venture a 
private equity.  They aren't focused on who will create the majority of net new jobs, 
but who has the greatest chance for a 10X return in the shortest period of time 
(Connecting Investors and Job Creators, 2011).   
The proponents of crowdfunding envisioned smaller levels of funding, ranging from $50,000 
to $250,000 as their sweet spot, funding amounts that are largely below the thresholds of 
institutional investors who target opportunities requiring greater investment amounts. 
Crowdfunding could support the underserviced majority of entrepreneurs by providing seed 
funding to startups and small companies that often do not promise a significant return on 
investment, which is the primary objective of professional investors:  
 “Whereas banks evaluate the success of a loan solely on full, timely repayment at the 
market interest rate, the community may consider an investment successful if they 
recoup their principal, feel the pride of being a part of something, and get exclusive 
perks” (Small Business Capital Formation, 2011).  
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Criticisms of the crowdfunding frame 
From the outset, the campaign for the legalization of crowdfunding faced criticism 
from investor protection groups such as the North American Securities Administrators 
Association. This opposition was not strong enough to stop the JOBS Act from being passed, 
but sufficient to forestall the implementation of the SEC rules. This criticism or, counter-
frame, was twofold: the primary arguments attacked the implementation and oversight of 
equity crowdfunding and focused on the issues of fraud and investor protection. A second,  
relatively minor, the volume of criticism challenged equity crowdfunding as a fundamentally 
bad idea. 
Fraud, risk & protection: The critics of equity crowdfunding argued that allowing 
unsophisticated investors to invest in startups would run counter to the interests of the general 
public because new companies are notoriously risky. In addition, the liberalization of rules 
could result in fraud and unchecked fundraising activity, as opportunistic salespeople would 
exploit the crowd`s lack of expertise. This fear was captured in Prof. John Coffee`s 
comments: 
Let me sketch what I think will happen under this bill.  A character vaguely 
resembling Danny DeVito who may have been -- who may have been barred for life 
from the securities industry, now, enters the field as an unlicensed salesman.  He sets 
up shop in bar room, flips open his laptop on the bar or the Starbucks counter and 
begins showing glossy PowerPoint slides to customers of allegedly high-growth 
companies (Spurring Capital Formation, 2011). 
However, I find that this type of criticism did not challenge the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding as a concept, as many had expected. Rather than block the legislation, it led to 
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the review and revision of particular provisions in the legislation, which resulted in a 
significant delay of the SEC rules.  
Criticism of the idea: Some experts, however, challenged the notion of equity 
crowdfunding on a more fundamental level. Primarily, they worried that amateur 
crowdinvestors would not bring much value beyond money and that it would result in funding 
potentially unproductive entrepreneurship. In general, according to the opponents of 
crowdfunding, there are more clever ways to raise funding for entrepreneurs: “Let's start with 
a basic issue: Yes, small businesses need capital. But they need a lot more than that. And by 
focusing simply on capital, equity-based crowdfunding would rob small companies of access 
to everything that traditionally comes with capital” ("Should Equity-Based Crowd Funding 
Be Legal?," 2012). Such criticisms challenged the fundamental idea of equity crowdfunding. 
However, due to relatively low visibility in the public debate, namely newspaper coverage, its 
impact on the process of legalization of equity crowdfunding was rather limited. 
Discussion 
Based on the analysis of the crowdfunding legalization process, I propose that the 
process of industry emergence and regulatory approval may be, for certain scope conditions, 
less conflictual than believed. Drawing from the social movement literature on framing 
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986), I argue that new market entrants may gain the 
support of governments and reduce incumbent opposition by invoking the “public interest” 
frame. Secondly, I suggest that challengers may face less criticism from incumbents by 
framing their initiative as a new complementary “niche” instead of circumventing or 
completely replacing the incumbent industry norms and practices.  
The previous research on industry emergence and regulatory change states that 
appealing to the public interest is a potentially effective strategy for new players seeking 
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change in regulated markets (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). By invoking 
this narrative, challengers claim that new technology and/or product promotes the public 
good. In regulated markets, where positions of incumbents are particularly robust and 
protected by regulators, “finding the right coalition partners among other market players …as 
well as in the public and institutional sphere…who can help construct and diffuse an 
alternative frame of public interest is a crucial step in winning the framing contest” (Gurses & 
Ozcan, 2015, p. 1731).  
Internal governance units – actors that “…are charged with overseeing status quo in 
the field” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 17) in general,  are extremely conservative, which 
is an additional reason why institutional change is virtually impossible without pressure from 
external fields. In general, incumbents tend to control the majority of resources. Shared 
understandings are fashioned and institutionalized, and internal governance units are there to 
reinforce the dominant perspective. In the case of equity crowdfunding, these regulations had 
to be developed by the SEC, which acts as the internal governance unit for the field of 
entrepreneurial finance. The exogenous shock came from the coalition of entrepreneurs and 
politicians who challenged the existing understanding of entrepreneurial finance. 
Nevertheless, despite pressure from Congress, the SEC was very reluctant to change and 
adopt the specific rules on crowdfunding. Thanks to the power of this multi-stakeholder 
coalition and the fact that the U.S. Congress has precedence over the SEC, equity 
crowdfunding regulation was ultimately passed. However, even though the crowdfunding bill 
was approved relatively quickly compared to other significant reforms, it still took more than 
18 months to design and implement specific regulations on crowdfunding.  
I find that the proponents of crowdfunding utilized the public interest frame and, in 
doing so, addressed three critical issues: jobs, the state of the economy, and democratization. 
By leveraging this frame, the crowdfunding interest group was able to win over critical 
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institutional actors – Senators and Congressmen – and put the legalization of crowdfunding on 
their agendas. More importantly, crowdfunding became part of the more general solution that 
aimed to tackle economic slowdown and unemployment. Recruiting allies among 
Congressmen was instrumental in passing pro-crowdfunding regulation, and thanks to the 
perceived role of “public interest”, few critics fundamentally challenged the concept of digital 
platform-based equity crowdfunding. However, the crowdfunding interest group also needed 
to mobilize supporters within the field of entrepreneurial finance – entrepreneurs and 
investors.  
Members of the crowdfunding movement fashioned and leveraged the collective 
action frame “Advancing the field of entrepreneurship” to gain support within the field of 
entrepreneurship. This frame was instrumental in recruiting allies among entrepreneurs and, to 
some extent, investors. However, regarding the latter, social movement theory predicts that 
incumbents would oppose innovation if they believe that it may endanger their positions. 
While Fligstein and McAdam (2012) subscribe to the social movement theory assumption 
concerning the prevalence of conflict, they nevertheless indicate that sometimes it is possible 
to avoid confrontation by finding “a niche in the strategic action field where incumbents will 
not go” and then “work toward complementarities” (p.98).   
In the case of equity crowdfunding, the impact of the “Funding” frame was twofold: 
first, the supporters of crowdfunding claimed that this new form of financing has a potential 
to bridge the funding gap. Obviously, this framing is aligned with the goals of incumbents of 
entrepreneurial finance, VCs, and BAs, as they are primarily interested in the development of 
the entrepreneurship ecosystem, and, subsequently, the supply of new deals. However, they 
may have challenged the emerging digital equity crowdfunding model if it promised to affect 
their positions as dominant players. Conversely, platform-based equity crowdfunding was 
framed as a funding mechanism that had significant potential, but which primarily targeted a 
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market segment previously representing the majority of deals, unoccupied by these major 
players. Thus, the “challenging” collective action frame was aligned with the goals and 
interests of incumbents. While simultaneously not threatening their privileged statuses, 
institutional investors and crowdfunding activists realized the significant potential for 
complementarities, and therefore, incumbents endorsed the passage of pro-crowdfunding 
regulation (NVCA, 2015).  
Finally, I see clear parallels between the legalization of equity crowdfunding and other 
innovations such as initial coin offerings (ICOs), which “constitute a novel mechanism for 
funding highly innovative ventures that use distributed ledger technology” (Fisch, 2019, p. 1). 
Both ICOs and equity crowdfunding serve the interest of key entrepreneurship stakeholders, 
namely entrepreneurs and investors as they provide a viable alternative to established sources 
of financing. Both innovations have brought into question the relevance of existing securities 
regulations. Similar to equity crowdfunding, governments of several countries such as 
Switzerland and Singapore have already introduced favorable measures to compete with other 
jurisdictions for international ICO entrepreneurs, while others such as China have banned 
fundraising using ICO completely. It is still early to definitively say whether ICOs are 
sustainable initiatives, which may bring long-term economic benefits or, rather, transient fads. 
Time will tell if many other countries relax their regulations in light of ICO as well as the 
movement for the adoption of ICO-friendly regulations gains global status as in the case of 
equity crowdfunding.  
Conclusion 
This unique longitudinal dataset enabled me to conduct one of the first studies that 
analyzes how the digitalization of entrepreneurial finance emerged within the context of 
crowdfunding platforms. Adopting a social movement framing perspective revealed how the 
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nature of relationships between key stakeholders was affected and how selected actors were 
leveraging the public interest frame in support of the legalization process of equity 
crowdfunding in the U.S.  
Contributions to research 
Drawing on the social movement framing theory (Benford & Snow, 2000; Cornelissen 
& Werner, 2014), I show that the legalization of crowdfunding was a negotiated process that 
required the collaboration of multiple stakeholders, and I demonstrate how the proponents of 
equity crowdfunding leveraged collective action frames to secure support for their model of 
new venture financing. In particular, I claim that framing equity crowdfunding as a public 
interest phenomenon, which simultaneously promotes the public good while advancing the 
field of entrepreneurship at the same time, was instrumental in the legalization of 
crowdfunding. More generally, concerning extant research on crowdfunding, this study raises 
the unit of analysis from individual decision-making to the industry-level of collective action. 
I also contribute to the studies on new industry emergence and legalization (Georgallis 
et al., 2018; Lee, 2009; Sine & Lee, 2009). I argue that the process of industry emergence and 
legalization may be less conflictual than usually assumed for a certain scope of conditions. 
First, leveraging the “public interest” frame may reduce the level of opposition to a new 
industry or product and gain the support of government actors. Correspondingly, emergent 
frames that draw from the discourse of high-status government actors are more likely to 
become public interest frames. Second, if new market entrants create a new sub-industry or a 
niche that is complementary, rather than threatening the norms and practices of the incumbent 
industry, they are less likely to face opposition from incumbents and, contrary to the 
normative view, develop a collaborative relationship, which may ultimately result in the 
legalization of a new sub-industry. Finally, by demonstrating the important role played by the 
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multistakeholder collaboration behind the legalization of equity crowdfunding, I contribute to 
the emerging multistakeholder perspective on the studies of legalization and policy change 
(Georgallis et al., 2018; Uzunca et al., 2018).  
Lastly, I also offer a contribution to the social movement framing literature (Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; Snow et al., 1986). While the normative view in 
the literature assumes contestation between incumbents and the proponents of a new industry 
or organizational form, an emerging perspective proposes that incumbents and challengers 
may engage in collaboration. In addition to other factors conducive to the collaboration such 
as the creation of an intermediary organization that were already described in the literature 
(O'Mahony & Bechky, 2008), I propose that framing a new initiative in a way, which 
complements the interests of government actors and incumbent industry players, may trigger 
the collaboration from the outset. 
Policy implications 
 This study has several potential policy implications, having demonstrated increased 
public interest in both crowdfunding and entrepreneurship in general. First, the digitalization 
of entrepreneurship and new venture financing poses particular challenges for governments. 
Governments need to show a certain level of flexibility regarding rules and regulations 
concerning entrepreneurship; otherwise, they may face a risk of losing a new generation of 
entrepreneurs who are becoming increasingly more international. Institutional environments 
that are too rigid may prompt entrepreneurs to launch digital funding platforms in other 
countries, as was the case with Seedrs, which was started in the UK as opposed to the U.S. 
because of the latter`s rules.  
Second, governments of multiple European countries and the European Commission 
have been promoting an agenda of cross-border investment via crowdfunding platforms. This 
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might be somewhat contradictory to the initial framing of crowdfunding as a tool for domestic 
job creation. Interestingly, according to CrunchBase data (2017), 14% of successfully funded 
projects on Crowdcube are located outside of the UK. In the long term, more crowdfunding 
liberal countries may end up facilitating the funding of foreign companies that create jobs 
elsewhere, in countries without crowdfunding platforms or vibrant entrepreneurial finance 
ecosystems. 
Additionally, there are potential downsides of a more liberal approach to equity 
crowdfunding. First, governments need to ensure that platforms are not utilized for money 
laundering and the financing of illicit activities. Given that equity crowdfunding platforms 
provide unprecedented access to deals across the globe, “investors” operating out of tax 
havens and less regulated countries may find ways to exploit this open market. Further 
research is required to determine if greater measures might be necessary to ensure that 
unscrupulous investors do not take advantage of the democratization of new venture finance.  
Limitations and further research 
There are several limitations of this study. First, the time frame of the study excludes 
the period when the SEC was working on the regulations that would allow the general public 
to invest via equity crowdfunding platforms. This was motivated by the focus on the stage of 
emergence rather than institutionalization. Second, I was primarily interested in framing and 
collective action, and correspondingly, I focused on the political backdrop of the story. The 
legal discourse on equity crowdfunding is a potentially interesting research direction, but it is 
outside of the scope of the current study. The third limitation of this study is the concentration 
on one national setting. I have chosen the U.S. because the campaign for the legalization of 
equity crowdfunding served as a trigger for similar movements around the globe. 
Nevertheless, further studies are needed to achieve theoretical replication of the results (Yin, 
42 
 
2009). The fourth limitation of the study is its heavy reliance on archival data. Using archival 
data reduces the risk of hindsight biases and respondent subjectivity. However, I had to rely 
on written evidence, and as a result, I might have ignored some essential unrecorded 
information, which I could have otherwise obtained from interviewing stakeholders such as 
politicians or entrepreneurs at the forefront of the crowdfunding movement in the US who 
played a significant role during the legalization process. It might be of interest to interview 
these stakeholders in a follow-up study. Finally, due to the focus on the political background 
of the legalization, I primarily concentrated on Congressional hearings and national news, 
while social media blogs on crowdfunding received scant attention. Given that the role of 
social media in the political process increases rapidly, I suggest authors of future studies make 
better use of the data from social media platforms. 
Crowdfunding activity continues to grow year-on-year, but little is known about the 
relationship between equity crowdfunding and other sources of funding such as VCs and BAs. 
Despite some claims that crowdfunding is a threat to traditional capital providers (Vulkan et 
al., 2016), growing evidence suggests that institutional investors actively participate in equity 
crowdfunding campaigns and some of these campaigns are led by VCs (Invesdor, 2017; 
"Professional investors join the crowdfunding party," 2017). In addition, there has been little 
systematic research focused on the role of crowdfunding in the entrepreneurship ecosystem. 
Further research is needed to analyze whether crowdfunding has been narrowing the funding 
gap as hoped and, if so, which types of ventures are benefiting from these digital platforms 
that may be poised to revolutionize entrepreneurial finance. Interestingly, despite the potential 
global reach of digital campaigns, the majority of funding has thus far come from domestic 
investors, although some campaigns are attracting overseas investors (Guenther, Johan, & 
Schweizer, 2017), albeit  increasingly from countries not typically associated with equity 
funding such as the British Virgin Islands and the United Arab Emirates (Crowdcube, 2016). 
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Thus, understanding the pace and profile of cross-border crowdfunding investment, as well as 
the character of these international investors, relative to more traditional forms of investing, is 
a potentially fruitful research area that calls for scholarly attention.
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CHAPTER THREE – The Diffusion of Equity Crowdfunding Across the Globe 
ABSTRACT 
Affecting regulation is difficult for any firm, but it requires strenuous efforts for those 
operating in emerging industries. In this study, I seek to understand the complex process 
through which equity crowdfunding has become legalized in four Commonwealth countries 
following the passage of equity crowdfunding regulations in the US. I use extensive archival 
data to analyze how social discourse, as well as the institutional environment, has made an 
impact on governmental regulatory decisions concerning the new model of venture finance. I 
find that the legalization of equity crowdfunding is a complex process shaped by firms’ 
interactions with various interested parties, especially regulators and other relevant state 
actors. Based on the analysis, I propose several conditions, which may increase the 
probability of legalization, one of which is complementarity with the goals of key 
stakeholders. This study contributes to the literature on equity crowdfunding, new industry 
emergence and legalization, as well as to a broader stream of research on policy diffusion.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, new industry emergence and legalization, equity crowdfunding, 
policy diffusion 
Introduction 
Digital, platform-based crowdfunding emerged in the late 2000s, and the United States 
quickly became a thriving market for online fundraising: in 2012, Kickstarter – one of the 
significant U.S. crowdfunding platforms – received more than 2.2 million contributions 
totaling up to nearly $320 million. However, the equity-based form of crowdfunding was 
initially snubbed by U.S. regulators. In June 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) imposed a cease-and-desist order on the creators of 
BuyaBeerCompany.com website who collected more than $200 million in pledges in return 
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for the future ownership of the company shares. Despite the fact that the concept of Internet 
fundraising had already gained marked prominence among entrepreneurs and consumers, the 
BuyaBeerCompany.com campaign was shut down as it infringed securities regulations at that 
time.  
As this example shows, acceptance of a new product or industry by key stakeholders 
involved in a particular market does not necessarily happen simultaneously with legal 
acceptance. In regulated markets such as finance, companies also need to receive legal 
approval, which is a fundamentally political process dependent upon the endorsement of 
government actors (Funk & Hirschman, 2014; Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). In newly established 
markets and industry segments such as alternative energy, scholars have demonstrated that 
regulation has a significant impact on the process through which new products come to 
market and gain regulatory acceptance (Russo, 2001). For new product or industries, which 
are yet to gain “the right to be taken for granted” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994, p. 653), overcoming 
those regulatory hurdles is a process fraught with problems.  
 Scholars interested in the legalization of emerging industries have addressed the issue 
of regulatory change from multiple theoretical standpoints such as social movement 
perspective (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Pacheco, York, & Hargrave, 2014; Sine 
& Lee, 2009) and corporate political strategy (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Bonardi, 
Holburn, & Bergh, 2006; Hansen & Mitchell, 2000). Despite wide variance in the approaches 
these authors have taken, I find some common patterns in the literature. Generally, 
government agencies are treated as “…indistinguishable and static, and focused on 
reinforcing existing policies for institutional maintenance purposes” (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018, 
p. 1793). It is oftentimes assumed that all government actors, such as politicians and 
regulators, will be in agreement, which is not always the case (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). 
Consequently, as state actors have been considered to be rather homogeneous and reactive, 
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scholars addressed other determinants of regulatory support such as pressure exerted by social 
movement organizations or industry associations (Pacheco et al., 2014). Very few scholars 
have examined the legalization as an endogenous process (Georgallis et al., 2018), or, in other 
words, as the outcome of “…firms’ interaction with various category audiences, with 
particular attention to the perspectives and actions of regulators and other relevant state 
actors” (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). In line with the literature on categories (Durand & Paolella, 
2013; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Paolella & Durand, 2016), I view regulators and politicians as 
audiences that pursue their goals and respond to emergent categories according to their 
preferences. However, government actors do not come to a judgment in a vacuum; their 
interpretations result from interactions with key stakeholders such as incumbent firms, new 
market entrants, and consumers (Uzunca et al., 2018).  
 Another important aspect of legalization is the diffusion of legal innovations from 
other countries, which are perceived to be more advanced. Governments have been shown to 
learn from experiences of “other states that have dealt with similar problems, and their 
leadership may draw on successful “alters” (Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009, p. 1323). 
Governments should perceive another country as its peer for the diffusion take place. In many 
cases, states aim to adopt similar policies or regulations that were already implemented by 
their more successful rivals. 
 In this study, I analyze the adoption of equity crowdfunding regulations in the UK, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. To better understand the legalization processes and 
analyze the mechanisms of diffusion, I draw both on new industry emergence and legalization 
literature as well as on the studies of policy diffusion. 
 Because I am theoretically interested in social discourse and the dynamics of 
multistakeholder engagement, I conducted a qualitative study. Based on archival data 
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including 311 news articles, more than 1350 pages of government documents, and 
supplementary data from such sources as Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Doing Business 
Report, and CB Insights, I uncovered how the four aforementioned Commonwealth countries 
responded to the much-publicized passage of the JOBS Act in the United States. 
 The findings reveal that while the 2008-2009 economic downturns and the reduction 
in the supply of new venture funding created an opportunity for such innovations as 
crowdfunding, these countries` politicians have responded to its emergence differently. In 
particular, their policies were affected by governments` perceptions of the role played by 
entrepreneurship in boosting national competitiveness, as well as by the pressure exerted by 
politically active industry associations and other high-profile institutional actors such as 
ministers and members of parliament. I also outline other factors contributing to the overall 
government stance on equity crowdfunding, including levels of institutionalization and 
competition in the field of entrepreneurial finance, overall institutional and infrastructure 
quality, and government policy towards the sharing economy. Altogether, the findings unveil 
that the diffusion of equity crowdfunding regulations has been a highly political, multi-actor 
process contingent upon the congruency of crowdfunding with policymakers` and other 
stakeholders` goals and “theories of value” (Georgallis et al., 2018), as well as nationwide 
socioeconomic dynamics.  
Literature review 
Regulation and industry emergence 
 I characterize studies analyzing the impact of regulations and government policies on 
emerging industries according to the attributed impetus of regulatory change. These are social 
movements and NGOs, lobbying and industry associations, as well as direct regulatory 
intervention. Additionally, I depict an emerging, audience-based view, which synthesizes 
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findings of the above-mentioned approaches along with recent studies of the cognitive 
categorization processes (Georgallis et al., 2018; Ozcan & Gurses, 2018; Paolella & Durand, 
2016). Lastly, I provide an overview of the studies of policy diffusion, which are frequently 
used to analyze the adoption of new policies and regulations across the globe (Henisz et al., 
2005; Simmons et al., 2006; Simmons & Elkins, 2004) 
Social movements 
 Emergent industries are characterized by a smaller number of organizations, some 
degree of categorical ambiguity,  low legitimacy, and unsettled power dynamics (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). A newly formed group of firms most likely has not yet established favorable 
relations with government actors and does not possess enough resources to engage in 
lobbying.  
However, companies operating in emerging industries may be endorsed by grassroots 
or society-wide campaigns if a new industry targets an issue of public interest and is framed 
as a solution to societal problems. If an issue is perceived as salient and a campaign is 
successful, then social movement backing may eventually change the institutional 
environment in favor of emerging categories, and enable regulatory support from 
policymakers (Davis et al., 2005; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2014). Large 
scale coalitions such as the environmental movement in the U.S. have spawned new 
industries, underpinned their political and legal infrastructures, and encouraged 
entrepreneurship in new sectors (Sine & Lee, 2009). Social movements may also have a more 
indirect effect on regulatory change. For example, the grassroots movement for recycling has 
facilitated the ascension of a for-profit recycling industry by transforming general public 
socio-economic practices, and, ultimately, shaping related policies (Lounsbury et al., 2003). 
In a similar vein, the temperance campaign delegitimized alcohol consumption and catalyzed 
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the Prohibition in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. These social 
changes created a demand for alternative beverages resulting in the rise of the soft drink 
industry (Hiatt et al., 2009). Thus, social activism is instrumental in mobilizing support for 
emerging industries and market categories, which tackle burning social issues.   
Industry action and lobbying 
 While nascent firms often need to rely on support from civil society organizations, 
companies in more established industries possess the necessary power and resources “to seek 
new or to maintain existing policies that affect their current business operations or future 
opportunities” (Bonardi et al., 2005, p. 397). Companies allocate vast resources and effort to 
impact the regulatory environment of their industries through lobbying and direct financial 
contributions (Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2015; Jia, 2014). In doing so, they often mobilize various 
groups such as industry associations that exert pressure on regulators. Organic food 
producers, for instance, relied on standard-based certification organizations to bring about 
changes in U.S. state laws (Lee, 2009). In another case, genetically modified food (GMO) 
producers enlisted support from powerful farm associations and government agencies to 
obtain GMO approval from the United States Department of Agriculture (Hiatt & Park, 2013). 
Firms may also form political associations to influence the repeal or enactment of laws 
against rival market categories (Ingram & Rao, 2004). Overall, in order to affect regulatory 
regimes, firms resort to a broad spectrum of political strategies and tactics such as lobbying, 
engaging with interest groups, and constituency building (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Shaffer, 
1995).  
Regulatory interventions  
 Whereas the previously described line of thought emphasized a crucial role of 
companies in regulatory change, regulators can also act “exogenously to intervene and create 
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industries” (Georgallis et al., 2018, p. 26). Government intervention may positively impact 
organizational founding rates in emerging industries by designing policies that would 
ultimately reduce risks for new entrants (Russo, 2001; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). 
Additionally, governments may facilitate the emergence of new categories by adopting new 
general policies that are not directly related to the industry in question. For example, the 
Chinese government focus on sustainable development was instrumental in preserving the 
socially responsible investing (SRI) niche in China (Yan & Ferraro, 2016), while changes in 
competition rules helped shape the early railroad industry in Massachusetts (Dobbin & Dowd, 
1997). Dramatic changes in government regulations can also cause shifts in existing 
organizational domains and top management team composition, and in extreme cases, a 
complete disruption of an industry (Haveman et al., 2001; Wade, Swaminathan, & Saxon, 
1998). All in all, this research stream has portrayed regulations and policies as determined 
externally. Moreover, regulators and other government actors sometimes “exogenously pick 
an industry to support because it is consistent with their goals” (Georgallis et al., 2018, p. 26).  
Audience-based approach 
 Category research is an established theoretical approach for studying how market and 
political stakeholders or, in other words, audiences react to industry changes (Georgallis et al., 
2018; Vergne & Wry, 2014). In general, “categories represent a meaningful consensus about 
some entities' features as shared by actors grouped together as an audience” (Durand & 
Paolella, 2013). To gain the support of any market audiences, new categories must 
demonstrate congruency with their theories of value (Paolella & Durand, 2016, p. 1100). 
Audiences or stakeholder groups may comprise consumers, government agencies, investors, 
and civil society organizations (Hsu, Hannan, & Koçak, 2009). Regulatory categories may be 
remarkably different from market categories because broader audiences may alter their 
preferences rapidly, whereas regulatory categories tend to remain on the books for an 
51 
 
extended period of time even if their taken-for-granted status is being questioned (Funk & 
Hirschman, 2014). Additionally, regulatory categorization, the process “which sets legal 
limitations on the production and sales of products” (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018, p. 1789) has 
been shown to “differ from product categorization through the asymmetrical power structure 
among different regulatory category audiences due to the critical role of state actors” (ibid., p. 
1791) such as regulators. While regulators wield enormous power in their respective 
industries, their legitimacy also depends on the opinion of other government actors, interest 
groups as well, and, to some extent, the general public (Bonardi et al., 2006). For example, 
companies may appeal to public opinion and elected politicians in order to revise regulation in 
their favor. In some other cases, as a new industry grows in prominence, government actors 
gradually recognize the need for the regulatory change and introduce some regulatory 
measures (Georgallis et al., 2018).  
Overall, regulatory categorization or legalization has been viewed in the literature as a 
highly political, multistakeholder process the outcome of which is shaped by the dialogue, or, 
sometimes, a contest, between regulators and regulated firms, but also involves other category 
audiences (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018).  
Diffusion 
 The normative pressure exerted on peer social groups by more prominent social actors 
and resulting in isomorphic changes is one of the cornerstones of institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Studies have looked at the isomorphic 
processes within organizations, industries as well as at the cross-national level (Guler, 
Guillén, & Macpherson, 2002; Haveman, 1993; Honig & Karlsson, 2004). A smaller body of 
research within this literature has analyzed the role of global institutional pressure in policy 
adoption (Simmons et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2009). Scholars have documented the global 
diffusion processes of numerous policies and institutions ranging from public stock exchanges 
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and the central bank independence principle to more general policies focused on 
environmental protection (Polillo & Guillén, 2005; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Weber et al., 
2009). The imitation may happen for a variety of reasons, but one of its prerequisites is 
“equivalence in networks” (Burt, 1987) between two actors. The peer relationship may result 
from geographical proximity as well as from extensive trade and diplomatic relationships, 
shared historical heritage, as well as similar legal systems (Guler et al., 2002; Weber et al., 
2009). These shared structural positions set a particular “competitive frame of reference” 
(Burt, 1987), which causes governments “to be tuned to peers` job performance” (Guler et al., 
2002).  
 Scholars have observed multiple mechanisms by which international policies may 
diffuse such as coercion, competition, learning, and emulation (Simmons et al., 2006; Weber 
et al., 2009). Among these, learning and competition are especially helpful for studying 
policies related to emerging innovations, which have not fully gained normatively appropriate 
status yet such as equity crowdfunding. The competition mechanism has been described in the 
literature as adopting a policy to gain “advantage relative to competitors, or to avoid a 
disadvantage” (Weber et al., 2009, p. 1324). While the competition oftentimes implies a 
mechanical adaptation of the innovation implemented by the peers, the learning mechanism of 
diffusion emphasizes adaptive learning. That is, governments engaged in learning draw on 
both successful and unsuccessful experiences of their peers. While it is difficult to define a 
clear-cut difference between the competition and learning diffusion mechanisms, due to its 
emphasis on adaptive learning, the learning approach has been shown to be more successful in 
the adoption of new policies and regulations (ibid.).  
In this study, I draw both from the literature on industry emergence and policy-making 
as well as from the studies of policy diffusion to investigate the legalization of equity 
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crowdfunding across four Commonwealth countries – the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand. 
Methods 
Case selection 
I wanted to study how the passage of the JOBS Act in the United States influenced the 
legalization of equity crowdfunding in other countries. The evidence from multiple cases is 
usually more robust because it allows a researcher to replicate results across cases or predict 
contrasting results based on a theory. The replication principle of multiple case studies is 
based on the same logic as multiple experiments (Yin, 2009). 
I chose four Commonwealth countries as the sample: The United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. I have selected this sample based on the principles of theoretical 
sampling (ibid.). In short, these countries provide a fertile ground for studying the diffusion of 
legal innovations originating in the United States. The reasons for the theoretical relevance of 
my selection are the following. The diffusion literature stipulates that in order for a policy 
diffusion to happen, governments of a country in questions should perceive another country 
where innovation originates as its peer or competitor (Weber et al., 2009). Countries are more 
likely to be in each other`s “competitive frame of reference” if they possess strong network 
ties as indicated by extensive diplomatic relationships, trade ties, close intergovernmental 
cooperation, shared historical and cultural background, and geographical proximity (Guler et 
al., 2002; Weber et al., 2009), which holds for my sample.  
In addition to the factors described as well as common legal traditions and language, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand countries are also early adopters of 
other entrepreneurship-related innovations originating in the U.S. such as venture capital 
(Black & Gilson, 1998; Lerner, 2010; Lockett & Wright, 2002), academic entrepreneurship 
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(Grimaldi, Kenney, Siegel, & Wright, 2011; Mowery & Sampat, 2004), and entrepreneurship 
education (Kuratko, 2005; Matlay, 2008; Matlay & Carey, 2007). Because other U.S.-
originating innovations focused on the promotion of entrepreneurship have been 
enthusiastically received by the sample countries, it is reasonable to expect that the passage of 
the JOBS Act would naturally draw a very positive reaction. Yet, as I will demonstrate later, 
the diffusion process was more complex than initially envisaged due to the variation in 
institutional environments as well as different preferences of politicians and other 
stakeholders.  
As I was interested in how the legalization of crowdfunding was discussed and 
negotiated in the public sphere, I began the analysis with newspapers. More specifically, I 
selected the most widely circulated and respected national and regional newspapers in each of 
the four countries. To ensure that the coverage of crowdfunding from these sources was 
comprehensive, I conducted a systematic search of articles published between 2011 and 2014 
using LexisNexis and Europresse. These dates were chosen because the U.S. discussion on 
equity crowdfunding started in late 2010, and the JOBS Act was passed in 2012, so I wanted 
to study the articles that followed these events. I analyzed the subsets of newspapers and 
online news agencies using the word “crowdfunding” both as the search and index term. I 
found that UK sources provided the most extensive coverage (130 articles), followed by 
Canadian (61 articles), Australian (65 articles), and New Zealand (55 articles) sources. 
Additionally, I also analyzed government documents pertaining to the legalization of 
crowdfunding such as regulatory consultation papers, responses of interested parties to the 
proposed regulation on crowdfunding and transcripts of parliamentary hearings.  
I triangulated the findings from newspapers and government documents against the 
additional macroeconomic data such as the GEM Global Entrepreneurship Monitor statistics, 
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Doing Business Report, CB Insights, and other sources on the government policy on 
entrepreneurship. Please refer to Tables 6, 7, and 8 for an overview of the sources I used.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Tables 6, 7, and 8 about here]] 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Altogether, the newspaper articles, government documents, and country-level 
additional statistics provided a detailed account of the legalization of equity crowdfunding, 
themes prevailing in the media and political discourses on crowdfunding as well an overview 
of the macroeconomic context in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
These materials contained the essential arguments used by the proponents and opponents of 
equity crowdfunding. Thus, these data present a rare opportunity to study how equity 
crowdfunding was legalized and institutionalized in multiple countries and how these 
countries responded to the much-publicized JOBS Act in the United States. 
Data analysis and initial findings 
In order to reveal the issues present in the public debate on crowdfunding, the text data 
were analyzed using qualitative interpretative methods (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia et al., 
2013; Leitch et al., 2010). Since in a previous study (Iurchenko & Petty, 2018) I analyzed the 
discourse surrounding the JOBS Act campaign, it was unrealistic not to expect certain 
common themes. However, I adapted the coding scheme as I progressed, since interpretive 
epistemology encourages emerging and more nuanced understanding. With regard to newly 
uncovered themes, I used “open coding” to establish initial categories (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008), which involves simple descriptive coding followed by axial coding where researchers 
look for relations among these categories and assemble them in higher order (Corley & Gioia, 
2004). Developing the framework involved constant comparisons between the codes, which 
resulted in new codes being created, or original codes being divided, combined and abolished. 
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The original text was copied word for word, with the transcripts ranging from short 
excerpts to complete paragraphs. I kept track of the authorship of a message (e.g., a journalist, 
an investor, or a politician) to identify the prominent participants in the debate. Most of the 
coded blocks of the text had sufficient pertinent information, which could be grouped into one 
category and some of the sections contained several themes or messages that required more 
than one category. The iterative process of analysis continued until further examination gave 
no further insight, which marked the point of theoretical saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
 I have made every effort to assure the “trustworthiness” of the coding (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). The data were stored and managed using NVivo to preserve each passage of 
text, code, and other relevant information. In various phases of the analysis, I used peer 
debriefing and talked with several researchers not directly involved in the study about the 
initial categories and the emerging coding frame and requested critical questions concerning 
data collection and analysis methods to gain an outsider's perspective (Corley & Gioia, 2004).   
Country-level characteristics 
In 2007-2008, the supply of capital from venture capitalists for entrepreneurs was 
significantly reduced around the globe. In some countries representing the sample, the value 
of venture capital investment diminished very substantially. For example, in 2009, the amount 
of venture capital in the UK decreased to one-third of that in 2007. Australian startups 
received only 23 million dollars in funding as compared to 169 million in 2009. In Canada, 
the funding trend was somewhat inconclusive as the number of deals has steadily increased 
since 2003, only facing a slight pullback in 2008. New Zealand, in turn, had not attracted 
much funding for entrepreneurial ventures before 2007 but was strongly affected by the 2008 
crisis as well. 
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 In addition to the actual funding gap, there was also a perceived crisis captured in the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor studies. Between 2008 and 2010, all four countries faced a 
downward trend in “Venture capital availability” and “Financing through Local Equity 
Market,” and the UK scored the lowest. However, both perceived and actual entrepreneurial 
activity did not decrease during the crisis, as evidenced by a more or less constant rate of new 
business creation and the GEM indicator “Total Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity.” Thus, 
the economic downturn did not reduce the willingness to start a business, and all the countries 
represented in the sample had business-friendly and transparent institutional environments. 
However, in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, there was not enough available capital. 
Thus, an opportunity for a new early-stage source of financing arose. 
The course of reform in the countries 
In this chapter, I will characterize the processes that have led to the legalization of 
equity crowdfunding in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Generally 
speaking, I find that the process of legalization of equity crowdfunding included 
parliamentary hearings, public consultations with various stakeholders such as industry 
associations, legal experts, and investors, ultimately leading to regulatory change. While I 
found that in all of the countries the legalization involved similar stakeholders, the process 
evolved according to the priorities and interests of politicians as well as depending on their 
understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in boosting national competitiveness.    
Tables 9 and 10 describe the main events related to the process of regulatory 
acceptance of equity crowdfunding. The legalization process, as well as the social discourse 
surrounding the legalization of equity crowdfunding, was initiated in the United States. 
However, the United Kingdom was the first country in this study to legally accept fundraising 




[[Please insert Tables 9 and 10 about here]] 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
United Kingdom 
  From the very beginning, the United Kingdom took a leadership position in equity 
crowdfunding. Crowdcube – a British equity crowdfunding platform – emerged as early as 
2011, and, was also one of the first equity crowdfunding platforms in the world. Initially, the 
regulation of equity crowdfunding was very liberal in Great Britain. In particular, the activity 
itself was not prohibited, but each platform had to be authorized by the regulator. So-called 
"unsophisticated" investors could invest a limited amount of funds as well.  
 The movement for better regulating equity crowdfunding was endorsed by most of the 
relevant stakeholders ranging from founders of crowdfunding platforms to British Treasury 
executives and Members of Parliament. Despite some heated debates concerning the 
distinction between “sophisticated and unsophisticated” investors among the Financial 
Conduct Authority and Labour MPs such as Barry Sheerman, the regulator supported the 
reform. One of the biggest victories of the “crowdfunding movement” was the extension of 
very generous tax breaks to equity crowdfunding, which made investing on crowdfunding 
platforms very attractive.  Overall, since 2013, the UK has become a global leader in equity 
crowdfunding, hosting three out of five of the world’s biggest platforms. In fact, according to 
the founder of Seedrs – the fourth biggest platform in the world – the company was 
established in London and not in the U.S. precisely because of the former’s more permissive 
crowdfunding regulations.  
Australia  
Australia can be placed on the other side of the spectrum regarding the liberal 
approach to equity crowdfunding. Donation-based crowdfunding was not prohibited from the 
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outset, but equity crowdfunding was not permitted. Despite the lobbying efforts of 
entrepreneurs, investors and the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, equity 
crowdfunding was only legalized in 2017, and the first platforms were licensed as late as 
2018. As a result, in 2017, the amount of funding raised by Australian equity crowdfunding 
platforms accounted for as little as 1% of the global equity crowdfunding funding volume. 
New Zealand 
 The close competitor of Australia, New Zealand, has been more successful in equity 
crowdfunding due to its more liberal securities regulations. New Zealand seemed to be further 
advanced in equity crowdfunding in comparison with Australia, as the crowdfunding rules 
were passed as early as 2014 and the first operators were already licensed the same year. As a 
result, despite its smaller market size and a very modest amount of financing for entrepreneurs 
in general, in 2017, equity platforms attracted more funding in comparison to their Australian 
counterparts.  
Canada 
 The legalization process was slowed down by the country’s complexity regarding 
securities regulations as Canada did not have a central regulator. Consequently, each province 
passed its own rules, with Ontario being the first in 2013, but only that province’s residents 
were allowed to invest. The harmonization of equity crowdfunding regulations across the 
country is expected in 2020. 
The debate on the legalization of equity crowdfunding in Canada was sparked by the 
well-publicized JOBS Act campaign in the U.S., as well as by the departure of some high-
profile entrepreneurs such as the founder of Pebble, Eric Migicovsky. The emigration of 
entrepreneurs and even “the brain drain to the U.S.” was a recurring theme in Canadian 
discourse; the narrative was frequently repeated by the lobbyists of equity crowdfunding such 
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as the Canadian Advanced Technology Alliance. The crowdfunding reform faced some 
opposition from securities regulators and investor protection groups. Due to the regulatory 
complexity, so far equity crowdfunding has not been very successful in Canada, and only a 
handful of platforms are operating in selected provinces such as Ontario.  
Discursive themes 
As I proceeded with the analysis of the textual data – newspapers and government 
documents, I began to grasp the narratives utilized by the proponents and opponents of 
crowdfunding. Not surprisingly, I captured several themes already uncovered in a previous 
study of equity crowdfunding discourse (Iurchenko & Petty, 2018). Some of these narratives 
featured in the public debate represented the interests of entrepreneurs and investors, while 
regulators provided a more critical account of equity crowdfunding reforms. A few of the 
themes were somewhat similar across the sample, while a newly uncovered narrative of 
“National competitiveness” varied according to the national specificities and priorities of 
policymakers. Please refer to Figure 2 for a general overview of the themes and to Table 11 
for a more detailed description of the “National competitiveness” coding category.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Table 11 and Figure 2 about here]] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Criticism of crowdfunding theme  
From the beginning of campaigns for the passage of pro-crowdfunding regulations, 
critical reactions were quite prominent in all four countries. The criticism was twofold and 
focused on the following aspects of the upcoming reforms: Fraud, risk, and investor 
protection as well as the concept of equity crowdfunding itself. I begin with the former 
narrative, which was somewhat more pronounced in the data.  
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Fraud, risk, and investor protection. The premise of this argument, forwarded by 
critics of equity crowdfunding, was that allowing less sophisticated investors to invest will 
significantly increase risks and the probability of fraud. The essence of the fear is well 
captured in the testimony of Advocis, The Financial Advisors Association of Canada: “The 
combination of less stringent regulation in crowdfunding and neophyte entrepreneurs and 
investors will result in allegations of misrepresentation and fraud” (Advocis, 2013). Despite 
its significant presence in the public discourse, this form of criticism did not fundamentally 
challenge the idea of equity crowdfunding but instead focused on the risks associated with its 
implementation. 
Conceptual criticism. Conceptual criticism was less widespread in the debate and 
was virtually nonexistent in Australia. In general, it primarily called into question the possible 
consequences of equity crowdfunding such as unproductive entrepreneurship, the minimal 
value it would bring for entrepreneurs beyond money, as well as the negative impact it may 
have on a business in the long-term by making it uninvestable. According to an investor from 
New Zealand, “While crowd-funding delivers dollars, it can make it more difficult for the 
entrepreneur to get the business off the ground as there are no knowledgeable lead investors 
and their support networks at the table” (Duff, 2013). Some experts such as Canadian 
Professor Jeffrey G. MacIntosh questioned “the wisdom of the crowd” itself arguing that from 
the “Dutch tulip bulb mania to the Credit Crisis of 2008, crowd-driven behaviour has authored 
some of the worst meltdowns in human history” (Macintosh, 2013). However, this type of 
scathing criticism was not overly voiced in the debate on equity crowdfunding. 
Support for equity crowdfunding 
  Despite the criticism highlighted in the previous chapter, the crowdfunding reform 
was widely supported by different stakeholders across all four countries. Similar to the 
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previous study (Iurchenko & Petty, 2018), I encountered themes representing the interests of 
investors and entrepreneurs such as "Funding" and "Advancing the field of entrepreneurship", 
as well as the "Public interest" narratives.  I also uncovered the “Competitiveness” narrative, 
which did not play a significant role in the previous study.  
Advancing the field of entrepreneurship 
 Spur entrepreneurship. The supporters of equity crowdfunding asserted that, in 
addition to providing funds, it would help entrepreneurs to further develop and test their ideas 
along with connecting entrepreneurs to the market. Additionally, equity crowdfunding would 
help to eliminate less productive ideas quickly as “Even ideas that aren't deemed worthy 
enough to get funding are worth testing, because you will have saved yourself a whole bunch 
of time finding out it wasn't a good idea and getting smarter faster” (O'Carroll, 2013).  
 Secondly, according to its devotees, equity crowdfunding would turn investors into 
customers and advocates, and, more generally, enhance entrepreneurs` relationships with 
investors. According to The National Crowdfunding & Fintech Association of Canada (NCFA 
Canada), equity crowdfunding platforms “would standardize, professionalize and streamline 
communications and interactions between investors and SME issuers”, while crowd investors 
would become “avid supporters, marketing representatives and connectors”, who “will 
contribute to the success of their investment, manufacturing and distribution planning 
activities” (NFCA Canada, 2013).  
 Enhance industry dynamics. While making it easier for entrepreneurs to start and 
run the business, equity crowdfunding, its supporters argued, would also benefit other 
entrepreneurship stakeholders such as investors who would gain access to a broader pool of 
deals. A Canadian technology commercialization agency MaRS stated that “The ability for 
investors (or their advisors) to see a larger variety of early-stage investment opportunities that 
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they wouldn’t be able to access elsewhere without significant effort was a key benefit” 
(MaRS Discovery District, 2013) of equity crowdfunding.  
 In a similar fashion, crowdfunding would reduce the risks and strengthen positions of 
smaller investors. The focus on minority investor’s rights protection is well highlighted by 
Jeff Lynn, the founder of British platform Seedrs:  
“That's critical. Otherwise, you'll have a business that becomes successful and no one's 
looking out for the minority investor's interest - you'll end up with some horrible 
dilution event. We'll manage and protect [small investors'] rights. Other [crowd-
funding] platforms are stuck in the situation of being much more hands-off” (Hurley, 
2012a). 
 In addition to “Increasing the supply of new deals” and “Strengthening the positions of 
investors,” I also revealed other narratives focused on the benefits for investors and other 
stakeholders. Most notably, the proponents of equity crowdfunding argued that it would 
complement BAs (business angels) and VCs (venture capitalists) in the startup financing 
cycle, but also that crowdfunding would help positively transform the entrepreneurial finance 
industry in the long term. 
Funding narrative 
 Bridge the funding gap. The most direct benefit of equity crowdfunding, according 
to its supporters, would be in providing funding for companies and, therefore, bridging the 
funding gap. This apparent lack of funding was attributed to several reasons, one of them 
being the perceived unfriendliness of banks to startups:  
“The fact is that start-ups have the most difficulty in getting money from the 
conventional banks. Very often, the banks have failed them, because start-ups have no 
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track record and no history; consequently, banks are very cautious about lending 
money to them” (Crowdfunding and the FCA, 2013). 
 Equity crowdfunding would be in particular useful for very early-stage companies, 
which are not yet qualified for funding from VCs or BAs. In other countries, such as 
Australia, equity crowdfunding might be the only option for entrepreneurs willing to raise 
funding “as funding by business angels and venture capital firms is close to nonexistent” 
(Tompkins, 2013).  
 In addition to providing funding for startups, equity crowdfunding was often portrayed 
as a golden opportunity for smaller investors, who were frequently downplayed by larger 
investors. According to the founder of Crowdcube – a very successful equity crowdfunding 
platform, it used to be “very hard to invest £500 of equity in a private company” because “a 
business angel network would laugh you out of the door” (Hurley, 2012b). In summary, the 
proponents of equity crowdfunding described it as a tool for leveling the playing field for 
those early-stage companies, which typically found it harder to receive funding from 
incumbent investors, as well as for smaller investors underrepresented in well-established 
financial institutions.   
Public interest narrative 
 Economy and jobs. This narrative, which I considered to be crucial in the legalization 
of equity crowdfunding in the U.S. (Iurchenko & Petty, 2018), played a significant role in the 
four countries as well. However, I did not encounter a lengthy discussion about jobs in the 
sample; instead, the debate was mainly focused on economic development as a whole. In 
Australia and Canada, I located a narrative built around how the legalization of equity 




“[C]rowdfunding may help eliminate the geographical boundaries of capital 
formation—a major consideration in a country as large as Canada with a dispersed 
population. Entrepreneurs outside of Canada’s large urban centres may find in 
crowdfunding a means to financing startups that local banks would never support” 
(Advocis, 2013). 
 More generally, equity crowdfunding was portrayed as a means to address economic 
slowdown and unemployment, which are, undoubtedly, the society-level concerns. This 
sentiment is expressed by a New Zealand politician, the Labour MP David Parker: 
“[W]ould we not let them invest that through crowdsource funding in something that 
could grow the prosperity of our country and bring the jobs and innovations that we 
need to prosper as an economy and to create job opportunities for the young people?” 
(Financial Markets Conduct Bill, 2013) 
Democracy and transparency. In addition to the economy and jobs, the narrative of 
democracy and transparency provoked a heated discussion, in particular, in the UK and 
Canada. In the UK, a motion to remove the investor sophistication requirement resonated with 
a profoundly ingrained labour political tradition. The Labour MP Barry Sheerman 
problematized the situation by stating that the sophistication requirement is unfair to everyday 
investors:  
“The FCA suggests that only “sophisticated” investors should have access to 
crowdfunding; in other words, those who have a relatively high net worth. That kind 
of language makes me nervous, because it is insulting to ordinary people, suggesting 




In Canada, in addition to a previously mentioned concern about democratizing 
investment, equity crowdfunding was portrayed as an effective way to tackle the burning 
issue of female and minority underrepresentation in finance: “Crowdfunding holds enormous 
potential to allow women entrepreneurs access to capital by allowing them to monetize their 
social networks” (Charlesworth & Ania, 2013). According to MaRS, equity crowdfunding 
offered considerable potential for immigrant entrepreneurs that have a hard time accessing 
funding from traditional sources (MaRS Discovery District, 2013).    
Country competitiveness  
 Another narrative that was prominently featured in the public debate was focused on 
how passing pro-equity crowdfunding regulations would enhance a country’s 
competitiveness. In general, according to policy diffusion literature, boosting national 
competitiveness is one of the main reasons for policy adoption (Simmons et al., 2006; Weber 
et al., 2009). Based on the themes in the discourse and previous research, I distinguished 
between two different government stances on this issue. The first position in which equity 
crowdfunding was portrayed as a tool that would allow a country to nurture entrepreneurial 
leadership ambitions, was primarily shared amongst the United Kingdom and New Zealand, 
and to some extent by Canada. This position also displayed the learning component of policy 
adoption, especially in the case of the UK. The second one featured a more conservative 
position according to which a government should adopt similar policies to those of other 
countries in order to mitigate various negative trends such as the emigration of entrepreneurs. 
This attitude was shared by Australia, and, partly, by Canada.  
 The premise of the British standpoint was that the U.S. had passed very restrictive 
regulations on equity crowdfunding, and, hence, made it very difficult for equity 
crowdfunding platforms to operate: “If we play it right, the UK is likely to become the centre 
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of crowdfunding in the world, partly because the United States, in its haste to regulate 
crowdfunding, has, many argue, strangled the baby at birth” (Crowdfunding and the FCA, 
2013). Due to these perceived mistakes in the U.S. crowdfunding policy, and the fact that 
some platforms were established in the UK because of its more liberal regulations, the 
government made it very clear that it was the ambition of Great Britain to secure its status as 
the global crowdfunding hub: “UK has a strong global position in crowdfunding 
investment…I am keen to ensure that we maintain and grow that position” (Crowdfunding 
and the FCA, 2013). In general, British stakeholders emphasized that the UK should learn 
from both positive and negative experience of the US and adopt a more permissive regulatory 
stance to secure the competitive advantage for Britain on the equity crowdfunding market. 
 Similar to the United Kingdom, the New Zealand entrepreneurship stakeholders were 
quite ambitious regarding the country’s potential to become “a hub for start-ups seeking 
crowdfunding in the Asia-Pacific region” (Pullar-Strecker, 2013). They maintained that with 
their financial regulations being at the forefront of world practice, New Zealand would have 
the capacity to be ahead of Australia and other countries of the Asian-Pacific region in equity 
crowdfunding. In general, both the UK and New Zealand presented a proactive, globally 
focused narrative on how further stimulating equity crowdfunding would enhance their 
national competitiveness. Both of them highlighted the need to move beyond the mimicking 
of the regulations adopted in the US. 
 Contrary to the global perspective of Great Britain and New Zealand, the Australian 
discourse was much more focused on how the legalization of equity crowdfunding would help 
address the local issues such as the emigration of entrepreneurs and the “brain drain”: “By not 
having a developed Crowd Sourced Equity Funding structure there are obvious detrimental 
outcomes” (Ward, 2013).  One of the most obvious problems mentioned in the discourse was 
the emigration of high-tech, high-growth focused entrepreneurs to other countries such as the 
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United States. Additionally, the position of Australia was more reactive in the sense that the 
proponents of equity crowdfunding urged government officials to adopt measures similar to 
those of other countries, rather than to strive to become a financial regulations trendsetter: 
“the Australian Government should follow the lead of the United States and New Zealand and 
establish a framework for the regulation of CSEF in Australia” (Abrahams & Johns, 2013). In 
general, Australian stakeholders indicated the need to copy the best legal practices available, 
rather than innovating and moving ahead of other countries. 
 The Canadian standpoint in the debate on equity crowdfunding was in-between pro-
active and reactive. Similar to Australia, Canadian stakeholders aimed to imitate the more 
advanced with respect to crowdfunding countries, in particular, the United States: “This is an 
idea we should be studying now in Canada, because if it takes off in the U.S., we should have 
the ability to allow it here too” (Immen, 2012). Additionally, equity crowdfunding was also 
viewed as one of the tools to rectify issues hurting the national competitiveness such as the 
emigration of entrepreneurs because of the lack of funding: “We see growing evidence that 
U.S.-based portals are approaching early-stage companies in Ontario with the aim of drawing 
them to relocate to the U.S. to take advantage of their services and improve their access to 
capital” (MaRS Discovery District, 2013). However, the discourse on the securities reform in 
Canada was also featuring themes on how equity crowdfunding would help Canada to become 
a world leader in entrepreneurship and the financing of entrepreneurial activity:  
“In addition to raising more capital for more Canadian businesses, a progressive and 
vibrant crowdfunding regime will also make Canada more attractive to innovators and 
their businesses from other jurisdictions – strengthening our ability to compete in the 
fast-moving global innovation economy” (MaRS Discovery District, 2013).  
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Thus, the Canadian discourse on equity crowdfunding and national competitiveness 
was somewhat balanced between the very pro-active stance of Great Britain and New Zealand 
and the more conservative standpoint of the Australian government and regulators.   
Overview of findings 
 The analysis of the legalization processes across the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand shows that all four governments and other stakeholders were 
ultimately supportive of equity crowdfunding. However, the timelines of the reforms and the 
way in which the new financial innovation was portrayed in the public discourse were not 
identical. One of the surprising findings is that, unlike in Australia and Canada, national 
competitiveness was not mentioned frequently in the discourse on equity crowdfunding in the 
UK and New Zealand, which is displayed in Table 12. Based on the analysis of data, I 
attribute this relatively low prominence of competitiveness in the public debate to the almost 
unanimous support received by the notion of equity crowdfunding. In the UK, the majority of 
stakeholders, including regulators, were well disposed to the idea from the outset, and few 
issues could spark a heated debate.  There were scarcely any voices questioning the vital role 
of equity crowdfunding in boosting national competitiveness. As a result, in New Zealand and 
the UK, the focus of the debate shifted towards how equity crowdfunding would spur 
entrepreneurship, which indicated the priority of entrepreneurship for the majority of 
stakeholders.   
---------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Table 12 about here]] 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 While the general sentiment towards equity crowdfunding was somewhat positive in 
Australia and Canada as well, these countries, especially Canada, showed a higher level of 
opposition to the initiative. Unlike New Zealand, these countries possessed relatively stronger 
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entrepreneurial finance ecosystems and some powerful incumbents such as investor rights 
protection groups (FAIR Canada) and high-profile investors (Adir Shiffman in Australia) that 
were averse to equity crowdfunding. In addition, the Canadian securities regulation was 
managed by provincial and territorial agencies and laws. Consequently, each region had to 
establish its own rules, which slowed down the legalization of equity crowdfunding even 
further. 
Discussion 
Based on the analysis of the equity crowdfunding legalization process, I would like to 
make several propositions that go beyond the context of these four nations and may be 
generalizable for other studies of entrepreneurship, regulation and new industry emergence.   
The premise of the goal-based approach to cognitive categorization is that rather than 
focusing on a list of attributes, audiences evaluate categories based on how effective they are 
in achieving goals that are relevant for the audience (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Paolella & 
Durand, 2016). Contrary to the previously dominant static view on categories (Hsu, 2006; 
Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999), the goal-based approach stipulates that categories 
may adapt to the alterations in the preferences of audience members as well as to evolving 
social discourse (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Grodal & Kahl, 2017). These changes do not 
emerge in isolation but tend to be triggered by entrepreneurs and other parties interested in the 
change (David, Sine, & Kaehr Serra, 2017).   
In this case-study setting, key entrepreneurship stakeholders were not satisfied with 
the availability of funding in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis. Consequently, one of the 
prerequisites of a positive evaluation of equity crowdfunding was its complementarity with 
the goals of the stakeholders. For government actors, the evaluation of equity crowdfunding 
was positive, as, at least on the discursive level, it was instrumental in serving the public 
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interest and promoting national competitiveness, which, arguably, are primary objectives of 
politicians. For entrepreneurs and investors, equity crowdfunding was framed as a tool for 
advancing entrepreneurship that had the potential to increase the supply of funding for new 
ventures and enhance industry dynamics without threatening the positions of incumbents. 
Based on the condition of crisis and perceived complementarity, I propose the following:  
Proposition 1: Crises relax “categorical imperatives” and create opportunities for 
categories that are complementary to the audience’s goals. 
 Governments exert a profound influence on entrepreneurship, both directly and 
indirectly (Dowell & David, 2011). Governments tend to endorse, both financially and 
symbolically, these types of innovations “that may be important for the nation’s future 
competitiveness” (Georgallis et al., 2018, p. 3). However, while all governments, at least on 
the rhetorical level, appreciate the need for the advancement of national competitiveness, 
depending on their goals, they may seek to address this issue differently (Georgallis et al., 
2018). Some governments may be more willing to take more risks by quickly adapting 
innovations, while others adopt more conservative approaches. In this case, Great Britain and 
New Zealand have pursued a proactive strategy towards equity crowdfunding, aiming to 
secure the leadership status. 
On the contrary, Canada and, in particular, Australia, planned to “sit and watch” how 
equity crowdfunding would evolve in other jurisdictions, and then acted accordingly. Building 
on the analysis of the global competitiveness narrative, I propose the following:  
Proposition 2: Country ambition for global leadership in a given field increases the 
pace of a new category`s legal adoption.   
 Well-established industries are usually characterized by strong incumbents who wield 
tremendous influence within an industry, as well as government actors that tend to protect the 
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interest of dominant players, and, hence, the status quo (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Thus, 
the adoption of a new category may be slowed down by strongly positioned incumbent 
players, which may not be willing to lose their superior status (Ingram & Rao, 2004; Kim et 
al., 2007). This inertia tends to be less prominent if the general socioeconomic conditions are 
favorable and the current number of incumbents is low. Hence, the influence of established 
players on the rules of the game is rather weak. Additionally, if an industry is perceived to be 
underdeveloped, government actors may be more open to change (Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012). New Zealand possessed a dynamic pro-business economy, stable democratic 
government, and it was a friendly place for innovations in finance. However, the 
entrepreneurial finance market was very far from being saturated. Consequently, no strong 
opposition to equity crowdfunding could emerge because there were very few active players 
in the field of entrepreneurial finance. 
Proposition 3: Countries that have a lower level of institutionalization and competition 
in a given field, but possess a favorable socioeconomic environment and infrastructure 
conducive to innovation, may be more open to the adoption of new categories focused 
on the field in question. 
Establishing a shared collective identity is essential in recruiting and preserving a 
group that would like to endorse a new market category (Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008).  
Social discourse plays a vital role in forming a collective identity of emerging categories and 
helps define a category`s distinctiveness from the preexisting ones (David et al., 2017). 
During the campaign for a more liberal approach to equity crowdfunding in Great Britain, 
regulators faced a demand for lifting the “sophistication” requirement from both entrepreneurs 
and politicians. In particular, Labour MP, Barry Sheerman, was campaigning against this 
legal requirement as, according to him, its language was insulting to ordinary people. 
Consequently, the non-sophisticated investors were renamed into everyday investors, and the 
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legal restrictions were significantly relaxed. Thus, the collective identity of a group of pro-
crowdfunding supporters was directly imprinted in the regulations. 
Proposition 4: A collective identity of actors supporting a new market category may be 
directly imprinted in the regulation if it resonates with the beliefs of politicians or 
government actors that have an active role in lawmaking. 
Contributions 
Contributions to research 
This exploratory qualitative analysis of the legalization of equity crowdfunding 
bridges and expands the existing research on equity crowdfunding, new industry emergence, 
and legalization as well as policy diffusion.  
 I offer a contribution to an emerging body of research that seeks to understand how 
country-level institutions shape equity crowdfunding activity (Cumming, Vanacker, et al., 
2019; Johan et al., 2018). This analysis demonstrates that country-specific attributes such as 
the level of institutionalization in the field of entrepreneurial finance, the similarity of goals 
and priorities of different stakeholders, as well as political willpower to adopt pro-
crowdfunding policies quickly had a profound effect on the local equity crowdfunding 
ecosystem. I suggest that concerted efforts between British politicians, investors, and 
entrepreneurs were instrumental in securing the leadership position of the UK in the field of 
equity crowdfunding. Some of the founders of nascent equity crowdfunding platforms such as 
Seedrs decided to relocate from the United States because of their hostile policies governing 
equity crowdfunding securities regulations. Similarly, New Zealand has emerged as an equity 
crowdfunding leader in the Asia-Pacific region (Schwartz, 2018), even though, historically, 
the local venture capital industry was rather underdeveloped (CBInsights, 2018). Altogether, I 
propose that a close collaboration between the state, investors, entrepreneurs, and equity 
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crowdfunding platforms can create a vibrant crowdfunding entrepreneurial ecosystem 
(Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 2018).   
 In addition, I contribute to an emerging stream of research which draws connections 
between the studies of new industry emergence and legalization (Georgallis et al., 2018; 
Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). By probing into both discursive and institutional conditions, this 
framework generates valuable insights concerning the determinants of policy support for 
emergent industries (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Uzunca et al., 2018). I emphasize that 
government policy towards an emerging industry such as equity crowdfunding is shaped by 
general government strategy in a given field. The findings on how the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand’s political actors vigorously advocated for the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding contribute to a better understanding of the role of governments in the 
legalization of new industries. I uncovered that the speed and direction of a regulatory reform 
largely depend on whether relevant audiences – government actors – identify as an industry 
that helps attain their goals, and that enhances national competitiveness. The UK and New 
Zealand’s governments’ inclination to endorse equity crowdfunding was also increased by the 
perceived and actual crises in the field of entrepreneurial finance, which made them more 
eager to revise the “status quo”.  I also find that the UK government categorized equity 
crowdfunding in line with the existing policy focused on the promotion of the sharing 
economy and financial innovations. In the case of Great Britain, different stakeholders’ 
perceptions about equity crowdfunding were already shaped by previously established rules of 
the game.  
 I also contribute to the literature on policy diffusion (Guler et al., 2002; Polillo & 
Guillén, 2005; Weber et al., 2009). This study serves as empirical evidence for a more 
dynamic view of the diffusion processes and their outcomes. Previously scholars looked into 
the other factors contributing to the policy diffusion mechanisms such as strong trade and 
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diplomatic ties between countries (Guler et al., 2002) as well as the influence of international 
policy institutions such as the IMF (Polillo & Guillén, 2005). The focus on these, mostly 
macroeconomic factors, however, mostly ignored the role of social discourse in policy 
adoption. The results of this study suggest the dynamics and outcomes of the policy adoption 
processes may evolve depending on the social discourse, and the process may be facilitated if 
new policies serve the interests of different stakeholders better. Moreover, I demonstrate that 
the outcomes of diffusion depend on the perceived role of new policies by key government 
actors.  
Contributions to practice 
 These findings are relevant for policymakers seeking to revise government policies in 
light of innovations such as equity crowdfunding. The examples of Great Britain and New 
Zealand demonstrate that concerted efforts of government and industry helped secure 
leadership positions for these countries in the emerging industry. Although the United 
Kingdom is a much smaller market than the United States concerning entrepreneurial finance 
in general, the coordinated policy of the UK government towards equity crowdfunding was 
instrumental in acquiring its leadership status in this niche market. The fact that the U.S. 
lagged in introducing final crowdfunding rules also illustrates that the first mover advantage 
may last for only a fleeting while if final policies are not expeditiously adopted. Apparently, 
as legal innovations can be quickly and easily copied, policymakers should strive for rapid 
and consistent implementation of new policies.   
 For entrepreneurs, these findings illustrate how innovative types of businesses may 
gain legal acceptance very rapidly if their framing is aligned with goals of policymakers. In 
particular, the framing of new ventures as promoters of public interest and national 
competitiveness may be instrumental in gaining regulatory support instantly. In designing 
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their business ideas, entrepreneurs are advised to understand that addressing broader societal 
issues such as unemployment, security, and climate change may be instrumental in mobilizing 
public and political support, despite the potential pressure from industry incumbents (Uzunca 
et al., 2018). 
Limitations 
 Despite its contributions, this study is limited by the fact that I obtained all the data 
from archival sources. I did not interview policymakers and other stakeholders to understand 
how their perception of equity crowdfunding was formed. Additionally, while I was able to 
analyze written evidence about the legalization of equity crowdfunding, I did not have access 
to closed meetings or more informal discussions, which could have further enhanced my 
understanding of the process. 
 Furthermore, the sample comprises four Commonwealth countries, which share 
common cultural, historical, and linguistic backgrounds. I did not include other countries such 
as Israel because my country selection logic was based on the principle of theoretical 
sampling. The policy diffusion studies I drew on emphasize that countries are more likely to 
adopt policies of each other if they bear close similarities such as economic and diplomatic 
ties, shared cultural and historical traditions, a similar language as well as institutional 
similarities such as common legal systems (Guler et al., 2002; Simmons et al., 2006). 
Following this logic, Israel would definitely stand out as an outlier, being a unique country in 
many respects. Further studies that apply a different sampling logic could benefit from adding 
other countries such as Israel.  
In addition, it should be noted that the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand are highly developed market economies. The patterns observed in this study could 
contribute to a better understanding of the legalization process in other developed countries, 
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which have strong formal institutions. However, it is possible that in emerging countries, a 
similar process would be less formulaic. Additionally, in countries with more authoritarian 
political regimes, the society-level discursive processes described in this study may not play a 
prominent role as governments would be more likely to formulate public policies behind 
closed doors with little regard for stakeholders` opinions. 
Conclusions and further research 
 Since its emergence in the early 2010s, equity crowdfunding has intrigued 
entrepreneurship scholars. Moving beyond previously studied factors that drive crowdfunding 
success, this paper responds to the call for shifting the crowdfunding research focus on 
country-level institutional characteristics (Cumming, Vanacker, et al., 2019; Mochkabadi & 
Volkmann, 2018). I demonstrate that the legalization of equity crowdfunding was an 
endogenous process shaped by country socioeconomic environments, social discourse, as well 
as the priorities and goals of politicians. While findings described in this paper offer new 
insights into the relationship between government policy, equity crowdfunding, and, at a more 
general level, emerging industries, many interesting questions still need to be addressed.   
Further investigations of equity crowdfunding could also build on the present study 
and test some of the findings empirically using a larger pool of countries. While the analysis 
includes a smaller, albeit typical for qualitative research number of cases, it might be 
worthwhile to examine how institutional factors (existing VC market, pro-entrepreneurship 
policies, and macroeconomic factors) impact government policy on equity crowdfunding 
across a larger sample of countries. I also suggest including countries such as India and China 
in a study as a growing number of internet users and an increase in middle-class wealth may 
open up ample opportunities for equity crowdfunding.  
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More generally, in order to better understand the legalization process of new market 
categories, further investigations could look into the differences in the legalization process in 
developing countries characterized by institutional voids (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). 
For example, unlike in London and Paris, Uber has faced little criticism in Egypt, partly 
because of its framing as a public interest phenomenon that addressed the issues of safety, in 
particular, the sexual harassment of women (Uzunca et al., 2018). It might very well be that 
other new market categories operating in the sharing economy sector will be more positively 
perceived in developing countries if those new ventures plan to tackle some of the pressing 
societal problems such as security.
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CHAPTER FOUR – Responding to the Crowd: How Online Investor – Entrepreneur 
Discussions Inform Equity Crowdfunding Decisions 
ABSTRACT 
Based on the analysis of a unique proprietary dataset comprising 276 equity crowdfunding 
campaigns, we propose that forum discussions between would-be investors and entrepreneurs 
serve as a form of vetting or due diligence. The results highlight that the decision criteria 
evaluated by the crowd are similar to those of professional investors, however, the importance 
of different evaluation parameters evolves throughout a campaign. As these online 
discussions are impromptu and initiated by the crowd, an entrepreneur’s response may be 
perceived as a strong signal of a new venture`s quality. I discuss the implications of the results 
for future research and practice. 
Keywords: Crowdfunding; Entrepreneurial Finance; Decision Making; Investment 
Introduction 
Each year support for crowdfunding (CF) campaigns continues to grow, with the 
amount of funding skyrocketing from $808.4 million in 2010 to $99.9 billion globally in 2017 
(InsideTab, 2018). While there are several different forms of crowdfunding models being 
utilized, the campaigners on all of the available platforms are seeking to generate financial 
support for their cause, idea, or product whereas the primary motivation and benefits for the 
growing number of campaign backers have evolved over time. At the most philanthropic 
level, supporters of campaigns on donation-based platforms (e.g., GoFundMe) are often 
motivated by the feel-good effect and are typically acknowledged with a simple thank you 
note from the beneficiary. The backers of campaigns on more commercially focused rewards-
based platforms (e.g., Kickstarter) are being drawn in by the opportunity to fund and, if all 
goes well, pre-purchase a new product being offered by an entrepreneur or a company 
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(Belleflamme et al., 2014). More recently, equity crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Seedrs) have 
targeted and are attracting investors who, in addition to being interested in supporting a new 
product or organization, are motivated by the opportunity to potentially earn a financial return 
on their investment (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015).  
As with any new venture, projects posted on a crowdfunding platform of any type 
involve a high level of uncertainty, so backers seek to reduce the uncertainty by analyzing the 
available information about the product, the market, and the team (Courtney, Dutta, & Li, 
2017; Davis et al., 2017). Within the equity crowdfunding context, would-be investors 
typically rely on a short video pitch, a product description, and the information exchanged on 
the investor message board in order to reduce this information asymmetry. Researchers have 
studied the relevance and effects of the scripted messages that are posted as part of a 
campaign quite extensively, primarily focusing on the initial design of crowdfunding 
campaigns and the language used in the video pitches (Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 2018; Short 
et al., 2017). However, these elements are more akin to the initial business plan or executive 
summary that a traditional professional equity investor such as business angels (BAs) and 
venture capitalists (VCs) would receive as opposed to the information that one would collect 
during the  more  interactive due diligence process that involves face-to-face meetings with 
the entrepreneurs and external experts, Thus, scholars have recently begun to analyze the 
impact of more dynamic, on-going information cues provided during an equity crowdfunding 
campaign such as the entrepreneur’s updates and comments posted by investors after they 
contributed to a project (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018; Dorfleitner, Hornuf, & Weber, 2018). 
These early studies have focused on the unsolicited communication prepared by entrepreneurs 
as a marketing mechanism, whereby the team or previous investors try to influence the 
opinion of the crowd. 
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Yet, despite the insights gained from these studies, our knowledge about how the 
communication between the campaigner and potential investors as well as amongst the 
community of investors themselves impacts the outcome of equity crowdfunding campaigns 
is far from complete. Specifically, we lack understanding about how online interactions 
between the crowd and the team have been utilized as a means of conducting due diligence 
(Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 2018). Whereas BAs and VCs can request meetings with 
entrepreneurs and seek input from external parties when evaluating a deal, discussion boards 
implemented by all major equity crowdfunding platforms serve as an alternative channel for 
crowd investors to seek additional information about a project. Unlike the video pitches and 
other campaign materials that are prepared in advance, these discussions are impromptu and 
initiated from within the pool of potential investors. Consecutively, online discussions may 
serve as a reliable proxy for due diligence process that provides valuable information for 
potential investors. Despite the initial positive step towards exploring this phenomenon 
(Kleinert & Volkmann, 2019), we still know little about the effects of such communication on 
crowdfunding decisions.  
The criteria used to make strategic decisions is a topic that has been studied 
extensively in management literature ranging from hiring decisions to the endorsement of 
stock on the public market. The research has looked at the influence of different stakeholder`s 
endorsements and the ultimate importance of various criteria used in the selection process 
ranging from third-party endorsements in human resources selections to the influence of third-
party certification effects on IPO pricing (Fernandez et al., 2000; Fernandez & Weinberg, 
1997; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Following this logic, I 
propose that online investor-entrepreneur discussions in equity crowdfunding context may be 
another instance of the third-party certification and reputation building mechanism discussed 
above. Given that the online environment of equity crowdfunding precludes a comprehensive 
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due diligence typical for VCs, these investor discussion forums may be one of few selection 
mechanisms available for potential equity crowdfunding investors. 
In order to examine the potential effects of this dynamic investor-entrepreneur 
dialogue, I have collected, coded, and analyzed data from all campaigns posted on a leading 
European equity crowdfunding platform over a one-year period.  The results suggest that the 
discussions between potential investors and entrepreneurs have become an essential part of 
the crowdfunding campaign assessment process. Whereas scripted elements of a 
crowdfunding campaign such as videos and initial pitch documents have become ceremonial 
and institutionalized across the industry, the dialogue between the crowd and entrepreneurs is 
much more topic-specific and unique to each campaign. More practically, I argue that equity 
crowdfunding investors could benefit from delving deeper into the details, moving beyond 
videos and pitch documents, by making better use of the on-going discussions with 
entrepreneurs in order to receive more focused and current information and, ideally, harness 
the wisdom of the crowd. Equally important, entrepreneurs need to understand that starting a 
crowdfunding campaign is a decision that cannot be taken lightly as it requires sustained 
commitment throughout the whole campaign and the ability to respond to potential investors 
in a prompt, albeit thoughtful, way. 
Literature review 
While we know much about the role of information signaling in reward-based and 
loan-based crowdfunding (Short et al., 2017), research on equity crowdfunding is still in its 
infancy (Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 2018). Although several signals affect the funding 
probability of campaigns, it is possible to distinguish between fixed, campaigns-specific 
characteristics, and more dynamic parameters which evolve during the course of a campaign. 
Due to the availability of data, the research on fixed, campaign-specific characteristics is 
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already well established in the broader crowdfunding literature (Hoegen, Steininger, & Veit, 
2018; Moritz & Block, 2016; Short et al., 2017).  
At the most fundamental level, research focused on reward-based crowdfunding 
projects has shown that campaigns that are framed as opportunities to help others, as well as 
projects focused on sustainability, are more likely to receive funding from the crowd (Allison, 
Davis, Short, & Webb, 2015; Calic & Mosakowski, 2016). Similarly, the project`s perceived 
level of creativity is positively related to crowdfunding performance (Davis et al., 2017). 
However, with respect to product innovativeness, campaigns promoting incremental 
innovation are more likely to be funded in comparison to whose targeting radical innovation, 
which may be due, in part, because it is easier for non-professional investors to comprehend 
an incremental innovation (Chan & Parhankangas, 2017). Several other aspects of the 
scripted, pre-designed elements of crowdfunding campaigns such as videos and pictures have 
been  studied as well. In general, the inclusion of a video and pictures as part of the project 
description increases the chances that a campaign will secure the desired amount of funding 
(Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015; Mollick, 2014). The use of short and simple to 
understand videos has been shown to be particularly effective for pro-social projects 
(Dushnitsky & Marom, 2013). However, videos appear to play little role in more 
commercially driven campaigns (Parhankangas & Renko, 2017), as they are now quite 
commonplace in these more capital intensive campaigns and therefore have become 
ceremonial in nature. 
 Another growing stream of research on non-equity crowdfunding is dedicated to the 
analysis of the impact that the founding team characteristics have on crowdfunding 
performance. Within this literature, significant attention has been devoted to the role of 
gender in campaign success. While there are fewer women-led campaigns on non-equity 
crowdfunding platforms, female fundraisers usually enjoy higher success rates than their male 
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counterparts (Frydrych, Bock, Kinder, & Koeck, 2014). In general, campaigns in which 
women are part of the top management team outperform male-only projects, and this 
difference in funding performance is even more pronounced for high-tech projects. Greenberg 
and Mollick (2017) explained this discrepancy because of “activist choice” homophily. In 
other words, female crowdfunders tend to support female-led projects, especially in male-
dominated fields such as high tech (Greenberg & Mollick, 2017). The proportion of female 
backers on reward-based crowdfunding platforms varies significantly depending on industry 
ranging from as high as 55% for fashion and publishing to as little as 20% for high-tech and 
games. However, women account for almost 40% of total backers of female-led projects in 
some industries where women are traditionally underrepresented such as high-tech (ibid.).  
These findings are of particular interest, given that, historically, female entrepreneurs are 
disproportionally deprived of new venture funding relative to their male counterparts (Brush, 
Greene, Balachandra, & Davis, 2014).  
A smaller but growing literature analyzes the impact of funding dynamics and the 
information posted during campaigns on reward-based crowdfunding performance. In general, 
the funding pattern for reward-based crowdfunding has been shown to be U-shaped 
(Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017). While there is oftentimes a substantial flow of financial 
contributions during the first week of a campaign, especially from loyal backers and close 
acquaintances of entrepreneurs (Skirnevskiy, Bendig, & Brettel, 2017), the vast majority of 
campaigns experience a significant slowdown in the middle stage of the funding process 
(Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017). Once a campaign moves to the final stage, the funding rate 
tends to increase more rapidly, especially once a project nears its target goal (Kuppuswamy & 
Bayus, 2017). Research on an entrepreneur’s efforts to maintain an active communication 
strategy during a campaign, in the form of reminders and updates, highlights interesting 
effects on the probability of funding success for non-equity-based crowdfunding (Gleasure & 
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Feller, 2014; Xu et al., 2014). Specifically, Xu et al. (2014) find that having a few comments 
posted in the project page positively correlates with crowdfunding success, whereas the 
relationship becomes negative once the number of comments becomes very large.  
Equity crowdfunding 
Equity crowdfunding is an emerging field of research, which has been gaining 
prominence in the past few years (Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 2018), especially after the 
equity crowdfunding market had been opened to the general public in several countries such 
as the United States (SEC, 2015). As equity crowdfunding investors are in no small extent 
financially motivated, their decision-making criteria are more “rational” than their more 
philanthropic and product-focused counterparts (Moysidou & Spaeth, 2016). In addition to the 
perceived merits of the product being developed, potential equity investors are also interested 
in other aspects of the project such as,  but  not limited to, information regarding the equity 
retention by the founding team and a detailed commercial and financial risk assessment  
(Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016a). However, the limited timeframe of a campaign and the 
impersonal nature of crowdinvesting preclude a comprehensive assessment of deals. 
Moreover, thanks to the democratization of new venture funding that has been ushered in by 
online crowdfunding,  the majority of potential backers on equity crowdfunding platforms are 
not professional investors, so other factors such as social media exposure have become very 
relevant for the crowd (Lukkarinen, Teich, Wallenius, & Wallenius, 2016).   
An emerging area of crowdfunding research is dedicated to the role of the more 
dynamic, unscripted factors that develop or are updated during an equity crowdfunding 
campaign (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018; Vismara, 2016b). In 
terms of funding patterns, scholars have observed a significant difference between equity and 
non-equity crowdfunding. Whereas the funding distribution of non-equity crowdfunding is 
usually U-shaped, the funding pattern of the majority of equity crowd-investing platforms is 
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L-shaped (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018). Early, and, in particular, large contributions in an 
equity campaign appear to serve as quality signals for investors, which may initiate 
information cascades that increase the number of later investors (Astebro, Fernández Sierra, 
Lovo, & Vulkan, 2017; Vismara, 2016b; Vulkan et al., 2016). While already involved during 
previous funding rounds investors as well as “family, friends, and fools constitute the majority 
of investors in the first week…relatively more sophisticated investors arrive thereafter” 
(Abrams, 2017, p. 3). In addition to securing early contributions, effective communication 
with the crowd appears to be another driver of equity crowdfunding success (Angerer, Brem, 
Kraus, & Peter, 2017). Successful entrepreneurs have been shown to strategically post updates 
during a campaign to inform prospective investors about business development and to 
enhance group identity and the level of cohesion with existing investors (Dorfleitner et al., 
2018; Li et al., 2016). These unsolicited updates posted by the entrepreneurs are shown to 
increase funding success, in particular, those containing information about new funding 
sources, business development processes, and marketing campaigns (Block, Hornuf, et al., 
2018). However, the investment dynamics associated with crowdfunding are not only 
influenced by the updates produced by entrepreneurs (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018), third-
party communication such as feedback provided by investors already involved in a campaign 
is also valued as a quality signal and may potentially influence other prospective investors` 
decision-making in a more significant way (Moritz, Block, & Lutz, 2015). Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher (2018) have demonstrated that the crowd positively reacts to comments posted 
by investors who already contributed to a project. The positive effect is strongest when 
comments contain potentially valuable feedback on the product or market, or when an 
investor posts that it is his or her second investment during the same campaign, or that he or 
she participated in a previous campaign of that startup. 
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However, even though scholars have studied updates provided by entrepreneurs and 
individual comments provided by individual investors after they invested, we know very little 
about equity crowdfunding discussion boards and whether active discussions on platforms 
affect investment behavior, and, ultimately, crowdfunding performance (Mochkabadi & 
Volkmann, 2018). Knowing that “…it might be possible that disclosed project description 
does not cover all relevant aspects for an investment decision” (Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 
2018, p. 32), and that reputation systems such as eBay or Amazon forums have the potential 
to signal quality to potential investors and thus effectively reduce information asymmetries 
(Tomboc, 2013), I believe that there is much to be learned through a critical inquiry of 
discussion boards on equity crowdfunding platforms. Whereas professional investors such as 
VCs possess relevant knowledge, access to a network of experts, and time to conduct 
comprehensive due diligence before making an investment, equity crowdfunding discussion 
boards serve as a one of few tools at the disposal of the crowd, in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and, more specifically,  serve as a proxy for equity crowdfunding due diligence. 
However, the online, impersonal nature of equity crowdfunding, as well as a much shorter 
timeframe, can significantly affect the equity crowdfunding due diligence process. Moreover, 
the majority of potential backers on equity crowdfunding platforms lack expertise and 
extensive networks of professional investors (Vismara, 2016b). As a result, the deal 
evaluation criteria of investors on equity crowdfunding platforms are not necessarily the same 
as those in more traditional settings, and analyzing these potential differences is a question 
that warrants further investigation.   
Research examining comments that were posted by investors who have already 
invested in a particular campaign (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018; Dorfleitner et al., 2018; Hornuf 
& Schwienbacher, 2018)  further enhances our understanding of the impact of communication 
on crowdfunding platforms. Nevertheless, even though these comments may serve as quality 
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signals to the crowd, knowing that the contributors already have “skin in the game” there is a 
risk that their input may be positively biased and, as such, may be described as a part of a 
marketing campaign aimed to mold the opinion of the crowd in favor of a particular project. 
Following these initial investigations of the role of strategic communication, the next 
logical step is to analyze online investor discussion forums as a medium for crowd investor 
due diligence (Kleinert & Volkmann, 2019). Hence, the current study seeks to understand in a 
more systematic way not only when investors engage in discussions and raise questions 
during an equity crowdfunding campaign, but, more importantly, how these dynamic 
exchanges that are initiated by the crowd ultimately impact campaign performance.  
Hypotheses development 
 I develop multiple hypotheses to address my central research questions. Beginning 
with the general nature of non-scripted communication, the first hypothesis investigates the 
impact of discussion intensity on crowdfunding performance. Building upon the many 
findings focused on the role of specific criteria in traditional equity funding settings, 
additional hypotheses are also developed. Specifically, the impact of threads regarding the 
quality of the team, the product, market, and financial aspects of a campaign are explored - at 
different stages of a crowdfunding campaign.   
The impact of open discussions on campaign performance 
The four decades of research on equity funding have enriched the idea that 
information exchanges between investors and entrepreneurs play a significant role both before 
and after the initial funding decision is made (Cable & Shane, 1997; Fried & Hisrich, 1994; 
Sapienza, 1992). Scholars have found that both entrepreneurs and investors are interested in 
engaging in dialogue, especially during the due diligence process, for several reasons. On the 
one hand, the need for further information is critically pressing for investors due to potential 
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adverse selection issues (Cable & Shane, 1997). On the other hand, entrepreneurs are advised 
to maintain open and frequent communication with investors in order to build a relationship 
of trust between the parties, which may ultimately result in a more favorable evaluation of a 
deal (Batjargal, 2007; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001).  
In the context of equity crowdfunding, the frequency of discussions is also likely to 
serve as a signal to the crowd and have an effect on investor decision-making knowing that 
potential investors appear to value updates and information exchanges during a campaign. 
While the updates provided by entrepreneurs have been shown to have some positive effect 
on performance (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018), the crowd seems to especially value third-party 
communication such as messages posted by investors involved in a campaign (Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher, 2018). As we have seen within the context of charity-based crowdfunding, 
studies have found that the relationship between crowdfunding success and the messages 
posted during the project follows an inverted U-shape (Gleasure & Feller, 2014), that is, it 
becomes negative if the number of messages increases significantly. 
Moreover, a large percentage of participants on equity crowdfunding platforms are 
unsophisticated investors, who have been shown to contribute during the early stages of 
campaigns as opposed to more sophisticated investors, who are more likely to invest at a later 
stage and who exhibit behavior patterns similar to those of VCs (Abrams, 2017). The less 
experienced investors from the crowd may be more prone to invest based on information 
cascades created by other investor contributions and comments than their professional 
counterparts (Vismara, 2016b). That is, experienced investors will not invest immediately, but 
rather ask additional questions as they conduct a brief due-diligence if they are interested in 
the pitch posted on the campaign. If they are not, they will be more likely to switch their 
interest to another project. Hence, unlike rewards-based campaigns, I propose that there is a 
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more linear positive relationship between the intensity of entrepreneur-investor discourse and 
crowdfunding performance. As such, I propose the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a general positive linear relationship between the intensity of 
investor-entrepreneur discussions and equity crowdfunding performance.  
Potential equity investors, regardless of the environment, typically evaluate a few key 
criteria of a deal when making an investment decision (Fried & Hisrich, 1988; Macmillan et 
al., 1985). Prior research has also highlighted that selected criteria may attract more attention 
from investors at different stages of the evaluation process (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Petty & 
Gruber, 2011). Several previous studies of equity crowdfunding decision-making report that 
the decision to invest is driven by rational, financial motives (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; 
Moysidou & Spaeth, 2016), and that, to some extent, the factors that affect the crowd’s 
investment decision-making resemble those of VCs. For example, Brem and Wassong (2014) 
found that the crowd’s investment decisions were influenced by team competencies, venture 
stage, and the business model as well as the anticipated return on investment. Other scholars 
have reported the importance of such factors as previous funding by VCs (Hornuf, Schmitt, & 
Stenzhorn, 2018), active communication strategy of entrepreneurs (Angerer et al., 2017), as 
well as the presence of a lead investor (Li et al., 2016). One of the potential advantages of the 
virtual nature of crowdfunding platforms is that a thread about any of these criteria, whether it 
be a comment or a question, can be initiated by and responded to at any time by one of a 
multitude of potential investors. Yet, it is difficult for one to predict the importance and the 
associated timing of the evaluation criteria used by unsophisticated investors in the equity 
crowdfunding context.  
Any deal or project is ultimately highly dependent upon the perceived quality of the 
product and the nature of the market, and these factors have been identified as important by 
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professional investors during the screening stage (Macmillan et al., 1985; Macmillan, 
Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987). Drawing upon this logic, I expect that during the early 
stage (i.e., a first week) of a campaign most of the investor-entrepreneur discussions will be 
focused on the product and market as these are fundamental elements that will provide critical 
information regarding the project’s commercial potential. I propose that some potential 
investors might still focus on the product and market criteria after the first week, but this 
interest would mean that the project does not entirely convince them, and therefore, they 
would be less likely to move on to other discussions, and, ultimately, they would be less likely 
to invest. Once satisfied with the commercial elements, professional investors commonly shift 
focus to the financial criteria during the latter stage of the evaluation process (Petty & Gruber, 
2011). Although the time frame in equity crowdfunding may be more accelerated than in the 
classic VC context, the importance of the financial elements of a project will be equally 
recognized by potential investors (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf & Neuenkirch, 2017) and I 
expect finance to feature in discussions later in the campaign after the first week. Of course, if 
investors are focused on finance during the first week, this may signal either a remarkable 
opportunity or, more likely, some grave concerns regarding the valuation which immediately 
attracts the attention of sophisticated investors (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Mason & Harrison, 
1996). 
Overall, I propose that investor-entrepreneur discussions of more successful 
campaigns will take place in two stages, with first week discussions focused on product and 
market, and post-first week discussions focused on finance. Accordingly, I propose the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: Discussions about product and market during the first week will be 
positively related to crowdfunding performance.  
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Hypothesis 2b: Discussions focused on finance after the first week will be positively 
related to crowdfunding performance. 
Of the many criteria that have been identified, the relative importance of and focus on 
the management team within the domain of equity investment decision-making is well 
established in the new venture funding literature (Muzyka et al., 1996; Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). However, the evidence regarding the salience of 
information about project team in the context of crowdfunding is limited. In keeping with 
much of the VC decision-making literature, selected studies highlight the vital role of the set 
of characteristics related to the team and entrepreneurs` social capital (Piva & Rossi-
Lamastra, 2018; Vismara, 2016a). Bernstein, Korteweg, and Laws (2017) take the human 
capital argument further and assert that early stage investors base their decisions primarily on 
the information about the founding team.  
Yet, it is important to note that there are also findings reported in the equity 
crowdfunding literature that may challenge this normative view. Notably, Dorfleitner et al. 
(2018) have found that among all the updates provided by entrepreneurs, only a few of the 
updates were dedicated to a team. Similarly, Block, Hornuf, et al. (2018) have demonstrated 
that, unlike additional information about new funding sources, business development 
processes, and marketing campaigns, updates about the team have no significant effect on 
fundraising dynamics. However, these studies examined the entrepreneur generated updates 
as opposed to the discussion threads that are initiated by the crowd. Consequently, owing to 
the focus on investor-led discussions and the more general findings concerning team quality 
being an essential evaluation criterion for professional and crowd-based investors alike, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: Discussions focused on the team will be positively related to crowdfunding 
performance. 
Methodology 
Sources of data 
The online equity crowdfunding landscape is quite diverse as platforms widely differ 
concerning the terms and features provided. First of all, while the majority of crowdfunding 
platforms are open for both non-professional and more sophisticated investors, others such as 
OurCrowd (Israel) or Syndicate Room (UK) target only professionals and high net worth 
individuals. Moreover, platforms vary significantly with respect to the degree of certification 
being provided. Whereas some platforms only ensure the regulatory compliance of the 
crowdfunding campaigns listed on their site, the majority of platforms also verify the 
accuracy of projections and business plans. Only a minority of equity crowdfunding services 
such as OurCrowd (Israel) conduct a comprehensive assessment of projects, or, in other 
words, due diligence somewhat similar to that of VCs. Consequently, in general, 
crowdinvestors are expected to perform their own due diligence. To facilitate the process, 
most of the platforms have introduced online discussion platforms where prospective 
investors may communicate with the team as well as read comments and questions of other 
crowdinvestors and read the responses from the team.  
Most of the equity crowdfunding platforms operate in an all-or-nothing fashion, 
meaning that a minimum funding goal must be reached in order to receive funding from the 
crowd. Additionally, the majority of services permit overfunding, whereby a team may 
continue to raise additional funding once the minimum goal is attained. Usually, during the 
overfunding period, investors contribute at the same terms as at the general funding stage. In 
other words, the pre-money valuation does not change, whereas the post-money valuation 
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increases, and more equity is released after each new investment. Consequently, the value of 
investments made by the crowd stays the same regardless of the degree of overfunding; 
however, after each new overfunding investment, an equity stake of previous investors is 
diluted. Please refer to Table 13 for an overview of leading equity crowdfunding platforms 
with respect to the parameters discussed above.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Table 13 about here]] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
The data on the equity crowdfunding campaigns was collected from Crowdcube over 
the period spanning from September 30, 2017, to September 30, 2018. Crowdcube is the most 
prominent equity crowdfunding platform in the world and represents about 22% of the overall 
equity crowdfunding capital raised worldwide between 2017 and 2018 (InsideTab, 2018). The 
platform`s functionality is typical for equity crowdfunding and satisfies our needs in terms of 
providing an online forum and access to all potential investors. The average funding success 
rate reported by the platform is around 50-60% (Crowdcube, 2019). I hand-collected titles of 
investor discussion sections as well as descriptions of all campaigns that were completed until 
the end of the observation period. Altogether, I analyzed more than 4,400 headlines of 
investor-entrepreneur discussion sections pertaining to the 276 Crowdcube campaigns that 
were active during the observation period. Overall, given the significance of Crowdcube in 
the equity crowdfunding landscape, and the fact that I was able to track all campaigns within 
the one-year time frame, I obtained a comprehensive representation of investor-entrepreneur 
communication in the equity crowdfunding context. 
In order to focus on specific topics, I developed a coding scheme that categorized the 
discussions into subjects. The original text data – the headlines of investor-entrepreneur 
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discussion – which were copied verbatim, have been analyzed using qualitative methods to 
reveal the topics present in the discourse (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). 
Equity crowdfunding is a phenomenon that resembles non-equity crowdfunding and 
more traditional sources of funding as VCs and BAs because both experienced and non-
experienced investors invest on these platforms. Given some affinity of equity crowdfunding 
with VCs and BAs, I expected that some of the discussion points raised by crowdinvestors 
would be similar to those of VCs and BAs. Accordingly, I developed the initial coding 
scheme based upon the VC and BA decision-making literature and adapted it as the coding 
progressed (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011). The final coding scheme is 
comprised of six discussion categories: Product & Model, Market, Finance, Team, 
Fundraising Strategy, and Other. Please refer to Table 14 for an overview of the coding 
categories and illustrative quotes.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Table 14 about here]] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
A systematic process was employed to ensure the validity and reliability of the coding. 
First, each passage of text, code, or another relevant piece of evidence data was preserved, and 
a coherent, extensive explanation for each variable was recorded. Second, an experienced 
qualitative researcher examined the data analysis procedure, the coding scheme development, 
and the resulting conceptual categories. Third, a second researcher who was not directly 
involved in the data collection recoded a random sample of investor-entrepreneur discussion 
titles. The sample was comprised of 59 campaigns, and 2065, or 15% of the total lines of 
code. Afterward, the interrater agreement was examined by calculating Cohen's Unweighted 
Kappa (Cohen, 1960). The result (K=0.8755) has signified a high level of interrater reliability 
(Landis & Koch, 1977).  
96 
 
I complemented these records with data from InsideTab – a proprietary crowdfunding 
database. InsideTab is one of the most extensive databases that aggregates data on 
crowdfunding from both individual platforms and industry level statistics. The information 
supplied by InsideTab includes, but is not limited to, the amount of money raised during a 
particular campaign, project goal, status of a campaign (failure/success), and the number of 
crowdinvestors as well as aggregated industry-level data. For all the 276 Crowdcube 
campaigns during the period under study, I utilized data related to numerous parameters such 
as the amount of funding raised, the number of investors, and whether a given project 
succeeded or failed in reaching the funding goal as well as more general data on campaign 
funding targets and industry dynamics.  
Dependent variables 
In the empirical analysis, the dependent variable crowdfunding performance includes 
several different aspects of crowdfunding success. I operationalize crowdfunding performance 
using three different variables that have frequently been highlighted in the crowdfunding 
literature (Ahlers et al., 2015; Piva & Rossi-Lamastra, 2018; Vulkan et al., 2016). Utilizing a 
variety of measures allows capturing both the magnitude and scope of crowdfunding 
performance (Anglin, Wolfe, Short, McKenny, & Pidduck, 2018).  
Raised overall. The total amount of funding raised during a campaign is measured using 
InsideTab data. 
Overall investors. The total number of investors who contributed to a project is captured by 
InsideTab data. 
Final funding rate. This is a ratio that indicates the relationship between the funding target 
and the amount raised and is calculated using data from InsideTab as well as campaign 




Discussions. This variable captures the total number of investor-entrepreneur dialogues 
posted on discussion boards for a given campaign.  
Product & Model. All information about a project`s business model, product, strategy, and 
future offerings/plans are included in this variable.  
Market. These discussions include topics related to market characteristics, competition, and 
regulations.  
Financial. This variable comprises all the discussions about financial projections and a new 
venture`s potential to generate a return for investors.  
Team. This variable includes any comments or questions about the project`s founders and 
employees.  
Fundraising strategy. This variable comprises information on the overall fundraising strategy 
for a project, previous funding rounds, reasons for choosing crowdfunding over other sources 
of funding as well as clarification questions about the crowdfunding mechanism.  
Other. This variable is dedicated to threads that do not fit into any of the aforementioned 
groups.  
Controls  
 Building on existing research on non-equity and equity crowdfunding, I include 
numerous control variables to account for established determinants of crowdfunding 
performance, which are defined below. 
Industry classification (primary) (Hornuf & Schmitt, 2016). This variable contains a 
campaign`s primary industry classification code based on the United Kingdom Standard 
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Industrial Classification (UKSIC). The code is assigned according to official company 
registry information or, if this information is not available, according to the description 
provided by a campaign itself.  
Industry classification (secondary). This variable contains (if data were available) a 
campaign`s secondary industry classification code based on UKSIC.  
Funding goal (Vulkan et al., 2016). This variable indicated an initial funding goal, which was 
needed to be attained in order for a campaign to be successful. 
Equity offered (Kumar & Langberg, 2017). This variable provides information on the final 
amount of equity offered to the crowd at the end of an equity crowdfunding campaign. 
Pre-money valuation (Vulkan et al., 2016). This variable indicates a pre-money valuation 
provided in campaign description. 
Campaign duration (Lukkarinen et al., 2016). The variable contains information on the length 
of a campaign based on the records provided by InsideTab as well information recorded 
directly from the Crowdcube website. 
Ongoing campaigns (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018). This variable records the number of 
campaigns running on Crowdcube simultaneously.  
Competing investments (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018). The total amount of funding raised on 
Crowdcube throughout a given campaign. 
Empirical models 
I utilize the following econometric techniques to estimate my models. Because Raised 
overall, Overall investors and Final funding rate are non-normally distributed, I use the 
generalized linear model (GLM) which allows for dependent variables to be non-normally 
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distributed (MacCullagh & Nelder, 1984). I also control for highly influential observations by 
calculating Cook's distance and creating a dummy variable Sample to account for data points 
that may distort the outcome and accuracy of regressions. The estimation coefficients for 
Raised overall, Overall investors are represented by natural logs, while the coefficients for 
Final funding rate are squared roots of the original values. 
Results 
Table 15 offers a summary of the discussion themes, both overall and grouped by 
campaign stage. In each instance, the dominant discussion threads are related to the product 
and business model as well as the financial aspects of a project. Interest in the fundraising 
strategy is consistently present in about one-fifth of the discussion threads, while discussions 
regarding the market appear less frequently. Questions and comments focused on the team are 
least likely, being present quite infrequently in discussions regardless of the campaign stage. 
With respect to a campaign stage, there are no significant differences regarding the 
distribution of topics, except for Finance. Please refer to Table 16 for the results of the 
respective T-test. Table 17 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample, and Table 18 
displays the correlation matrix of all variables. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Tables 15, 16, 17 and 18 about here]] 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 plots the average distribution of discussion threads per day, whereas Figure 4 
displays the distribution of discussion topics at different stages of Crowdcube`s campaigns.  
During the first few days of the most dynamic campaigns, the number of threads can 
be as high as 60 and, on average, I find that over 48% of all discussions take place in the first 
seven days. As can be seen in Figure 3, the average number of discussions per campaign 
steeply declines after the first couple of days until reaching a low steady-state in the middle of 
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a campaign, with a very minor uptake in discussions just prior to the close of the campaign. 
There are no significant differences with respect to the distribution patterns of different 
discussion topics over the course of a campaign as can been seen in Figure 4. Thus, the 
distribution of investor-entrepreneur discussions in my sample is similar to the L-shaped 
dynamic pattern of equity crowdinvesting (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018), with the majority 
of investing activity taking place during the first week and then trailing off dramatically. In 
line with the previous research on crowdfunding which analyzes the impact of the sentiment 
of backer comments and entrepreneur updates on crowdfunding performance (Courtney et al., 
2017; Dorfleitner et al., 2018), I also examined the sentiment expressed in the headlines of 
investor-entrepreneur discussions using NVivo sentiment analysis tool. The vast majority of 
the text (94.69%) was coded as neutral. Given the small number of non-neutral threads, I did 
not proceed with further statistical analysis of sentiment. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Figures 3 and 4 about here]] 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 19, 20, and 21 provide the results of the hypothesis tests concerning the funds 
raised, number of investors, and funding rate, respectively. These tables include both the 
coefficients and standard errors of the models.  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
[[Please insert Tables 19, 20, and 21 about here]] 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Hypothesis 1 proposed a positive (linear) relationship between the number of 
comments and crowdfunding performance. The independent variable Discussions has a 
positive and statistically significant effect for all models I use (funds raised: b = 0.033, p < 




Hypothesis 2a proposed that discussions about product and market during the first 
week are positively related to crowdfunding performance. The Product & Model first week 
estimation coefficients are consistently insignificant for all the models. However, they 
become positive and significant if I focus on the post first week discussions (funds raised: b = 
0.028, p < 0.1; backers: b = 0.035, p < 0.01; funding rate: b = 0. 010, p < 0.1). The Market 
category for the first week is positive and significant level for all three models (funds raised: b 
= 0.085, p < 0.05; backers: b = 0.075, p < 0.01; funding rate: b = 0.034, p < 0.01). Overall, I 
find mixed support for hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 2b suggested that discussions on finance after the first week are positively 
related to crowdfunding performance. The estimation results for Finance category after the 
first week are indeed consistently positive and significant (funds raised: b = 0.055, p < 0.01; 
backers: b = 0.050, p < 0.01; funding rate: b = 0. 018, p < 0.01). Therefore, hypothesis 2b is 
supported. 
Based on the existing literature, I expected that the frequency of investor-entrepreneur 
discussions regarding team would be comparable to such topics as finance, product, market, 
fundraising strategy, and business model. Somewhat surprisingly, less than 3% of all coded 
headings of discussions may be attributed to the Team category, which is in stark contrast to 
Finance (32.46%), Product & Model (30.96%) or Market (16.02%). Moreover, hypothesis 3 
proposed that discussions about the team will be significantly related to crowdfunding 
performance. Counter to my expectations, the independent variable Team has no statistically 
significant effect on crowdfunding performance. Therefore, I do not find support for 




 One of the central questions of this study is centered on the role of equity 
crowdfunding discussions boards, and whether active discussions may affect the outcome of 
campaigns. I argued that discussion platforms serve as a tool to reduce the information 
asymmetry for potential investors and that the intensity of discourse, or, in other words, the 
number of discussions, may trigger information cascades and attract less sophisticated 
investors to a campaign. The results demonstrate that the number of dialogue threads has a 
statistically and economically significant positive effect on crowdfunding performance 
regardless of how the performance is measured. Most generally, these findings provide further 
support for the view that communication between investors plays an essential role in 
investment decision-making (Estrin, Gozman, & Khavul, 2018). By demonstrating the 
influence of investor-entrepreneur discussions on equity crowdfunding performance, I 
contribute to an emerging stream of research on more dynamic signals in equity crowdfunding 
(Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018). While online communication 
with the team as well as with other investors appears to be essential for crowd decision-
making (Moritz et al., 2015), little systematic knowledge exists about whether active investor-
entrepreneur discussions on platforms affect investment behavior. Given that similar 
reputation systems were shown to be very powerful in the context of Amazon and eBay 
(Tomboc, 2013), and, correspondingly, discussion forums have been adopted by major equity 
crowdfunding platforms across the globe, I believe that this is an issue that warrants detailed 
investigation. Consequently, my analysis makes one of the first steps towards understanding 
the role of these reputation systems in equity crowdfunding. 
 While online discussion boards are relatively new phenomena, other forms of 
certification relying upon third-party assessment have been extensively studied by 
entrepreneurship scholars. As emerging firms possess a limited track record and the evidence 
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about their quality is usually inconclusive, investors make their judgments based on the 
reputation of  startup partners (Stuart et al., 1999), previous investors (Drover, Wood, & 
Zacharakis, 2015) and referrals from investor networks (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). Third-party 
certification is also present in other domains of management such as human resources where 
referred applicants gain a significant advantage over non-referred applicants in the hiring 
process (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997). Thus, while the analysis of the discussion boards is 
one of the first of its kind in equity crowdfunding literature, the underlying certification 
mechanism I uncovered resembles other instances of third-party certification and reputation 
building well-documented by entrepreneurship scholars (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Megginson & 
Weiss, 1991; Shane & Cable, 2002). 
Beyond the intensity of discourse, this study also offers a detailed analysis of the 
evaluation criteria addressed in discussion boards on platforms. The growing literature on 
equity crowdfunding states that investment decision-making is affected by a diverse set of 
factors such as team quality, entrepreneur social capital and project characteristics (Ahlers et 
al., 2015; Piva & Rossi-Lamastra, 2018). We know little, however, about whether investor 
decision-making criteria evolve over time and during the course of the campaign. The results 
indicate that messages posted about the market during the first week, and finance as well as 
product and business model after the first week, are positively correlated to crowdfunding 
performance. I originally envisaged that investors begin with questions about the market, 
product, and business model, and then move directly to finances. However, it appears that, for 
more successful campaigns, the discussions about product and business model continue to 
matter to potential investors beyond the first week. One possible explanation is that equity 
crowdfunding is a mixed environment between reward-based crowdfunding and professional 
investment, and, thus, many everyday investors will be attracted primarily by the product. 
One notable example of this investor mix is Brewdog – one of the most successful campaigns 
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in the history of equity crowdfunding that raised £26M from 1530 of investors, a result that 
would not have been possible without the support from their consumers and dedicated 
fanbase. Interestingly, the evaluation pattern of the crowd resembles that of professional 
investors who also begin by addressing the market and then moving to the financial 
projections if they are still interested (Petty & Gruber, 2011). Yet, due to the pace and 
specificity of crowdfunding campaigns, the due diligence cycle is significantly shorter and 
involves product-focused discussions even at a later stage. 
One of the surprising findings of this study is the paucity of discussion about the 
startup team (<3% of all threads). While team-related issues have consistently featured in the 
venture capital decision-making literature for early-stage investment decision-making 
(Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000), potential investors on equity 
crowdfunding campaigns do not tend to seek additional information about it during 
campaigns. I propose two explanations for these results. Firstly, investors may put little value 
on signals about the team coming from a team itself as the information may be viewed as 
being self-serving and biased. Secondly, investors may be more interested in learning more 
about the dynamic aspects of a campaign such as new information about business 
development and new external financing for a project (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018). While 
team composition is unlikely to change significantly during a campaign, which, on average, 
lasts for less than seven weeks, it is enough time for an entrepreneur to conduct an additional 
market test, revise financial projections, or modify the plans for their funding strategy.  
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on investment decision-making in 
equity crowdfunding (Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015; Hoegen et al., 2018; Moritz et al., 2015). 
Specifically, I add to the studies of selection criteria used by crowdinvestors. While scholars 
have made significant progress in understanding how predesigned parameters such as a 
business plan or a video affect crowdfunding performance, despite few exceptions (Block, 
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Hornuf, et al., 2018; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018), we know very little about the effect of 
more dynamic signals such as investor-entrepreneur communication. While the study by 
Kleinert and Volkmann (2019) began to address investor-entrepreneur online discussions, my 
analysis investigates this communication in detail and shows that it matters for the success of 
campaigns and also that the focus of this communication regarding the evaluation criteria 
used by investors evolves throughout a campaign.  
Implications for practice 
Crowdfunding, and in particular, its equity form has a significant potential to 
democratize the world of entrepreneurial finance. While it has already opened up enormous 
possibilities for both entrepreneurs and amateur investors, it is essential that the growing 
numbers of everyday investors make informed funding decisions and support productive 
entrepreneurship. Traditional due diligence mechanisms are less available in the equity 
crowdfunding context, yet, I argue, the discussions between entrepreneurs and investors serve 
as a close proxy for the assessment process. Hence, this discourse may provide several 
benefits to, and be highly valued by, potential investors. They need to be prepared to ask 
additional questions and monitor the entrepreneur’s dialogue with other potential investors to 
ensure that informed financial decisions are made. Specifically, the contributions for investors 
are twofold. First, I argue that investors need to go beyond pre-scripted videos and pitch 
documents and make even better use of discussions with entrepreneurs to receive more 
impromptu feedback. Second, investors should capitalize on the wisdom of crowds as 
feedback posted by a particular investor may be read and interpreted by others as well.  
These findings are also relevant for entrepreneurs seeking to raise money on equity 
crowdfunding platforms. Monitoring and managing investor communication during a 
campaign may be as significant as designing the campaign itself. In particular, the first week 
of fundraising appears to be especially influential, so entrepreneurs need to put as much effort 
106 
 
as possible into securing initial traction. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are advised to be ready 
for additional questions from the crowd, particularly questions concerning the product and 
business model, the target market, and financial projections. However, the crowd is unlikely 
to pose additional questions about the team, so, a complete description of the team should be 
available from the outset of a campaign.  
Limitations and further research 
The limitations of this study also provide opportunities for future research. The first 
limitation is related to the fact that I have analyzed the headlines of investor-entrepreneur 
discussions, not the discussions themselves. This approach allowed for a careful qualitative 
analysis of themes in the data, which was one of the objectives of this study. While analyzing 
headlines instead of complete texts is an approach frequently used in digital communication 
research (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Lai & Farbrot, 2014), it would be beneficial to study 
complete discussion threads as well (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & 
Hugo Lambert, 2015). Given the magnitude of the data, I expect that this analysis should be 
performed using advanced analytical techniques such as machine learning. Second, I know 
what topic or criterion was discussed but do not account for the reputation or status of the 
individual posting a comment or question. Specifically, it would be of interest to study the 
role of investor “opinion leaders” (Li & Du, 2011) in the online crowdfunding due diligence 
process. It is possible that the crowdinvestors that enjoy very good reputation may initiate 
information cascades, which will ultimately attract other potential investors. A social network 
analysis would be suitable for such an investigation. Third, I uncovered the general pattern of 
the investor-entrepreneur communication, which is L-shaped, but I did not delve deeper into 
the communication patterns with respect to a particular campaign (Costa, Yamaguchi, Traina, 
Caetano Traina, & Faloutsos, 2015). It would be beneficial to analyze this topic in more 
details. For example, researchers could try to uncover the distinction between different types 
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of communication decay patterns and their impact on the outcome of equity crowdfunding 
campaigns. Furthermore, I did not control for a founder`s experience in crowdfunding 
(Allison, Davis, Webb, & Short, 2017; Gafni, Marom, & Sade, 2019). It might be potentially 
interesting to analyze whether entrepreneurs manage the communication with the crowd 
differently depending on their previous experience of online fundraising. Finally, one of the 
limitations of this study is related to the issue of causality. Given the design of the study, it is 
impossible to discern whether a higher number of discussions makes campaigns more 
successful, or, alternatively, if more attractive and successful campaigns generate more 
attention from the crowd (Holland, 1986). Further investigation utilizing an experiment could 
potentially disentangle the influence of due diligence discussions from campaign-specific 
fixed effects.  
Overall, my study is one of the first systematic attempts to analyze the role of 
investor-entrepreneur discourse on discussion forums in equity crowdfunding. As such, it lays 
the foundation for further research on impromptu investor-entrepreneur communication, due 
diligence, and investor decision making in the equity crowdfunding context.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – Conclusion 
 This dissertation was completed in order to investigate the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding across several countries as well as to conduct an initial assessment of the role 
of investor-entrepreneur discussions in equity crowdfunding decision-making. These areas of 
inquiry are addressed by analyzing archival materials pertaining to the legalization process, as 
well as the data on the equity crowdfunding campaign dynamics. This final chapter aims to 
highlight some of the major findings of this study and emphasize a few promising avenues for 
research. 
Theoretical contributions 
This study investigates the phenomenon of equity crowdfunding at the industry and 
organization levels, and, therefore, I aim to contribute to the streams of research on equity 
crowdfunding, related to both levels of analysis. Although the main contributions of this 
dissertation are to the literature on equity crowdfunding and entrepreneurial finance, I also 
provide valuable insights into the process of new industry emergence and evolution, as well as 
to the studies of industrial policy-making.  
First, I offer a contribution to a small but growing body of literature on how national 
institutional environment shapes the industry of equity crowdfunding (Cumming, Vanacker, 
et al., 2019; Johan et al., 2018). Based on the analysis of the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding in the U.S., the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand I propose that a close 
collaboration between crowdfunding entrepreneurs and relevant stakeholders, in particular, 
policymakers, has played a central role in creating vibrant equity crowdfunding ecosystems. 
Moreover, framing equity crowdfunding as a public interest phenomenon, which may 
simultaneously promote the public good and national competitiveness, was instrumental in 
securing support from politicians. More generally, I identify several country-specific 
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attributes that may help local equity crowdfunding ecosystem flourish such as a slowdown in 
the field of entrepreneurial finance, a shared view on the essential role of entrepreneurship in 
the economy, as well as a strong determination to adopt pro-crowdfunding policies rapidly.  
Additionally, this study contributes to a better understanding of dynamic, on-going 
information cues produced during an equity crowdfunding campaign such as online dialogues 
between entrepreneurs and investors (Block, Hornuf, et al., 2018; Dorfleitner et al., 2018). At 
a more general level, I offer substantial evidence to support the view that communication 
between investors and entrepreneurs plays a vital role in crowdfunding decision-making 
(Estrin et al., 2018). More specifically, I argue that discussion boards adopted by many equity 
crowdfunding are instrumental in reducing information asymmetry inherent for new venture 
financing. In fact, the intensity of discourse, or, put differently, the number of discussion 
threads, may cause information cascades and attract unsophisticated investors to a campaign.  
I also contribute to the research on selection criteria applied by crowd investors. The 
results of this study indicate that, similar to VCs and BAs, crowdinvestors take into account 
such new venture`s dimensions as a product, market, finance, and team. In line with previous 
studies of investor decision-making (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011), the 
focus of investors’ attention shifts throughout a campaign. For example, the importance of 
finance-centered discussions significantly increases after the first week of fundraising. 
Although the evaluation pattern of the crowd follows that of professional investors, two 
considerable differences between the two exist. First, crowdinvestors do not tend to look for 
additional information about a project team during campaigns. I explain these results by the 
potential lack of trust in the information about a team quality provided by a team itself. 
Second, the crowdinvestor`s due diligence cycle is very short and includes product-focused 
queries even at a later stage, which may be attributed to the pace and specific characteristics 
of crowdfunding campaigns such as an increased emphasis on a product.  
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More generally, this study also adds to the literature on new industry emergence and 
policy-making (Georgallis et al., 2018; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). This analysis suggests that 
the process of new industry emergence and change may be less conflictual than previously 
proposed if several boundary conditions are met. Primarily, the proponents of a new industry 
should try to leverage the “public interest” frame, which signifies that a new industry or 
product, in some way, contributes to the public good. Additionally, this study enhances our 
understanding of the role of government actors in the legalization process with respect to 
emerging industries or products requiring regulatory approval. The results of this 
investigation illustrate that government policy on emerging industries is defined 
endogenously rather than exogenously. Specifically, policymakers are more likely to proceed 
with the legalization of an emergent industry if they perceive it as a powerful means to attain 
their goals, such as enhancing national competitiveness. Also, several contributing factors 
affect government stance on new industries such as pressure exerted by relevant stakeholders, 
the general government strategy in a given organizational field as well as the adoption of an 
innovation in question by another country, which is a perceived as a competitor. 
Implications for practice 
 This study also has practical implications for policymakers seeking to revise 
regulations in light of innovations as well as for entrepreneurs aspiring to raise funding, and 
investors planning to invest on one of equity crowdfunding platforms.  
Policymakers 
 This study offers some important findings for policymakers facing the need to react to 
recent innovations such as equity crowdfunding. First, governments are advised to be more 
accommodating with regard to the possible introduction of regulatory changes. Inflexible 
regulatory environments are likely to hinder entrepreneurial innovations seriously and may 
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even prompt entrepreneurs to launch puzzling for regulators, yet high-potential ventures in 
other countries with a more liberal regulatory approach.  
 In contrast, a coherent policy towards equity crowdfunding or other innovations may 
be instrumental in securing a country`s leadership status in a given field. Furthermore, 
policymakers are advised to coordinate with regulators and industry associations to assure a 
complete and swift adoption of new rules. As the U.S. example demonstrated, in dynamic 
industries such as equity crowdfunding the first mover advantage may not endure as other 
countries watch intently for innovations that may be quickly and easily copied.  
Entrepreneurs 
 Any entrepreneur intending to raise money on equity crowdfunding platforms should 
be aware that mastering investor communication during a campaign is a task that cannot be 
taken lightly. A team that is able to avoid a conflict with the crowd might be perceived as 
being more capable of establishing better customer relationships as the pool of crowd 
investors is very diverse and, depending on the industry, may consist of product`s potential 
consumers. Months of preparation, time and resources spent on a professional video, 
spreadsheets and a business plan may be wasted if a discussion between a team and potential 
crowdinvestors leads to a misunderstanding or ultimate breakdown in the relations between 
the two parties. These narratives are recorded and cannot be easily deleted. Thus, they are an 
enduring signal that could serve as an endorsement of the quality or might undermine an 
entrepreneur`s reputation. Also, entrepreneurs should be ready to go beyond the initial 
campaign description and respond to as many additional questions as necessary. Particular 
attention should be paid to the queries regarding the product and business model, the market, 
and the financial projection. While the crowd is unlikely to pose additional questions about 
the team, it does not mean that this criterion lacks importance. Instead, it signifies that a 
comprehensive description of a venture`s management should be available from the beginning 
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of a campaign. Overall, responding to Q&A as well the general ability to run a campaign and 
stay diplomatic regardless of the circumstances needs to be taken very seriously by 
entrepreneurs as these skills serve as their proxies for entrepreneurial ability. 
More generally, entrepreneurs should be informed of the fact that the future of their 
companies may hinge on the perception of their ventures among different stakeholders. To 
give an example, pioneering businesses operating in regulated industries may gain legal 
acceptance if their framing is complementary to the goals of regulators and policymakers. The 
results of this study indicate that the framing of new ventures as champions of the public 
interest and national competitiveness may be conducive to securing strong political support 
from government actors. Thus, when reflecting upon their business ideas, entrepreneurs are 
suggested to target broader societal issues such as global warming, unemployment, or gender 
equality in one way or another. 
Investors 
Equity crowdfunding has changed the landscape of entrepreneurial finance and 
empowered the general public to participate in new venture funding, previously restricted to a 
closed circle of professionals. It is vital that individuals lacking expertise and privileged 
access to investment networks take advantage of the unparalleled opportunities offered by 
equity crowdfunding. 
Everyday investors seeking to invest money on equity crowdfunding platforms need to 
familiarize themselves with quality control mechanisms at their disposal. Even though 
comprehensive due diligence may not be readily available, investors should make good use of 
online discussion boards, which may offer many advantages. While campaign videos and 
pitch documents warrant proper consideration, great emphasis should also be placed on 
impromptu discussions with entrepreneurs. In addition to receiving immediate feedback from 
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a team, the discussion mechanism allows investors to leverage the wisdom of the crowd as all 
messages posted by any user can also be read and interpreted by others. Crowdinvestors 
would not be able to pick high potential investments by relying on the crowdfunding 
discussion mechanism only; however, this mechanism is very efficient at eliminating less 
attractive deals. 
Limitations 
 The research design and data collection methods impose inherent limitations to this 
study. First, the systematic analysis of the legalization processes of equity crowdfunding is 
limited by the exclusive reliance on historical archival data. On the one hand, archival 
research is less susceptible to recall or post-hoc rationalization biases typical for interviews or 
surveys (Bucheli, 2014). On the other hand, unlike field research, which allows an 
investigator to interview various stakeholders, archival methods necessarily entail heavy 
dependence on written evidence. The documentary sources utilized in this study such as 
transcripts of Congressional (U.S.) or parliamentary hearings offer a detailed account of what 
was said during a specific session. However, any political process is not restricted to formal 
procedures such as parliamentary hearings. As a result, many important decisions are made 
during informal, undocumented discussions, which, oftentimes, take place behind closed 
doors. Obviously, I could not track or attend these meetings in person. Thus, the completeness 
rather than the quality of the data might be a potential issue of this study. 
 Furthermore, the regularities observed in the legalization of equity crowdfunding 
could enhance our understanding regarding other legalization processes that take place in 
developed countries with strong formal institutions. Many emerging countries are 
characterized by dysfunctional institutions. Consequentially, their legalization processes can 
be more erratic than described in this study. Also, authoritarian regimes may exert tight 
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control over public media. Thus, the discursive processes analyzed in this dissertation may not 
play such a prominent role there in comparison to the United States or the United Kingdom.  
 Finally, the qualitative analysis conducted in Chapter Four of this dissertation offers a 
complete yet slightly simplified view of the themes found in online discussions between 
entrepreneurs and investors. I focused on the headlines of the discussions and favored 
parsimonious coding labels over more elaborate descriptions of the themes. This approach 
facilitated further statistical analysis of the results and was perfectly suitable for this study, 
which aimed to provide a first systematic analysis of the investor-entrepreneur 
communication; however, some slight nuances and emergent meanings might have been lost 
during the process. 
Further research 
 The results of this dissertation lay the foundations for several avenues of future 
research. First, moving beyond the case study format, further examinations could test how 
various institutional factors such as the size of VC market, the presence of pro-
entrepreneurship policies, and macroeconomic dynamics shape government policy on equity 
crowdfunding across a large sample of countries. It will be of scientific interest to include 
developing countries such as India or China in this study. Large populations, along with the 
increasing Internet penetration rate and growing middle-class wealth, generate strong 
momentum for equity crowdfunding.  
 In addition to the themes identified in the online discussions between investors and 
entrepreneurs in this analysis, further studies could conduct an even more thorough 
examination of these discussions using advanced research methods. For example, scholars 
could carry out a qualitative narrative analysis to understand how investors make sense of 
new ventures through interactions with entrepreneurs as well as how entrepreneur`s framing 
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of their projects shapes the perception of the crowd (Garud & Giuliani, 2013). Alternatively, 
researchers could utilize advanced analytic techniques such as social network analysis to 
study whether discussions initiated by prospective investors that enjoy very good reputation 
may initiate information cascades, which will ultimately attract other potential investors 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). 
 Furthermore, scholars are encouraged to conduct more of longitudinal studies as well 
as studies that analyze multiple platforms across several countries. We need to develop a more 
complete understanding of selection criteria used by crowdinvestors, and whether those 
criteria change depending on the macroeconomic environment or platform parameters. Also, 
given the significant presence of non-sophisticated investors on equity crowdfunding 
platforms, it would be of considerable interest to find out whether the decision-making 
procedures of these investors evolve over time, and, potentially, if they develop evaluation 
patterns similar to those of professional investors.  
At a more general level, scholars could acquire a more thorough understanding about 
the legalization of new types of ventures operating in regulated markets by analyzing the 
legalization process in emerging countries characterized by “institutional voids” (Puffer et al., 
2010). Governments of numerous developed countries may be rather skeptical about 
innovations that target established and relatively well-functioning industries such as the taxi 
market. By comparison, ridesharing alternatives such as Uber were not the subject of 
widespread criticism in emerging markets because of the appalling state of public 
transportation or taxi services, to be more specific (Uzunca et al., 2018). Further studies could 
investigate if appealing to “public interest” is particularly useful in developing markets as 
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Table 1. Organizing framework for research on Equity crowdfunding/overview of main themes 
Focus/theme Levels of analysis 
used 
Examples of DVs 
used 
Examples of IVs 
used 
Examples of studies 
Determinants of 
funding success 
Platform level Funding success Discourse on 
platforms; funding 
dynamics; 




(Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Block, Hornuf, et al., 
2018; Dorfleitner et 
al., 2018; 
Lukkarinen et al., 
2016; Vulkan et al., 
2016), this study 




















(Ahlers et al., 2015; 




2019; Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher, 
2018; Mohammadi 
& Shafi, 2018; 




and the reasons for 





ENT decision to 
seek equity 
crowdfunding; 
Reasons for seeking 
funds from ECF 
Venture and team 
characteristics; 
previous 
experience of ENT 
with banks or VCs 
(Belleflamme et al., 
2014; Brown, 









between ECF and 






investors before or 
after an ECF 
campaign; views of 




money from ECF. 
Funding received 
on ECF platforms; 
Funding received 
by prof. investors 
during, before or 
after a campaign; 
ownership 
structure of ECF 
projects. 
(Brown et al., 2017; 
Cumming, Meoli, & 
Vismara, 2019; 
Estrin et al., 2018; 
Hornuf et al., 2018; 
Signori & Vismara, 
2018; Wang, 
Mahmood, Sismeiro, 
& Vulkan, 2019) 
ECF policies and 
regulations 
Industry level Impact of 






















Table 2 Timeline of the main events in the US related to the emergence and legalization of equity crowdfunding 
Date Macroeconomic events Crowdfunding events 
2001  ArtistShare, one of the first internet fundraising platforms for creative activities, has been created. 
2005  Kiva Microfunds, an internet microfinancing platform, has been established. 
2005  Prosper Marketplace, one of the first peer-to-peer lending platforms, has been created. 
2006  The launch of Lending Club – one of the first peer-to-peer lending websites. 
2007-2008 The global financial crisis significantly reduced the supply of funding for entrepreneurs.  
2007-2008 
The winning US Presidential candidate, Barack 
Obama, managed to raise more than $500 million 
online, mostly through small (<$100) 
contributions. 
 
2008  The launch of Indiegogo – one of the leading reward-based crowdfunding platforms. 
2009 The US unemployment rate reaches 10% - the highest number since 1983. 
The launch of Kickstarter – a leading reward-
based crowdfunding platform. 
2009-2011  
A Facebook campaign aimed to buy the Pabst 
Brewing Company collected more than $200 
million in pledges.  
August 
2010  
Three entrepreneurs created the Startup 




Hearings in the House of Representatives 
dedicated to the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding took place. The House ultimately 
approved the Bill. 
June 2011  The Pabst Beer campaign has been shut down by the SEC.  
2011-2012 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act campaign was launched.   
2011-2012 The 2012 US presidential election campaign took place.  
Sep 2011  Equity crowdfunding provision was included in the JOBS Act.  
December 
2011  
The  North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) voiced public opposition to 





The crowdfunding bill was introduced to the 
Senate. Ultimately, it passed the Senate and 
became a part of the Jobs Act. 
2012  
Fundable was founded as one of the first US 
crowdfunding platform, which, to a limited extent, 
supported equity crowdfunding.  
 
Wefunder was established as the first US equity 
crowdfunding platform fully dedicated to equity 
crowdfunding. 
April 2012 Barack Obama signed the JOBS Act into law.  
September 
2013  
The SEC finally eliminated the ban on general 
solicitation. Equity crowdfunding became legal 
for accredited investors. 
May 2016  
Final regulations with respect to equity 
crowdfunding have been adopted. Equity 
crowdfunding became legal for both accredited 
and everyday investors. 
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Table 3 Categories and related coding scheme 
100: Criticism     
 110: Fraud, risk & protection  
  111: Fraud 
  112: Risk 
  113: Investor protection 
114: Other 
 120: Criticism of the idea  
  121: Lack of guidance from professional 
investors 
122: Potentially unproductive 
entrepreneurship 
123: There are better ways to raise 
funding 
124: Putting product above business 
model 
200: Advancing the field 
of entrepreneurship 
  
 210: Spur entrepreneurship 
 
 
211: Community benefits of CF 
  212: Enhance relationship with investors 
  
 





230: Problems with 
entrepreneurship 
 
213: Connection to market 
214: Other 
 
221: New deals for investors  
222: Increased competition for 
traditional investors 
223: New businesses started 
 
231: Fewer businesses started  
232: Regulatory burden 
233: Other 
300: Funding   
 310: Bridge the funding gap 
 
 
311: Providing access to funding 
312: Funding gap 
 320: Supporting lower potential 
ventures 
 
321: Small deals 
322: Small companies 
323: Seed & early stage 
324: Outside of traditional investor scope 
325: Other 
400: Public interest   
 410: Jobs 
 
 
411: New jobs thanks to CF &/or free 
flow of capital 
412: Unemployment  







421: Economic growth thanks to 
CF/flow of capital 
422: Stagnation 
 
431: Turn the general public into 
investors 
432: Empowerment of entrepreneurs 
433: Make finance more meritocratic 
434: Elitism of finance 






Table 4 Coding frequencies, grouped by stakeholder 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  




0.17 0.07 0.04 0.61 0.12 
 
110 Fraud, risk & 
protection 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.69 0.02 
 120 Criticism of the idea 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.56 
200 Advancing the 
field of 
entrepreneurship  
0.31 0.48 0.07 0.04 0.10 
 
210 Spur 
entrepreneurship 0.29 0.58 0.03 0.02 0.08 
 
220 Enhance industry 
dynamics 0.38 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.16 
 
230 Issues with 
entrepreneurship 0.28 0.52 0.07 0.07 0.07 
300 Funding 
 
0.32 0.40 0.07 0.15 0.05 
 
310 Bridge the funding 
gap 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.07 0.03 
 
320 Supporting lower 
potential ventures 0.23 0.40 0.04 0.26 0.08 
400 Public interest  0.41 0.40 0.07 0.02 0.09 
 410 Jobs 0.54 0.28 0.10 0.03 0.05 
 
420 The state of 
economy 0.44 0.41 0.08 0.05 0.03 
 430 Democratization 0.17 0.60 0.02 0.00 0.21 
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Table 5 Summary table with illustrative quotes   
Raw data themes/quotes Higher-order themes 
Aggregate/general 
dimensions 
“There are legitimate concerns that exempting crowdfunding from securities 
regulations would open or expand opportunities for fraud” 
. 
“…and I can tell you your crowdfunding market will cease to exist because the level 
of fraud will simply destroy any confidence of anyone”. 
 
“The thing about crowdfunding is that it brings together unsophisticated issuers with 
unsophisticated investors… What could possibly go wrong?” 
Fraud, risk, and 
protection 
Criticism “By selling equity through crowd funding, an entrepreneur could be stuck with a 
crowd of investors who may not know anything about the market or industry—or 
investing, for that matter—and may bring no other value”. 
 
“For small businesses that don't attract interest from angel investors, there are other 
options available that are better than crowd equity”. 
 
“But what worries me is that by definition almost, crowd funding takes away that 
getting-to-know-you element”. 
Criticism of the 
idea 
“Anyone who is bright, driven, and has a great idea can gather a supportive 
community around himself. Crowdfunding allows that entrepreneur to turn his 
community into a capital source”. 
 
“Crowdfunding will create new opportunities for small businesses to find the 
financing they need to get off the ground, expand and create jobs”. 
 
“Market validation: Crowdfunding on Indiegogo enables entrepreneurs raising money 






“The ones the crowd gets behind and helps succeed will be the ones the VC's will line 
up to help grow. And you know what? In the end, everyone will benefit - the 
entrepreneur, the crowd that supported them and the VC that took them to the next 
level”. 
 
“For those companies with blockbuster potential, crowdfunding alone simply won't 
provide enough money to support high-velocity growth…That means some 
crowdfunded ventures will find their way into the traditional venture capital pipeline”. 
 
“They raised over $24,000 and are now selling their products, creating jobs, and 
obtained investor -- gained interest from VCs”. 
Enhance industry 
dynamics 
“…but the overriding consideration was the current U.S. securities laws would 
present an insurmountable obstacle where a securities regulation in Britain is 
significantly better suited for this type of financial innovation”. 
 
“Our nation's small businesses have suffered disproportionately during the downturn 
and continue to struggle more than their larger counterparts”. 
 
“However, the potential of crowdfunding as a capital formation tool for early stage for 
profit companies has been impeded by uncertainty with respect to whether such 
transactions are subject to the registration requirements of the federal securities laws”. 
Problems with 
entrepreneurship 
“If crowdfunding can finance a candidate's campaign and show a matter of grassroots 
support for what you're trying to achieve, then certainly we should be able to permit 
crowdfunding to empower citizens to invest seed money for American entrepreneurs 
and innovators”. 
 
“So, crowd funding opens up more sources of capital by bringing together 
entrepreneurs who wouldn't ordinarily get financing with investors who wouldn't 
traditionally be investing in -- in startup financing”. 
 
“I believe that crowdfunding could spark a revolution in small business financing and 




“Besides, isn't this the type of innovation we should be encouraging? Unlike exotic 
derivatives and super-fast trading algorithms, crowdfunding generates capital for job-
creating small businesses”. 
 








months, and it is now clear that this new financing mechanism can help strapped 
early-stage ventures, especially social enterprises”. 
 
“…the vast majority of venture and angel funds are reserved for tech companies with 
big growth potential. The result is that far too many entrepreneurs can't start or grow 
their ventures—and can't provide jobs and new products and services to spur our 
economy”.  
“Allowing for an exemption for Crowdfund Investing, which includes prudent 
protections for investors, will spur innovation among your constituents, create jobs, 
increase consumer spending, and reinvigorate our economy”. 
 
“Based on SBA statistics on normal business attrition (closure, merger, sale) times a 
trending growth curve by the U.S. Census Bureau Statistics about Business Size we 
estimate that the 500,000 companies created on CFI platforms over the next 5 years 
have the ability to create the 1.5M net new jobs”. 
 
“The case for the JOBS Act goes like this: Small companies create jobs. The easier it 
is to fund a small company, the more jobs there will be. Federal rules make it harder 
for start-ups to raise capital. Ergo, relax the rules”. 
Jobs 
Public interest 
“I believe our witnesses will convince even the skeptics among us that there is 
enormous potential here for job creation and a stronger, more vibrant economy”. 
 
“And we think the platforms like these can help them overcome that hurdle and be 
absolutely transformative for an economy”.     
 
“Today in the United States, Internet-based crowdfunding is utilized to raise millions 
of dollars for charitable organizations and nonprofits. We should take this experience 
and apply it to growing our economy”. 
The state of the 
economy 
“In today's fast-paced world of innovation and innovators, all Americans, rather than 
just banks and venture capitalists and so-called qualified investors, high net worth 
individuals, should be able to invest in the next Google, Apple, Facebook, their local 
coffee shop, or their favorite beer company”. 
 
“It is important that crowdfunding exist because it democratizes access to start-up 
capital”. 
 
















Toronto Star, The Vancouver Sun, National Post, The Globe and 
Mail, The Gazette, The Calgary Herald, Ottawa Citizen, The 
Leader Post, CBC 
61 
Australia 2011-2014 
The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Australian, ABC, 





The New Zealand Herald, National Business Review, The 
Dominion Post, The Press 
55 
 
Table 7 Overview of government documents  




Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) on equity 
crowdfunding; FCA (Financial Conduct Authority), a Policy Statement, 
and a Consultation Paper on crowdfunding. 
242 
Australia 
Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) on equity 
crowdfunding; Submission of different parties (e.g., The Australian 
Securities Exchange, investors, crowdfunding advisors) in relation to 
CAMAC's Discussion Paper on Crowd Sourced Equity Funding (The 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee). 
368 
Canada 
Submissions regarding CSA Notice 45-311 that includes crowdfunding 
provisions (all jurisdictions except Ontario); Submissions to Ontario 
Securities Commission Consultation “Consideration for New Capital 
Raising Prospectus Exemptions”;  
669 
New Zealand 
Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) on equity  
crowdfunding; 2014/2015 Report of The House of Representatives 
Commerce Committee; New Zealand VC and BA associations 





Table 8 Country-level data  
Source of data Indicators used 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) -Entrepreneurial 
framework conditions 
- Financing for Entrepreneurs 
- Government support and policies 
- Taxes and bureaucracy 
- Governmental Programs 
- Internal Market Openness 
 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) -Entrepreneurial Behavior 
and Attitudes 
- Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity  
- Entrepreneurial Intentions 
- High Status To Successful Entrepreneurs 
- Perceived Opportunities 
- Perceived Capabilities 
- Financial Market Development 
 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) Adult Population Survey 
- Informal Investors Rate 
- Nascent Entrepreneurship Rate 
- Media Attention for Entrepreneurship 
 
WEF Global Competitiveness 
Index 
- Venture Capital Availability 
- Country capacity to retain talent 
- Country capacity to attract talent 
- Financing through a local equity market 
- Nature of competitive advantage 
 
World Bank, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (U.S.) 
- Number of businesses registered 
CB Insights - Statistics on venture capital funding 





Table 9. Overview of main events during the legal acceptance process 
Date United Kingdom Canada Australia New Zealand 
2011 
Crowdcube was established as 
one of the first equity 
crowdfunding platforms in the 
world. 
 
 Financial Markets Conduct 
Bill was introduced to New 
Zealand`s Parliament.  
 
2012 
Seedrs was established as one 
of the first equity 
crowdfunding platforms and 
received approval from the 
regulator.  
Ontario provincial security 
regulators initiate 
consultations with various 
stakeholders on 
“Crowdfunding exemption.” 
First discussions held in the 
Australian Parliament about 
crowdfunding. Regulatory 
changes are not proposed.  
Financial Markets Conduct 
(including equity 
crowdfunding) regulations are 
reviewed by different 
government agencies and 
external stakeholders.  
2013  
Crowdcube received 
regulatory approval from the 
regulator.  
 
Consultations with various 
stakeholders have been 
initiated by the regulator and 
draft regulations have been 
proposed. 
 
Debate on crowdfunding and 
crowdsourcing was held in the 
UK Parliament. 
Selected (e.g., Saskatchewan) 
provincial security regulators 
initiate consultations with 
various stakeholders on 
“Crowdfunding exemption.”  
 
First equity crowdfunding 
exemption has been approved 
in Saskatchewan. 
Australian Corporation and 
Markets Advisory Committee 
(CAMAC) initiated a public 




Specific regulations with 
respect to equity crowdfunding 
and peer-to-peer finance have 
been introduced by the 
regulator after consultations 
with the general public 
Provincial securities regulators 
propose new crowdfunding 
rules to the general public. 
Further discussions regarding 
the legalization of equity 
crowdfunding are held in the 
Australian Parliament.  
 
Based on the results of the 
public inquiry, the CAMAC 
publishes proposals for a 
regulatory framework on 
equity crowdfunding. 
New Zealand’s Financial 
Markets Conduct Act 2013 
(‘the FMC Act’) came into 
force, making equity 
crowdfunding legal for 
licensed platforms.  
 
In August 2014, Snowball 
effect became first New 




Selected provinces have 
adopted multilateral 
harmonized ECF regulations 
(e.g., Manitoba, Ontario, 
Quebec, New Brunswick, and 
Nova Scotia) with Ontario 




Post-implementation review of 
crowdfunding regulation was 
initiated by the regulator.  
Alberta adopted a prospectus 
exemption concerning equity 
crowdfunding. 
  
2017   
Australian Parliaments passes 
The Corporations Amendment 
(Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 
2017, which legalizes equity 




Changes to equity 
crowdfunding have been 
proposed by the regulator. 
 
Crowdcube and Seedrs have 
been named by the Beauhurst 
as the leading UK equity 
investors according to the 
number of deals. Overall, 
these two platforms dominate 
the equity investment 










Table 10 Process of regulatory acceptance of equity crowdfunding   
Country 
Public discourse on ECF 
regulatory reform started 
Initial regulatory acceptance of equity 
crowdfunding 
The United States of America 2011 2012 
The United Kingdom 2011 2011 
Australia  2011 2017 
Canada 2011 2013  





Table 11 Narratives on competitiveness across countries 
Codes Categories Frame 
United Kingdom 
- British global leadership in CF; 
- Need for coherent CF policy; 
- May lose their status due to poor 
regulation. 
British leadership in CF 
Global competition 
- The United States has strangled the baby 
at birth; 
- Lose the opportunity if go down the U.S. 
way. 
U.S. failure to regulate CF 
Canada 
- Be more attractive to entrepreneurs; 
- Adopt similar to other countries policies; 
- Be at the forefront of CF (regulation). 
Ways to be more competitive 
Competitiveness of Canada 
- Mass emigration of entrepreneurs; 
- Red tape; 
- Funding gap. 
Issues that are hurting competitiveness 
Australia 
- Being behind other countries in 
entrepreneurship; 
- Emigration of entrepreneurs to other 
countries; 
- NZ superiority in CF. 
Country issues/problems 
Competitiveness of Australia 
- Stimulate/entrepreneurial ecosystem; 
- CF could make Australia more 
competitive; 
- Adopt similar to other countries CF and 
ENT policies. 
Opportunities (to be more competitive) 
New Zealand 
- Leadership in Asia-Pacific; 
- World leadership in CF, and financial 
regulation in general. 
CF leadership of NZ Competitiveness/leadership of NZ 
Table 12 Coding frequencies, grouped by stakeholder 
Country Criticism Advancing the field of entrepreneurship Funding Public interest Competitiveness 
Australia 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.31 
Canada 0.24 0.16 0.12 0.23 0.25 
New Zealand 0.20 0.31 0.22 0.20 0.08 




                                                 
2  Depending on regulations, this may also refer to “accredited investors”, in other words, investment 
professionals, high-net worth individuals or individuals who receive professional investment advice.  
Table 13       
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Table 14   
Main coding categories with illustrative quotes   
Coding examples Includes following topics Coding category 
 
“Benefits to Kolanot Customers”  
“Does the consumer need your App to pay for 
something?”  
“A few questions around the model and growth” 
“Intermediaries business model” 
“Is your packaging recyclable?” 
“If PayPal Mobile, ApplePay, Qkr and Zapper have 
failed to become ubiquitous, how will you beat them 









Product & model 
 
“Idea regarding brand promotion and conscious 
linking” 
“hi what other participating arenas do you have lined 
up” 
“Route to market” 
“Monza/Revolut Competition?” 
“Competitors Landscape” 




Existence of market 








“Share capital and dividends” 
“High valuation leaves limited prospect for a return for 
investors...” 
“Funding and Valuations” 
“Revenue and profit against projections” 






Revenue and return potential 
Valuation 










Project founders and employees 
Team reputation 
Management of crowdfunding 
campaign 
Gender balance of the team 




“Clarity on 90%+ Funding to date” 
“Funding progress” 
“For a company who’s already raised 20 million, why 
use crowdsourcing to get you over the line?” 
“Why not VC/PE? Why Crowdfunding?” 
“Im suprised you dont offer samples as a reward” 
 
 
Fundraising strategy of a 
campaign 
Previous funding rounds 
Reasons for choosing CF instead 
of other sources of funding 







“My Sincere & Honest View to Genome ‼” 
“Congrats Guy!” 
“Hidden pages and assumptions” 
“Looks good, but lots of questions :-/ 
“The only reason am investing...” 
 







Table 15  
Summary of discussion themes, grouped by campaign stage 

























































Table 16   
T-test of the (in-)equality of distribution of different topics across campaign stages 































Table 17     
Summary statistics     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables min max mean sd 
     
Funding goal 50,000 2,194,000 380,786.848 308,567.739 
Equity offered 0.010 0.456 0.130 0.075 
Pre-money valuation 145,600 104,000,000 6,018,385.30 10,544,955.410 
Campaign duration 6 143 46.507 20.367 
Discussions 0 123 16.266 14.957 
Funds raised 260 5,134,130 444,093.609 625,018.798 
Number of investors 10 3,205 343.645 443.056 
Funding rate 0.001 15.061 1.098 1.187 
Ongoing campaigns 10 150 67.884 20.715 
Competing investments 763,310 46,688,930 13,939,174.446 7,444,484.183 
Product & Model 0 82 8.768 9.596 
Market 0 33 4.536 5.152 
Finance 0 53 9.192 7.995 
Team 0 10 0.822 1.589 
Fundraising strategy 0 54 5.649 7.599 
Other 0 51 3.536 4.468 




Table 18                 
Correlation matrix                  
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) 
Dependent variables  
(1) log (funds raised)  
(2) log (number of inv.) 0.85  
(3) sqrt (funding rate) 0.78 0.79  
Independent variables     
(4) Discussions 0.57 0.69 0.48  
(5) Product & bus. model 0.42 0.52 0.35 0.85  
(6) Market 0.41 0.50 0.38 0.73 0.76  
(7) Finance 0.58 0.65 0.52 0.78 0.52 0.54  
(8) Team 0.28 0.31 0.21 0.49 0.45 0.37 0.41  
(9) Fundraising Strategy 0.50 0.62 0.41 0.82 0.55 0.40 0.67 0.40  
(10) Other 0.34 0.44 0.26 0.75 0.58 0.39 0.41 0.24 0.60  
(11) Ind. classification 1 -0.18 -0.25 -0.17 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.15 0.00 -0.14 0.04  
(12) Ind.classification 2 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12  
(13) Funding goal 0.50 0.39 0.10 0.52 0.37 0.24 0.45 0.28 0.51 0.43 -0.00 0.00  
(14) Pre-money valuation 0.42 0.39 0.21 0.56 0.34 0.20 0.52 0.20 0.57 0.50 0.02 0.02 0.66  
(15) Equity offered -0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.15 -0.39  
(16) Campaign duration 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.21 0.20 -0.05 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.04  
(17) Ongoing campaigns 0.34 0.35 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.65  




Table 19  
Regression coefficients for Model I (funds raised) 











       
Predictors       
Discussions 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.034***    
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)    
Product & Model    0.012 0.003 0.028* 
    (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) 
Market    0.014 0.085** -0.029 
    (0.022) (0.033) (0.029) 
Finance    0.030** 0.011 0.055*** 
    (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
Team    -0.039 0.031 -0.066 
    (0.046) (0.071) (0.063) 
Fundraising Strategy    0.020 0.039 0.019 
    (0.014) (0.025) (0.019) 
Other    -0.000 0.010 0.005 
    (0.024) (0.038) (0.031) 
Campaign-specific 
controls 
      
Industry classif. 1 -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Industry classif. 2 -0.017 -0.020 -0.021 -0.017 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Funding goal 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-money valuation 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity offered 0.270 1.094 0.780 0.774 1.071 1.529 
 (1.008) (1.003) (1.029) (1.013) (1.032) (1.007) 
Campaign duration 0.014*** 0.011** 0.020*** 0.012** 0.019*** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Platform-specific 
controls 
      
Ongoing campaigns 0.011** 0.014*** 0.010** 0.012** 0.011** 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compet. investments -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       
Constant 10.230*** 10.342*** 9.925*** 10.145*** 9.947*** 10.123*** 
 (0.307) (0.317) (0.317) (0.325) (0.321) (0.336) 
       
Observations 269 271 271 272 272 272 
AIC 2.869 2.909 2.920 2.914 2.949 2.924 
BIC -1191 -1192 -1189 -1178 -1168 -1175 
Log likelihood -375.9 -384.2 -385.7 -381.3 -386.1 -382.7 
Scaled deviance 259 261 261 257 257 257 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 20  
Regression coefficients for Model II (number of investors) 











       
Predictors       
Discussions 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.056***    
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)    
Product & Model    0.020** 0.026 0.035*** 
    (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) 
Market    0.007 0.075*** -0.027 
    (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) 
Finance    0.033*** 0.020 0.050*** 
    (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) 
Team    -0.046 0.001 -0.062 
    (0.034) (0.056) (0.049) 
Fundraising Strategy    0.040*** 0.073*** 0.048*** 
    (0.010) (0.020) (0.015) 
Other    0.036** 0.067** 0.033 
    (0.018) (0.030) (0.024) 
Campaign-specific 
controls 
      
Industry classif. 1 -0.053*** -0.066*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.057*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Industry classif. 2 -0.015 -0.022* -0.022* -0.015 -0.021* -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Funding goal 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-money valuation 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity offered 0.581 1.782** 1.188 1.049 1.355* 2.102*** 
 (0.738) (0.789) (0.810) (0.749) (0.815) (0.781) 
Campaign duration 0.005 -0.001 0.014*** 0.003 0.014*** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Platform-specific 
controls 
      
Ongoing campaigns 0.006* 0.011*** 0.004 0.008** 0.005 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Compet. investments 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       
Constant 3.931*** 4.111*** 3.436*** 3.793*** 3.465*** 3.887*** 
 (0.225) (0.249) (0.249) (0.241) (0.254) (0.261) 
       
Observations 269 271 271 272 272 272 
AIC 2.246 2.427 2.442 2.310 2.477 2.417 
BIC -1311 -1295 -1293 -1297 -1271 -1281 
Log likelihood -292 -318.9 -320.9 -299.2 -321.9 -313.7 
Scaled deviance 259 261 261 257 257 257 
Standard errors in parentheses 








Table 21  
Regression coefficients for Model III (funding rate) 











       
Predictors       
Discussions 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.016***    
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)    
Product & Model    0.004 0.001 0.010* 
    (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Market    0.008 0.034*** -0.009 
    (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Finance    0.011** 0.007 0.018*** 
    (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Team    -0.009 0.006 -0.007 
    (0.015) (0.023) (0.020) 
Fundraising Strategy    0.011*** 0.023*** 0.009 
    (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
Other    -0.003 0.001 0.001 
    (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Campaign-specific 
controls 
      
Industry classif. 1 -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Industry classif. 2 -0.008* -0.010** -0.009** -0.008* -0.009* -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Funding goal -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-money valuation 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity offered 0.285 0.643** 0.429 0.453 0.541* 0.768** 
 (0.318) (0.325) (0.327) (0.321) (0.327) (0.327) 
Campaign duration 0.003** 0.002 0.006*** 0.003 0.006*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Platform-specific 
controls 
      
Ongoing campaigns 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Compet. investments -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       
Constant 0.647*** 0.687*** 0.506*** 0.625*** 0.506*** 0.625*** 
 (0.097) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103) (0.102) (0.109) 
       
Observations 269 271 271 272 272 272 
AIC 0.563 0.656 0.629 0.616 0.651 0.674 
BIC -1423 -1434 -1434 -1414 -1413 -1413 
Log likelihood -65.66 -78.89 -75.29 -68.78 -73.50 -76.60 
Scaled deviance 259 261 261 257 257 257 
Standard errors in parentheses 






































Figure 2 Overview of main themes in the discourse 

















• Lack of opportunities for smaller 
investors 
• Problems with banks – 
unfriendly to startups 
• Early stage 
Bridge the funding 
gap 
Funding 
• Unconventional sectors, more 
diverse set of companies 
• Small and early stage deals 




• CF is risky and unpredictable 
• High potential of fraud 
• Regional development/spur ENT 
outside urban centers 
• Economic growth 




Fraud, risk & 
protection 
Criticism 
• Great number of shareholders 
make a company uninvestable 
• Leads to less productive ENT 




Criticism of the 
idea 
• Market testing, exposure, 
concept validation 
• Turn investors into customers 
and advocates – enhance 






the field of 
ENT 
 
• Strengthen positions of 
INV/enhance dynamics for INV 
• Disrupt/enhance banking system 
• Complement BAs and VCs 
Enhance industry 
dynamics 
• Investor sophistication/let 
ordinary people invest 
• More transparency 







Figure 3 Daily discussion frequencies 
 
 
Figure 4 The distribution of discussion topics over the course of campaigns 
 
 
